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   While	  online	  virtual	  worlds	  draw	  increasingly	  wider	  audiences	  of	  players	  and	  scholars	  alike,	  offline	  games	  continue	  to	  evolve	  into	  more	  complex	  and	  socially	  layered	  forms	  as	  well.	  This	  dissertation	  argues	  that	  virtual	  worlds	  need	  not	  exist	  as	  online,	  digital	  environments	  alone	  and	  probes	  three	  genres	  of	  non-­‐digital	  gaming	  for	  evidence	  of	  the	  virtual:	  tabletop	  role-­‐playing	  games,	  murder-­‐mystery	  events,	  and	  localized	  alternate	  reality	  games.	  More	  broadly,	  then,	  this	  dissertation	  is	  about	  deliberate	  make-­‐belief:	  practiced	  by	  adults,	  taken	  seriously	  by	  participants,	  engaged	  with	  for	  long	  hours	  at	  a	  time,	  performed	  in	  public,	  and	  integrated	  into	  everyday	  social	  relationships.	  Drawing	  on	  scholars	  who	  study	  games	  as	  social	  activities	  (McGonigal	  2006,	  Montola	  2012)	  and	  social	  institutions	  (Goffman	  1974,	  Searle	  1995),	  I	  present	  three	  ethnographic	  case	  studies	  that	  illustrate	  how	  complex	  forms	  of	  social	  gaming	  can	  conjure	  and	  sustain	  environments	  best	  understood	  as	  analog	  virtual	  worlds.	  	  Through	  the	  widespread	  use	  of	  mobile	  technologies	  and	  the	  concerted	  efforts	  of	  innovators,	  game	  spaces	  are	  increasingly	  permeating	  our	  everyday	  lives	  on-­‐	  and	  offline.	   This	   dissolving	   boundary	   demands	   anthropologists	   to	   revisit	   questions	   of	  how,	  where,	  and	  with	  whom	  we	  play	  games.	  Dovetailing	  Martin	  Heidegger’s	  notions	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of	  worlding	  and	  poiesis	   to	  the	  semiotics	  of	  C.S.	  Peirce,	  this	  dissertation	  investigates	  how	   new	   forms	   of	   social	   gaming	   demonstrate	   the	   same	   qualities	   of	   shared	  intentionality,	  intersubjectivity,	  and	  performance	  essential	  to	  the	  production	  of	  new	  social	  meaning	  and	  cultural	   forms.	  Following,	   I	   situate	   the	  bold	  ethnographic	   case	  studies	  of	  make-­‐belief	  in	  dialogue	  with	  scholars	  who	  figure	  exclusively	  online	  virtual	  worlds	  (Castronova	  2005,	  Taylor	  2006,	  Boellstorff	  2008)	  and	  argue	  that	  analyzing	  both	  on-­‐	  and	  offline	  virtual	  worlds	  together	  can	  help	  scholars	  better	  understand	  the	  fundamental	  nature	  of	  social	   interaction	  and	  shared	   intentionality,	   those	  everyday	  mechanisms	  that	  both	  sustain	  personal	  relationships	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  maintain	  our	  broadest	  and	  most	  serious	  social	  institutions	  on	  the	  other. 
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 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Not being of “ordinary life” it [play] stands outside the immediate satisfaction of 
wants and appetites, indeed it interrupts the appetitive process. It interpolates 
itself as a temporary activity satisfying in itself and ending there. Such at least is 
the way in which it presents itself to us in the first instance: as an intermezzo, an 
interlude in our daily lives. As a regularly recurring relaxation, however, it 
becomes the accompaniment, the complement, in fact an integral part of life in 
general. It adorns life, amplifies and is to that extent a necessity both for the 
individual—as a life function—and for society by reason of the meaning it 
contains, its significance, its expressive value, its spiritual and social associations, 
in short, as a culture function. The expression of it satisfies all kinds of communal 
ideals. It thus has its place in a sphere superior to the strictly biological process of 
nutrition, reproduction and self-preservation. (Huizinga [1938] 1971: 6)  
I. THE PLAY ELEMENT OF CULTURE 
 
 This dissertation is about play. While easily understood as an activity “out of the 
ordinary,” upon closer reflection, we see that play is one of the most ordinary, pervasive 
activities to comprise everyday life. We hop a crack on the pavement; we opt for colorful 
stationery; we affect an accent when repeating the words of an unliked co-worker; we 
laugh, a lot, even when we are alone. The ways an individual plays can be one of the 
most defining qualities of her personality to friends and acquaintances.  
 Johan Huizinga, a medievalist by affiliation, offers the most thoroughgoing work 
on play to date, Homo Ludens ([1938] 1971). For Huizinga, what begins as the 
inconsequential interlude ends as the sacred, the set apart. Play is a creative force, the 
creative force, behind meaning and thus behind meaningful sociality; and what is a better 
definition of culture than “meaningful sociality?” Following such a vein, this dissertation 
is about the ways that play permeates culture, where it turns up, how we can recognize it. 
More specifically, this dissertation is about deliberate make-believing: practiced by 
adults, taken seriously by participants, engaged with for long hours at a time, performed 
in public, and integrated into everyday social relationships.    
 2 
Introduction of Study 
 While	   online	   virtual	   worlds	   draw	   increasingly	   wider	   audiences	   of	   players	  and	  scholars	  alike,	  offline	  games	  continue	  to	  evolve	  into	  more	  complex	  and	  socially	  layered	  forms	  as	  well.	  This	  dissertation	  argues	  that	  virtual	  worlds	  need	  not	  exist	  as	  online,	  digital	  environments	  alone	  and	  probes	  three	  genres	  of	  non-­‐digital	  gaming	  for	  evidence	   of	   the	   virtual:	   tabletop	   role-­‐playing	   games,	   murder-­‐mystery	   events,	   and	  localized	   alternate	   reality	   games.	   Drawing	   on	   scholars	  who	   study	   games	   as	   social	  activities	   (McGonigal	   2006,	  Montola	   2012)	   and	   social	   institutions	   (Goffman	   1974,	  Searle	  1995),	  I	  present	  three	  ethnographic	  case	  studies	  that	  illustrate	  how	  complex	  forms	   of	   social	   gaming	   can	   conjure	   and	   sustain	   environments	   best	   understood	   as	  analog	  virtual	  worlds.	  	  	   Through the widespread use of mobile technologies and the concerted efforts of 
innovators, game spaces are increasingly permeating our everyday lives. This dissolving 
boundary demands anthropologists to revisit questions of how, where, and with whom we 
play games. My research focuses on two forms of public play: alternate reality gaming 
and the tabletop role-playing game. I argue that studying and situating the mechanisms of 
a deliberate playfulness will help us better understand the fundamental nature of social 
interaction and shared intentionality, those everyday mechanisms that both sustain 
personal relationships on the one hand and maintain our broadest and most serious social 
institutions on the other.  
Ethnography of Virtual Worlds 
 In the summer of 2010, I undertook a fellowship with the Social Science Research 
Council to study virtual worlds under the direction of Tom Boellstorff and Doug Thomas. 
While ethnographic research into virtual worlds did at that time, as it still does today, 
focus solely on massively multiplayer online worlds (see Boellstorff et al. 2012), I 
entered the fellowship with the idea of looking for virtual worlds in offline environments. 
What other ways do humans use technology and design to produce virtual environments 
and virtual experiences? If the virtual is a fundamental part of what makes us human, as 
 3 
scholars in various fields feel comfortable implying to (Boellstorff 2008: 5, 237; 
Massumi 2002: 89–108; Clark 2008; McCormackb), what might this “virtuality” look 
like outside computer-generated environments? What other infrastructures, activities, and 
institutions can present something like a virtual world suited for human inhabitance? 
 My research started with tabletop role-playing games, a genre recognized by the 
iconic title Dungeons & Dragons (Gygax & Arneson 1974). While online virtual worlds 
captivate inhabitants by drawing users into digital environments that both open to and 
resist the human will, tabletop role-playing produces imaginary worlds, shared fantasies 
(Fine 1983), environments constructed only through symbolic language, aesthetic 
performance, material props, and objective procedure. Could the resulting structure 
comprise something more than mere words and fantasy? Could such a game produce an 
environment that both opens to and resists the human will in the same way online virtual 
worlds and their video game cousins seem to? This early research project, which will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, suggested that the unique—and no doubt 
complex—social institution that arises during fantasy role-playing, however ephemeral, 
conjures an experience of worlding similar to that of the massively multiplayer online 
games.  
 Over the following years, I have continued research into tabletop role-playing and 
at the same time broadened the scope of my study to include other genres of gaming, two 
forms of alternate reality game. I pursue the emergence of the virtual across these 
disparate genres in hopes of better understanding the productive force of play writ large 
and the roles imagination, virtuality, and intersubjectivity play in everyday social life. 
The longer I study these forms of gaming, the more I find parallels and analogs 
connecting such organized playfulness to everyday practices of public sociality more 
broadly. I have come to see these genres as more than mere metaphor, and I now find in 
them small societies or small publics of their own.  
 My central methodology relies on the notion of “cultural probes” developed by 
cultural geographer Nigel Thrift (2011). Each of the ethnographic case studies that 
follows hinges on an original game of my own design, a creative probe aimed at 
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leveraging the specific affordances of each genre I came to know. The goal in every case 
is to reach the very limits of the genre and to generate most conclusively and tangibly an 
analog virtual world comparable in as many ways as possible to the environments 
available online. Such games do not contain the virtual but elicit it, and a large portion of 
my research entailed long phases of interactive and experimental design, learning each 
new medium of gaming and working to produce something new within it. I designed each 
game to seek out and test the fundamental mechanisms and affordances of the genre, 
inviting the players themselves to construct their own meanings and goals and 
interpretations.  
 I worked with two other designers from 2011 to 2014 creating Fantaji, a tabletop 
role-playing game that participates in the nascent “story game” movement of the hobby 
while at the same time pushing beyond a narrative focus to incorporate novel forms of 
play within the tabletop genre. The game relies on qualitative traits and open-ended 
translation over constitutive rules and statistics to demand creativity from the players on 
every turn and require each local group of players to develop their own structures and 
systems out of the play.  
 With a handful of other writers, I wrote The Ski Lodge Murder in 2013, a murder-
mystery event that combines role-playing and gaming to elevate the genre above pure 
pageantry and scripted performance. We designed the game to animate the social space of 
the host’s home and provide not a script but an atmosphere. The game remaps the space 
as something else and invites players to generate the connections and meanings that 
interpolate the material elements provided by the game into meaningful activity. The Ski 
Lodge Murder is detailed more closely in Chapter 5.  
 The development of Fancy Bang, a localized alternate reality game, took more 
than a year and produced a sizeable failure before resulting in a workable game. In 
August of 21012, the team of creators and I finally “charged” an environment with 
sufficient materials to conjure a virtual world. We peeled back the genre of the alternate 
reality game to expose its most essential elements and relied on these few mechanisms to 
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create a veneer of the virtual. Accounts of our most successful attempts are covered in 
Chapter 6.  
Taking Play Seriously 
 It seems tantamount to taboo to take make-believe seriously. Erving Goffman 
observes that daydreaming, delighting, desiring can fill hours of every single day, and yet 
we talk about it so little (1974: 52). Where is fantasy given its due in discussions of the 
everyday? While dreams are fetishized as ciphers for our subconscious; daydreams, those 
things consciously and deliberately wished for and thought, go mostly disregarded. 
Daydreaming takes time; delighting engages the body; desiring can burn, brighten, or 
break us. But we relegate such pastimes to the realm of the inconsequential or 
epiphenomenal. Why is something so pervasive so dismissed? We muse constantly; we 
ruminate on old conversations and rehearse revisions; we take the long way home. It is as 
though the very nature of play, so self-aware of its “unseriousness,” resists our taking it 
seriously. Does play elude us on purpose, pleased with itself, tickled with its 
inconsequence? Play is the Jester who goes unnoticed when the King’s bailiff rounds up 
the usual suspects. Play is like Pan.   
The Nature of Play 
 What is the nature of play? Scholars of performance and game studies multiply 
definitions to suit their subjects, but for now we are talking about that fundamental 
something that is recognized locally, in whatever context, as playfulness. As I quoted 
earlier, Huizinga figures play as a necessary, fundamental element of whatever we 
understand as culture. Erving Goffman defines playfulness as a “keying” that turns a strip 
of actual activity into something else (1974: 44). Gregory Bateson sees play—along with 
threats, deceit, and rituals—as something set apart from “ordinary” communication and 
activity (1972: 177–193).  
 That play is “out of the ordinary” makes perfect sense. It is outside the required, 
the necessary, the important: gainful employment is required, being a productive member 
of society is necessary, maintaining a sane and sober mind is important. Then again, in 
 6 
those rare moments of clarity, when the course of “ordinary” life is exposed as so many 
games, so many mazes, as a Rat Race that pits us against our very neighbors—in these 
Zen-like moments of clarity, all of those “ordinary” things seem to be the fundamentally 
optional, unnecessary, unimportant. What inevitably remains for the Taoist sage and the 
Buddhist monk—to say nothing of the hermit and the madman—is play.   
 Admittedly, this use of “ordinary” refers only to social life and social institutions, 
not to the procurement of food, shelter, and safety—biological necessity. But do we 
consider the brute facts of eating and sheltering “ordinary,” per se? Maybe when we eat, 
how we eat, what we eat come to feel ordinary, but I would argue that eating itself resists 
such an evaluation. It seems only the cultural—and only the cultural that is not living up 
to expectations, to promises made, to life in all its liveliness—can be described as 
“ordinary.” The teasing out of what can count as “ordinary” and what counts as “out of 
the ordinary” becomes illuminating questions in a study of play as cultural production.  
Play as Freedom 
 First and foremost for Huizinga, play is free. Ostensibly, play has no 
consequences, risks no failure, demands no cost. When we speak of play, we speak of 
free activity, free movement.   
 C.S. Peirce defines play as “musement,” a mental and emotional freedom perhaps 
best experienced “during a stroll,” a mode of thought that “has no rules, except this very 
law of liberty” (2010: 120). He argues that play is essential to abduction, what he also 
calls retrospection, the process by which unconnected thoughts and experiences can be 
collected and assembled into the logic of argument or narrative. Wrangling disparate 
thoughts and images together to make connections and form an integrated could even be 
taken as the very foundation of meaningfulness. New perspectives and assemblages are 
“tried on,” donned, toyed with. New ideas along with their affordances are tested and 
evaluated through stochastic trial and error (see Bateson 1979: 165). Play as retrospection 
makes possible understanding and insight, both the facts of science and the truths of art.  
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 This freedom underpins a more ontological primacy as well. As the root of 
everything free and ostensibly contingent, play is likewise the root of agency. Play occurs 
every time the individual pulls herself out of the determinism of biological processes and 
does something frivolous and unnecessary. Play qua freedom is the assertion of an I as 
something that is free, some thing that has agency. What at first glance stands for the very 
quintessence of the optional or unnecessary comes to be the basis of free will, a condition 
of possibility for the human. I can choose to stop sniffing about for food, to pause my 
pursuit of sex, to cease going about my business in the ordinary way determined by my 
genes, ontogeny, and environment. Prove it? I can play! But is this freedom necessary? 
For someone who is not a philosopher, not an artist, of what consequence is play?  
 I would suggest that to imagine a life without play is to imagine the most severe 
form of unfreedom. Consider a cosmic judge sentencing someone to a life without play. 
The individual is free to travel, work, socialize, produce—free to go on living however 
she chooses, but anything playful would be forbidden. What would be left? What actions 
would be possible? What does travel look like devoid of playfulness? Socializing? Such a 
sentence would render the individual entirely devoid of agency in any meaningful way. 
And here we see the absolutely fundamental role of play in culture. The plantation, the 
prison, the asylum—whichever institutions prohibit play most completely are the worst.   
 And this may be precisely why the only happiness that Camus’ Sisyphus can find 
occurs at the very moment her turns “back to the rock.” Despite his sentence, he yet 
chooses to bear it. He has at least this agency left to him, this last ounce of play.  
Play as Contest & Presentation 
 But play is more than “free movement.” Huizinga offers two core aspects that 
characterize productive play, that form of play of interest to academic scholarship: 
 
The function of play in the higher forms which concern us here can largely be 
derived from two aspects under which we meet it: as a contest for something or a 
representation of something. These two functions can unite in such a way that the 
game “represents” a contest, or else becomes a contest for the best representation 
of something. (Huizinga [1938] 1971: 13) 
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 This “representation” must not be taken in a linguistic or mediating sense. 
Huizinga figures representation here as “display,” “exhibition,” “performance,” as a 
“realization in appearance.” To represent is to re-present, re-image, to unconceal—before 
an audience of ourselves and whoever else cares to see—what was in one sense already 
there. It is precisely through the action of deliberate re-presentation that the ordinary 
becomes “something different, something more beautiful, or more sublime” (ibid: 14). I 
will call this re-presenting presentation throughout to distinguish playful display from 
commonsense notions of linguistic representation.  
 And beyond re-imaging, play is a contest. Essential as much to make-believe as 
sports, the “something different” that is play makes it somehow harder than ordinary life. 
Often credited to Bernard Suits (1978), an old definition of play denotes a game as an 
“obstacle we volunteer to overcome.” The resolution of such an obstacle would constitute 
both a contest and a presentation. Huizinga figures play as “tense,” and likens it to the 
tension of the sacred ritual. In play, we try to produce or accomplish something, even if 
the accomplishment is only the leaping out of the ordinary, a salmon breaking the surface 
of the water. I will argue that this tension, this risk of failure, is a crucial element of 
meaningful activity. This is the “world—or not” of Bruno Latour (2008: 13), wherein 
each act of presentation succeeds in conjuring a new, fuller world—or not.  
Non-Representational Interventions 
 This dissertation includes ethnographic research of three complex forms of public 
make-believe. I have chosen one of the simplest forms of playfulness (make-believe) and 
located it within three of the most complex social and material contraptions I could—all 
this to investigate how play permeates, and in doing so just might sustain, complicated 
cultural institutions. The formulation of this project itself is an argument, and Section II 
below will present in more detail what is at stake in my use of games and play. Beyond 
these ethnographic and theoretical representations, I have undertaken a corollary task. 
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 I discuss at length in Chapter 2 how Nigel Thrift’s (2008) non-representational 
theory informs my approach to play in general and to tabletop role-playing and alternate 
reality games specifically. In his presentation of Lifeworlds, Inc. (2011), Thrift calls 
social scientists to get out into the world with their theory. Anthropologists, especially, 
have the opportunity to do theory out “in the wild.”1 Thrift suggests that the goals of our 
research should reach beyond packaging nice representations of this or that community, 
that we should reach towards generating “provocative awareness” for those we encounter, 
colleagues as well as subjects. Thrift demands that our experiments be instigating, 
animating, agitating and asks for: 
 
a new means of probing what is going on and instigating new 
behaviours/assemblages. We need, in other words, to invent an art of experiment 
which can up the methodological ante. I am looking, then, for a social science 
which promotes a rewoven empirics which, most particularly, generates the 
quality of provocative awareness. (2011: 8)  
 
He calls these hypothesized arts “cultural probes.” Taking Thrift’s call to arms seriously, 
I present this dissertation alongside a corollary project, the design of the Fantaji Role-
Playing Game, a tabletop role-playing game that seeks to elicit as much meaningful play 
as possible, to privilege regulative over constitutive rules, and to function as a toy as 
much as a game.   
II. CONTEXT FOR STUDY 
 
 In today’s intellectual market, studies of consequential play are likely confined to 
discussions of sports and video games. Both forms of play are backed by billion-dollar 
industries that act to generate and legitimize the attention they gather. Games are hip, 
while mere play is not. And games that generate billions of dollars each year are social 
objects that demand careful study and understanding, while mere play, which boasts of 
                                                
1 This is a phrase I borrow from cognitive anthropologist Edwin Hutchins (1995). His call for 
anthropologists to study processes such as cognition “in the wild” features prominently in this dissertation, 
a chord that will ring throughout. 
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no such economic worth, is childish, silly, unimportant. While I have nothing—or, just a 
little something—against games, I write this to privilege and celebrate play. Playfulness, 
as a fundamental mode of interaction and sociality, demands at least as much study as 
sports and video games. And anthropologists are just the scholars to do it.  
 To be a “gamer” in today’s global North is to be a player of video games, and 
when academics produce knowledge about games “in general,” they more often than not 
study video games to do so. Jaakko Stenros and Annika Waern flag this elevation of 
video games to the unmarked form of gaming and the concomitant focus on video games 
as emblematic of gaming in general as the “digital fallacy” (2011). Scholars of productive 
play—what I will champion as a flickering of poiesis—must challenge this fallacy at 
every turn, especially considering early successes in the academic field of ludology and 
the proliferation of “game labs” on university campuses that study video games 
exclusively.  
 Furthermore, just as much as studies of the industry surrounding professional 
sports, a thoroughgoing analysis of playfulness writ large can situate our world of late-
capitalism, with its endless productions of leisure and dalliance that amount to 
“ultimately unsatisfying worlds” (Thrift 2011: 3). We need better theories of play to 
maintain a critical engagement with these endless productions. What is the current state 
of the culture industry? What are we gaining from the “gamification” of everyday life? Is 
play the same thing as leisure? What is leisure time? Is time money? Is money happiness? 
Etc.  
 Defining games in distinction to play is important. While there is a virtual 
consensus among ludologists in the United States to define a game as “a system in which 
players engage in an artificial conflict, defined by rules, that results in a quantifiable 
outcome” and play as “free movement within a more rigid structure” (Salen and 
Zimmerman 2003), I argue that this definition reduces play to its most sterile function. 
Such definitions preclude the most meaningful entailments of freedom, limit the scope of 
contest to pass-or-fail outcomes, and almost entirely strip presentation from the role of 
the player (figuring it instead as the task of the game designer). Salen and Zimmerman’s 
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definitions are well suited to studying video games, but they foreclose a larger 
conversation among scholars who study other forms of gaming and broader forms of 
play.  
 In response, I hold onto Huizinga’s characterization of play as something akin to 
true poiesis and follow a series of scholars in Northern Europe who underscore the boldly 
social and analog qualities of play (see for example Juul 2005, Frasca 2007, Stenros and 
Waern 2011, Montola 2012). My research also engages scholars who study games in the 
context of narrative (see Ryan 1995; Cover 2010) and those who relate games to worlds 
(McGonigal 2006, 2007; Jenkins 2004, 2006; Montola et al. 2009), and I find this 
scholarship likewise more open to the wider perspective I embrace.  
Games as Social Institutions 
 Following John Searle (1995), I take games as constituting a special kind of social 
institution that participates in the broader social reality. I will take Searle’s definition of a 
social institution as a system or structure that participates in “an objective reality that 
exists in part by human agreement” (ibid: 2). He unpacks through insightful analyses of 
games, legal codes, and language the functions and foundations of social behavior and 
intentionality, building “social reality” from the constitutive formula “X counts as Y in 
Context C” (ibid: 44). He distinguishes these systematic constitutive rules from 
regulative rules, which we might summarize as taking an “If X, then Y” form and 
working on all kinds of behaviors outside the bounds of established contexts.  
 I am interested in the emergence of institutions and the ways entire systems of 
constitutive rules can be couched within ongoing social activity that pivots on regulative 
play. In other words, how and when does a “context C” emerge, elide, evaporate? How 
do we invoke and avoid contexts as necessary? When are systems entered into, and when 
are they suspended? Within a model of games as social institutions and playfulness as a 
kind of shared intentionality, I interpolate Bernard Suits position that 
 
to play a game is to engage in activity directed towards bringing about a specific 
state of affairs, using only means permissible by rules, where the rules prohibit 
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more efficient in favour of less efficient means, and where such rules are accepted 
because they make possible such activity. (1978: 48) 
 
Suits’ definition of games nicely brings together Searle’s focus on games as institutions, 
which operate around a distinction between constitutive and regulative rules, and 
Huizinga’s study of play as the freedom, contest, and presentation of meaningful activity. 
  
 My own experimentation with games also invokes Erving Goffman’s “frame 
analysis” (1959, 1961, 1974), as much to undo what has been done with Goffman in the 
field of games studies already as to present a clear, tidy format for approaching public 
make-believe with an eye to specific mechanisms, behaviors, and objectives.  
III. EXEGESIS OF TITLE: GLOSSARY 
 
 What does a dissertation titled “The Social Poetics of Analog Virtual Worlds: 
Toying With Alternate Realities” hope to address? 
Social Poetics  
 If poetry experiments with “the grammar of unwritten languages,” as the unnamed 
philosopher suggests, then a theory of social poetics would demand an experimentation 
with our broadest sense of what social situations and social interactions might look like. I 
follow Wittgenstein’s admonishment that “philosophy ought only to be written as a 
poetic composition” (1980: 24), and at times I risk purpling prose to maintain this 
standard. Rarely is any good meaning symbolic; that is, rarely does any provocative 
meaning result from a tidy intersection of conventional syntax and semantics. 
Fortunately, everyday language use is rife with other forms of meaning; that is, rarely do 
we speak in utterances reminiscent of VCR instructions.  
 However, even fresh, embodied, creative language has a way of “capturing” its 
speakers inside itself and limiting certain kinds of experience/awareness (Wittgenstein 
1953, 1981). Because of this, language must always be gripped deliberately, held like a 
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rag with so many spots, twisted, wrung out, and used carefully if we expect it to make 
clear more than it mars. I study meaning as both the substance and product of social 
interaction—as creative, bodily, invested, perspectival, tense, often spontaneous, etc. 
Theories of language and meaning will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.   
 Throughout this dissertation, my mobilizing of the term social poetics is less 
concerned with negotiating among deconstructionist, discursivist, and/or social 
constructionist agendas (see discussion in Cunliffe 2008), and I am—in likely an opposite 
footing—more invested in theorizing experiences of meaning-making that figure 
language less as a self-contained system and more as an assemblage of many things that 
are always already integrated within any number of other assemblages, domains, or 
registers apart from the strictly linguistic (see Shotter 1996).  
 That Symbolic meaning participates in a virtual system of grammar, the radical 
materiality of the Icon and Index in Peirce’s semiotics opens up Signs to function as 
operators in the world outside the strictly grammatical and representational. Language 
and meaning are both tangled in social activity; neither floats above in the ether. 
Describing the motivations behind the methods of social poetics, John Shotter suggests 
that: 
 
instead of seeking what might be called representational understandings, such a 
social poetics would be concerned with seeking what we can call relational 
understandings. Where again, it is worth reminding ourselves that we are not 
seeking, as already developed individuals, to discover what something is, but 
different possible ways in which we might relate ourselves to our surroundings—
how to be different in ourselves, how to live in different worlds. (Shotter 1995)  
  
 This usage ties well into my focus on non-representational theory and new 
materialism. Such a usage services a study of gesture, wordplay, affect, and motive. What 
did this just do? What is happening here? Through what specific mechanisms is this 
meaning or that image being produced? I work to trace out the associations, habits, 
twitches, tries, patterns—the little things that people are doing when they are playing.  
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 Echoing Latour’s demanding argument from Reassembling The Social (2005), I 
believe social scientists will continue to come up empty handed unless they study 
material life and activity as a dynamic, productive series of moments. Taking habits, 
norms, laws, rules for granted directly undermines any attempt to understand them. The 
gestures, words, objects, affects, bodies and points of contact that make up everyday life 
do not reveal, illustrate, follow, enact, or point to the Social; they constitute whatever it is 
we could hope to call the Social. There is never need for an appeal to a higher order or 
underlying Structure; the “order of things” is precisely the assemblage of gestures, words, 
objects, etc. themselves. I will continue this conversation in Section II of the next chapter.  
Analog 
 The analog as Index stands in direct contrast to the digital as Symbol. Writing 
against the “digital fallacy” mentioned earlier, I privilege the Indexical over the 
Symbolic, traces and impressions over stand-ins and representations. The analog is a 
testament to nondualist ontologies where the world is always materially present even 
when not physically tangible. This privileging should not be taken in any romantic sense, 
and is on the contrary a move towards a pragmatic, singular world: how symbols are 
things, how information is an object, how bodies bear traces, etc.  
 Building a definition of poiesis around a Peircean model of semiosis cannot help 
but privilege the Indexical and Iconic grounds over the Symbolic. However, I do not 
forego Symbolic meaning entirely, and Peirce certainly opens the Symbolic to material 
processes along with the Iconic and Indexical.  
Virtual 
 Furthering scholarship that situates virtual worlds solely within video games and 
other digital, computer-generated environments, I engage theories that develop “the 
virtual” more broadly, as a potential register of the physical world and everyday life. By 
understanding how explicitly virtual registers are created from and within physical 
environments, social scientists can better theorize so-called “natural” worlds and better 
recognize emergent modes of being and associating in the present. 
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 In his Parables For The Virtual, Brian Massumi (2002) describes virtuality as the 
co-presence of hitherto considered mutually exclusive states. It is the charge in the atom, 
the description that glosses over not a physical entity but a complex super position of 
possibilities. A charge is not physical like a rock or wall, but it is material and part of the 
world. A wave is not a substance, but it is a material entity. Massumi considers such 
material things virtual. The virtual is a potential state of all material things, an excess of 
presence created when the current state opens itself to possible future states. He connects 
the virtual to affect and the body’s ability to prefigure potentials in the present, describing  
 
affect or intensity in the present account is akin to what is called a critical point, 
or a bifurcation point, or a singular point, in chaos theory and the theory of 
dissipative structures. This is the turning point at which a physical system 
paradoxically embodies multiple and normally mutually exclusive potentials, only 
one of which is “selected.” (2002: 32) 
 
That these “turning points” can be figured/found in any moment and that they constitute 
not anomalous states but the very foundation of everyday materiality become central to 
Massumi’s book. This level of tense poiesis, of incomplete meaning, surrounds us.   
 Cultural geographer Derek McCormack (2010b) cites Massumi’s notion of the 
virtual when he describes the wreckage site of a hydrogen balloon expedition as a 
“spectral afterlife: a distributed field of affective materials that circulates through specific 
configurations of object, text, and image.” In 1897, the Swedish Andrée Expedition left 
Danes Island headed towards the North Pole and shortly thereafter disappeared. In 1930, 
the wreckage was found: a scattered field that included photographic film, human 
remains, diaries, and research materials. McCormack uses the “spectral” and “virtual” to 
theorize how this new geography of charged space might best be understood. He clarifies:  
 
The spectral does not refer so much to a realm of spiritual ether floating or 
hovering, wraith-like, above the reassuring solidity of living bodies or actual 
objects. The spectral is, rather, a constitutive element of geographical experience, 
taking place as a persistent and unsettling capacity of place to enchant and haunt. 
(2010b: 642)  
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Explained in this way, studies of spectrality are fundamentality concerned with physical 
presence and absence, with felt but unseen materiality. Furthermore, McCormack posits 
that any space, any environment, has the power to hold such a charge, to be haunted by 
something else. Though different individuals have different experiences at different 
times, there is nothing dismissively subjective about the affects and absences that charge 
places such as Gettysburg, Disneyworld, the ruins of Dresden, or the River Ganges.  
 Such encounters should not be relegated to mere hiccups of “mind over matter,” 
where the knowledge of past events clouds or tricks the mind. Rather, these physical 
places, in their very materiality afford experiences of the past. Moreover, within the space 
of a “charge” the distinction between past and future loses significance. What the present 
contains are others. Mechanical reproduction did not extinguish “aura;” neither could it 
hope to, for aura is not a merely a cultural memory or product of longevity. Objects and 
bodies bear traces of the worlds they inhabit, Indices that remain in the present and speak 
of worlds past. And minds are precisely those things meant to span that gap, the function 
of the assemblage that means to affect from the past a survivable future. It is neither 
science fiction nor religion to make sense of such affective geographies in ongoing social 
science. As we shall see, “mind” happens outside the body (Bateson [1979] 2002, 
Maturana and Varela 1998, Clark 2008); the imbrication of self and environment should 
never be theoretically suspended however easier it makes analysis. 
 That “specific configurations” of “affective materials” could emerge anywhere is 
McCormack’s point, not that they necessarily exist everywhere. The physical world 
affords such configurations, and they cannot be wholly erased. Collections of Indices 
may lie in wait anywhere as an affordance of the specific place awaiting recognition. 
Such a “charge” may, for instance, survive a whitewashing and even collective 
forgetfulness. Imagine taking a black light into an otherwise tidy hotel room: there may 
be “affective material” that retains its power to charge. Of course there is no ghost who 
haunts the area and infects the visitor’s mind with memories, but at any given moment 
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one body or another could recognize a configuration of affective materials and come to 
regard this other moment now made present. 
Virtual Worlds 
 What McCormack describes I would liken to a virtual world, an environment that 
exists in circulation within the Indices that regard it. In this way, a virtual world, though 
characterized by absence, is not smaller or less than the actual, but rather larger, 
encompassing a more expansive horizon of affordances and possibilities. More than an 
imaginary or fictional world, the virtual world has the power to contain, trap, charge, 
compel, excite. It becomes larger than the individual and exists in circulation out atop the 
actual world.  
 While I might go the route of Brian Massumi and in the future explore a broader 
application and investigation of the virtual, in this dissertation I figure virtual worlds by 
delimiting McCormack’s “spectral geography” in two ways. First, I define a virtual world 
as one that is deliberately manufactured through the creation and dissemination of 
fabricated “affective materials.” These materials, insofar as they function as Signs, can be 
digital or physical, on a screen or in the park. Second, a virtual world holds at its core 
some virtual Object that is fundamentally unrealizable. I propose that a virtual world 
demands its inhabitants to don a new ontology, one that expands beyond an everyday 
ontology. This distinguishes virtual worlds from other Possible Worlds that may come to 
exist as “states of affairs” that share the same ontology as the Actual World (see Ryan 
1991). This also, for the time being, disavows any direct intersections with discussions of 
politics, alternative lifestyles, religion, or conspiracy theories; however, I imagine future 
projects will broach such topics by way of the virtual.  
Toying 
 In a discussion of the imbrication of mind, intention, body, and sign, Paul 
Kockelman (2006) figures an “Instrument” within a Peircean paradigm as an artificed 
object (Sign) that fulfills a purpose (Object) when correctly manipulated (Interpretant). 
We can imagine any number of objects being instrumentalized in such a way, whether or 
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not they were designed as such. Crowbars, for instance, have a particular shape that 
affords it to serve expected purposes when articulated sufficiently in the world. Likewise 
wheels, hammers, bowls, and chairs.   
 Building on this work, I theorize a “Toy” as a kind of open-ended Instrument. 
Kockelman’s Instrument is approached with a necessary purpose, and fulfilling a needed 
purpose is precisely what would distinguish the Instrument from a contextually useless 
artifact. In contrast, the toy is approached within a practice of play—within a free but 
tense presentation—to look outward and instigate purposeful use. What the Instrument 
embodies of the agency and intentions of its designer the toy demands of its user. Where 
the instrument contains or preserves meaning insofar as it is designed with specific 
purposes and specific uses in mind, the toy produces meaning insofar as it takes on new 
purposes; indeed, the toy makes possible new purposes and new meanings that could not 
exist if not for the specific affordances of the artifact itself.  
 Of course, an “artificed object” designed for the purpose play would then be one 
kind of Instrument, which I both acknowledge and challenge. By focusing on the process 
more than the artifact itself, I figure “toying” as the activity of instrumentalizing some 
otherwise contextually useless object, utterance, gesture, etc. as a toy. Importantly, toying 
does not produce meaning by way of activating latent or dormant meaning in an object or 
environment; rather, meaning emerges in ongoing negotiation and “riffing” among the 
toy and a community of players. I will explain this further in Chapter 3.  
Alternate Realities 
 The alternate realities of this ethnography come largely in two forms, tabletop 
role-playing and alternate reality games, though I distinguish in practice between “small 
group” and somewhat larger but still “localized” alternate reality games, which leaves us 
with three rough genres. The question at the heart of this dissertation is if, when, and how 
such alternate realities develop into virtual worlds. I will throughout the following 
ethnographic case studies be pushing on the virtual and the imaginary to see what slim 
film separates them.  
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Tabletop Role-Playing 
 Tabletop role-playing games evolved as the direct descendants of Little Wars, a 
game designed by the well-known pacifist H.G. Wells and published in 1913. Little Wars 
used toy soldiers and large pieces of fabricated terrain to recreate historical battles. Wells 
presented his players with a “what if” of grand significance and asked them to take on the 
roles of generals, marching soldiers across fields, choosing targets for the artillery, 
making gambits with cavalry, and rewriting history.  
 As miniatures became more various and detailed, any number of worlds could be 
simulated. By the 1970s, dozens of games had evolved, many involving fantastical battles 
with magic and monsters. While individual units still had certain fixed abilities and rules 
of use, dice had become the central mechanic in arbitrating contests. Would the sniper 
miss his target? How much damage is dealt to the cavalry by the advancing goblins? How 
large a blast would the artillery’s shell produce? Does the fireball that hit the warrior 
damage his armor or leave it intact?   
 Rules for settling the various attacks and gambits with dice began to carry more of 
the weight than the arrangements of the models themselves. For instance, when a sniper 
or wizard became powerful enough, it did not matter where on the table the miniature 
was in relation to its target. When the model of the dragon became powerful enough, it 
could “fly” from any place on the table to another, making the physical relation of the 
tokens on the model less important. These developments in both the content (magical 
heroes) and materials (growing rules precluding the need for models) eventually led to a 
tipping point: the elaborate models and crafted miniatures were no longer necessary. All 
each master player needed was a sheet of paper that delineated the particular powers of 
his or her best hero and a handful of dice, and any duel could be settled without resorting 
to physical models at all. In other words, the pen-and-paper rules had outgrown the 
physical models.  
 In 1974, Gary Gygax and Dave Arneson published a set of rules for players who 
wanted to skip the models all together and get right to being powerful heroes in an 
imaginary world of magic and monsters. Enter Dungeons & Dragons.  
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Alternate Reality Games 
 Alternate reality games incorporate multiple media and live-action game elements 
to elicit intense player involvement in a story that takes place in real-time and evolves 
according to the participants’ responses. Players interact with real-world content and 
characters controlled by the game’s designers and eventually with each other to solve 
plot-based challenges and puzzles in the actual world, challenges and puzzles that 
become part of the interactive narrative. Small games take the form of murder-mystery 
events or dinner theater, and larger games play out like citywide scavenger hunts or 
elaborate global hoaxes. Large-scale alternate reality games can include millions of 
people, and several have been documented doing so.  
 In either case, large or small, participants share information and analyze the 
emerging story together, coordinating and competing in activities to resolve the narrative. 
The experience of an alternate reality game is explicitly designed to blur the line between 
the players’ reality and the virtual world of the game. According to Dave Szulborski, one 
of the most successful ARG designers to date, “In an alternate reality game, the goal is 
not to immerse the player in the artificial world of the game; instead, a successful game 
immerses the world of the game into the everyday existence of the player” (2005a: 31). 
This seems the perfect way to study the virtual as an expansion of the actual world 
towards something else, rather than a reduction of the world into a smaller system or 
structure, which seems to be the function of most proper “games” (see Chapter 3).  
IV. QUESTIONS & METHODS 
 
 Much of my methodology grows directly from my theoretical grounds, which 
have been discussed briefly so far and will be developed and defended in the following 
chapter.  
Hypotheses & Research Questions 
 This dissertation arose from an interest in linking tabletop role-playing games 
with online virtual worlds, to uncover the similarities and explore what cognitive and 
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social affordances—that must be present in everyday life—are particularly leveraged in 
online virtual worlds. When does a game become a world? What do they both share that 
makes them commensurable forms? What holds them apart? 
 Though pioneering anthropological work in the field of virtual worlds has done 
much to explore the sociality that arises in virtual platforms (see Castronova 2005, 2007; 
Taylor 2006; Boellstorff 2008; Pearce 2009), I felt that the divide between the digital and 
the actual was too starkly defined. If social theory works so well when ported to the 
digital platform, what might such theories be missing? In other words, if the first close 
look at online virtual worlds came up with so many similarities between everyday life 
and computer use, I wondered if it may be our theories of everyday life that are lacking. 
Which elements port so easily between the digital and the actual? Which mechanisms 
translate so readily our day-to-day patterns and habits across media? Rather than using 
traditional social theory to explore and explain virtual worlds, maybe the virtual worlds 
can teach us something about our everyday sociality that remains less tangible or 
untouched in contemporary theories.  
 Holding those questions and curiosities in mind, I designed the resulting research 
project to revolve around three escalating clusters of data-driven questions:  
 
1.   How do playful actions, objects, gestures generate meaning? Using the pragmatic 
model of Peirce’s semiosis, how can we trace the meaningfulness of play? What 
moments are meaningful? Where lies the materiality of meaning? How are new 
things presented, represented, conjured, experienced?  
 
2.   What is the nature of the worlds produced within these games? How do the 
fantastic or alternate realities interact with our own? How do players—
consciously or not—navigate two realms? If they do not, and instead experience 
only a single, combined world, how do the overlays and overlaps come to be 
imbricated? What “virtual objects” circulate in our ongoing actual worlds?  
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3.   Where might we see poiesis in different genres of role-playing? While Heidegger 
discusses poiesis only within the context of classical forms of art—painting, 
architecture, sculpture, music—how can new understandings of art expand on his 
thinking? If we can now see how films, food, games, or large-scale events work 
as art, what would poiesis at those levels look like?  
 
By understanding how explicitly fictional worlds are inhabited, how “virtual” registers 
are created from and within physical environments, social scientists can better theorize 
the late-capitalist moment of “gamification” and Nigel Thrift’s Lifeworlds, Inc. We can 
discover new modes of being and associating in the present and uncover the hitherto 
unknown affordances that make such new modes possible. While paying attention to the 
market motivations that spawned—and to a large extent sustain—these entertainment 
worlds, my own approach privileges the everyday lives of players and takes account of 
the affective, cognitive, and social labor undertaken in playing/performing role-playing in 
alternate realities. 
Research Strategy & Methods 
 My research of “analog virtual worlds” entails three different kinds of worlds, or, 
rather, worlds produced by three different modes of make-believe: fantasy role-playing, 
murder-mystery events, and alternate reality games. I felt it necessary to investigate 
multiple forms of worlding to explore as varied and diverse practices of make-believe as 
possible. The focus of my dissertation being these mirage-like re-worldings that work to 
overlay our ongoing actual worlds, I wanted to experience worldings of various scales 
and scopes.  
 I needed to study relatively exceptional games, and not just the games themselves 
but also the playful elements of their execution. This focus on effervescent play and 
ontological labor makes archival research into alternate reality games or tabletop role-
playing games less useful for my work. Orchestrating my own games seemed the best 
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way to get at my research questions, and I designed three original games as part of the 
research process.  
Fantasy Role-playing 
 My research entails participant observation with four central groups of 4-6 gamers 
over the course of two years and culminated in taking three of my informants to the Gen 
Con gaming convention in Indianapolis, IN, in August of 2013. I logged hundreds of 
hours gaming with the groups. Each acted as a focus group, and individual and collective 
semi-structured interviews took place as needed throughout the months I worked with 
each group.  
Small-Group Alternate Reality Games: Murder-Mystery Events 
 As a “small group” alternate reality game, murder-mystery dinners or weekends 
present a localized experience that focuses more on playful “keying” than the large-scale 
games do. While the games function as interactive puzzles and players must compete to 
solve the mystery of a fictional murder, the participants typically know at any given 
moment what the “frame” is, or, in other words, “what it is that is going on here” 
(Goffman 1974).  
 I participated in 13 murder-mystery events between October of 2010 and  
July of 2014, logging over 100 in-game hours. Of these 13 gaming events, I designed and 
hosted seven myself, five of them as iterations the same game in the same location over 
the winter of 2013–2014. The other six consisted of two “dinner theater” events and four 
iterations of the same store-bought MME hosted by an informant. Much like the tabletop 
gaming, these events provided excellent focus groups.  
Localized Alternate Reality Games 
 To have sufficient perspective on and access to the “keying” and “fabricating” of 
an ongoing alternate reality game, I had to design and implement a localized game 
myself. While this game did not have the scope of the million-player ARGs designed by 
Jane McGonigal and Dave Szulborski, I was able to generate fabrications large enough to 
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contain more than 200 players in its final iteration. The game, tenderly referred to as 
Fancy Bang by myself and the other designers, first took place over 11 days during the 
SXSW Interactive and SXSW Music Festivals (March 2012). We asked players to solve 
puzzles, role-play, undertake scavenger hunts, and perform related challenges to uncover 
a narrative that recoded the city of Austin, TX, as a fictional city in the 1920s. It was a 
colossal failure, securing something like 12 players at the cost of almost $3000.  
 However, the failure was illuminating as such, and my group of designers and I 
would build on the experience to create two further iterations. We retooled Fancy Bang 
around the tabletop gaming hobby specifically and later ran weeks-long iterations over 
the Web that culminated in localized four-day events at gaming conventions in August of 
2012 and June of 2013, gaining 80 and 200 players, respectively.  
 Fancy Bang afforded participant observation among the scores or hundreds of 
players, and I gave three lengthy interviews with successful participants of the latter two 
iterations.  
Analysis 
 I interrogate make-believe as a form of play that relies on the pleasurable 
“keying” and the “fabricating” of frames to enchant a player’s experience of real-world 
environments and events. This make-believe is happening explicitly and tangibly out “in 
the wild” and in the actual world, participating in ongoing social relationships without the 
closed or bracketed boundaries that mark typical board and video games. By focusing on 
the “corpus” of cognitive, affective, and social practices required by the players to see 
one world as another, I can tune into the intersection of world-making and meaning-
making. What does it mean to invoke and inhabit an alternate reality in the face of 
otherwise everyday urban events and environments? How do the players feel they are 
creating or shaping their worlds through participating in the game? These questions 
prompted me to employ two central forms of analysis.    
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Peircean Semiotics 
 This dissertation mobilizes the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce to interrogate 
how linguistic and poetic meaning is generated through Sign use. Adapting Paul 
Kockelman’s (2006) figuration of the “instrument” as a physical object that can be seen 
to function as a Sign, I theorize what I call the “toy,” a specific kind of instrument 
designed with affordances that open outward to instigate, agitate, and elicit meaningful 
usage from wielders. Further, eschewing a naïve dualism, I theorize what an imaginary 
toy that embodies imaginary affordances might look like and how such a virtual, or 
“epistemic,” object might operate in the actual world.  
Frame Analysis 
 John Searle must have titled The Construction of Social Reality (1995) in direct 
contrast to Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman’s The Social Construction of Reality 
(1966). The thrust of Searle’s constructionist argument is that “reality” as a meaningful 
construct will always be a social reality. And that is okay. Arguing against those 
philosophers who fetishize the sign—and, thus, the text—Searle posits that it is not that 
discourse creates objective reality, but that anything understood, defined, and 
instrumentalized as much as “reality” seems to be must necessarily be the product of 
social forces and representation. He maintains that there is, of course, an objective world 
out there, but that whatever it is, it is not that thing we so nicely and tidily refer to with 
the word “reality.” In a similar vein as Ian Hacking (1983, 1991), Searle believes that the 
world out there is objective and knowable insofar as we interact with it, regardless of 
theoretical models or representation. Key to my own research is Searle’s philosophical 
assumption that social institutions and social facts emerge through intersubjective 
intentionality, an intentionality that might not precede the individual but surely exists as 
something other or more than an aggregate of preexisting individual intentions. He 
writes:  
 
The idea is that if we intend to do something together, then that consists in the 
fact that I intend to do it in the belief that you also intend to do it; and you intend 
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to do it in the belief that I also intend to do it. And each believes that the other has 
these beliefs, and has these beliefs about these beliefs, and these beliefs about 
these beliefs about these beliefs… […] Collective intentionality is a biologically 
primitive phenomenon that cannot be reduced to or eliminated in favor of 
something else. Every attempt at reducing ‘We intentionality’ to ‘I intentionality’ 
that I have seen is subject to counterexamples. (Searle 1995: 24) 
   
 Taking such intersubjectivity as a given, Erving Goffman (1974) works through 
William James and Gregory Bateson to define his own take on reality and meaning-
making. For Goffman, who remains a self-professed phenomenologist in the tradition of 
Husserl, the social domain is regularly experienced from within projects of meaning and 
is best treated—as far as everyday questions of intention and intelligibility are 
concerned—as the stuff of such a project. Any scientific claims to “reality” are made 
within the Primary Frameworks of the natural sciences, according to Goffman. The 
assumption is that there is of course an objective reality, a clash of forces, a material 
universe, and we can of course learn about this world; however, any such learning—as 
far as any such learning is intelligible and representational in nature—will always be 
social. Goffman’s approach, by explicitly focusing only on how “the social” emerges, 
does not concern itself with the wrestling of reality and representation and instead 
“bridges” the natural and cultural as one experienced world (see Latour 2008: 14).  
 In both cases the social capacities and necessary intersubjectivity of humans are 
taken for granted along with an objective world that persists despite our best efforts to 
cast “reality” over it. Coupling this approach with the semiosis of Peirce, then, allows me 
to trace just how meaningfulness is produced, felt, circulated, and recursively operated 
upon.  
V. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
 
 This dissertation is composed of seven chapters, including the present. While the 
four substantive chapters demonstrate different forms of writing, a single logic connects 
the various chapters even as the objects of study change. Throughout the four substantive 
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chapters, I have distributed auto-ethnographic passages that convey my own experiences 
as a game designer. First proposed as a self-contained chapter, the most demonstrative 
auto-ethnographic moments ended up working better when embedded within the analyses 
of their respective genres.  
The Setup 
 In the first two chapters, I open up “analog virtual worlds” as worthwhile objects 
of study somehow tied to Heidegger’s notion of worlding, Peirce’s semiotic, and Nigel 
Thrift’s non-representational theory. Compelled by Brian Massumi’s (2002) 
conceptualization of “the virtual,” my research purports to locate virtual worlds outside 
popular online, digital worlds and out in everyday life: the virtual “in the wild,” as it 
were.  
The Pivot 
 Written with an eye to eventual stand-alone publication, Chapter 3 marks my 
intervention in the field of game studies. I work through the “digital fallacy” described by 
Stenros and Waern (2011) and note certain limitations to building the discipline around a 
game-as-systems approach. The second half of the chapter features my adaptation of 
Kockelman’s (2006) “instrument” as a “toy” and teases out the careful knot of what it 
might look like to study games—which are undeniably systems of rules—as constituting 
and consisting of toys. This games-as-toys approach maintains that games always look 
outward and operate in the actual world as much as we let them. This unique approach to 
games as open systems of affordances then informs the ethnographic case studies that 
follow.    
 While early work in the field of game studies distinguish between games (ludos) 
and play (paideia), recent syntheses have dovetailed the latter into the former: the 
dominant idea now is that game denotes a system of signs and rules while play denotes 
“free movement” within such a system (Salen and Zimmerman 2003). In some part, I can 
abide these definitions; they are well suited to the study of video games, procedural 
rhetoric, and systems theory. However, a broader notion of play following Johan 
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Huizinga ([1938] 1971) maintains a focus on play as poiesis2, how play participates in 
social and cultural production.  
 Following Huizinga as it does, my characterization figures the kind of “free 
movement” that happens within most games to be play of only the most sterile variety. 
For example, the quintessential moment of play for Salen and Zimmerman might be 
moving a pen through a maze on paper, an unscripted exploration of a very clearly 
defined system. In contrast, a quintessential example of play as poiesis ⁠1 might be looking 
up at the clouds and shouting out recognized shapes and narratives. Following this 
broader scope, my dissertation distinguishes between games (qua systems) and toys (qua 
affordances), which allows me to demonstrate exactly how my understanding of 
play/poiesis expands on dominant notions: you play within a game but with a toy, e.g. 
you play within a maze but with a cloud. It is the specific activities that with entails that 
not only invite analysis but also justify a closer analysis than hitherto given.  
The Payoff 
 Chapters 4 argues that tabletop role-playing games (e.g. Dungeons & Dragons) 
are best seen not simply as games (e.g. poker, football), but as complicated toys (e.g. a 
deck of cards, a football) that offer imaginary affordances. To be sure, the book 
purchased from the store does contain the rules needed to play a game, but the mode of 
play that emerges around the game is what truly characterizes the experience of fantasy 
role-playing. Contrary to broad assumptions about the genre, my research suggests that 
the world of the game is intended to be open to the world around it and only functions 
when this is so.   
 My goal is to turn this chapter into an ethnographic article fit for publication, the 
central subject being the hitherto ignored “meta-game” nature of tabletop role-playing 
and expounding on the implications of seeing tabletop role-playing as producing an 
“analog virtual world” not unlike those offered in popular online, digital games.  
                                                
2 That Heidegger would not consider such frivolous play poiesis bears keeping in mind; however, I use the 
term to distinguish the forms of play that could in the end lead to poiesis from play that takes the form of 
use or activation of a system. 
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 In Chapter 5, I define murder-mystery events as “small group” alternate reality 
games. Almost all previous publications on ARGs take for granted the large-scale worlds 
that rely heavily on the Internet and ubiquitous computing technologies (McGonigal 
2006, Montola et al. 2009). The rare study of less digitally distributed gaming is often 
seen as another, either more traditional or entirely unrelated, form of gaming. There is an 
argument entailed in my choice to speak of murder-mystery events—and similar 
activities such as “capture the flag” or live-action role-playing—as alternate reality 
games. In some ways this follows Markus Montola’s (2012) brilliant formulation of 
social play, though our subjects and ultimate conclusions differ.   
 As the culmination of the previous ethnographic chapters, Chapter 6 theorizes 
how small-scale, or what I call “localized,” alternate reality games offer emblematic 
examples of analog virtual worlds. I describe the events of two iterations of Fancy Bang 
in chronological order and tease out in each escalating encounter how a virtual world 
emerges and circulates among the players. Touching base with three players months after 
the events reveals provocative insights into the possibilities and futures of such localized 
alternate reality games.  
 The final chapter of the dissertation argues that the analyses offered throughout 
the four substantive chapters are immediately germane in other, less “playful” domains. I 
also discuss how my data may defend or refute the notion of a singular “actual,” 
“default,” “base,” or “normal” world upon which virtual worlds build. If there are 
multiple worlds, what are the implications of seeing every individual as a confluence of 
multiple worlds/ontologies rather than a sovereign actor who travels/switches between 
them? Is the individual’s experience of the world always singular, just as our two 
forward-facing eyes produce a singular visual field? I crack open the Lifeworlds, Inc. of 
Thrift and ask how worlds might compete. How are they alternative wholes apart from 
and how modules within the system? 
 I also question what it means to be a designer of games in the face of such facts. 
As creators of fragmented worlds and alternative ontologies, what is our responsibility? 
 30 
What are our goals? Can we make the world better, as McGonigal (2011) and Castronova 
(2007) so boldly argue, in any lasting way?  
VI. THE END OF THE BEGINNING 
 
 This dissertation will move swiftly from the cybernetics of Gregory Bateson, to 
the phenomenology of Erving Goffman, from the assemblage theory of Gilles Deleuze to 
the logical types of Alfred Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, from the actor-network 
theory of Bruno Latour to the semiosis of C.S. Peirce. Some of these will seem like 
strange bedfellows, I confess, maybe even antitheses. However, this collage is not 
arranged to be some kind of aesthetic object or tour de force. Neither do I wish to evince 
naïve eclecticism or share in the dilettante’s love of superficial similarities. Rather, I see 
strands that connect older American traditions of philosophy of science with 
contemporary social theory, and I want to continue on in these earlier projects that have 
in some ways been abandoned. Specifically, I wish to engage those anthropological and 
scientific questions that may have been marginalized in the social sciences during the 
“linguistic turn” of the 1970s.  
  In all cases I am interested in presentation over representation, not out of an 
aversion to Symbolic meaning so much as in aversion to systems that presuppose the 
magical force of Rules, Rationality, or Laws.  
By Way of Foreword 
 This dissertation was difficult to write precisely because such a chore precludes 
play. The research had been done; the experimenting concluded; the Peircean 
retrospection, which resulted in more than 417 pages of thought both raw and refined, 
was getting unruly; and what was left was the janitorial task of tidying things up for 
guests.  
 To write something is to finalize it, to encode it in a single representative image: a 
butterfly pinned behind the glass, a ticket stub kept for nostalgia, a jersey retired. To 
write something down also plays into the myth of media, the fiction that written words 
 31 
are sufficient to share ideas. Plato hated writing for its false claims, its promise to contain 
forever the meaning of spoken words. Where is the dialogue? Where is the collaboration 
from which meaning arises? Are words that are written for all audiences suited for any?  
 While my qualms placed me in good company, it was time to move on. I am sure 
there are other dissertations I could have written, and I apologize if any one of those 
potential dissertations piques your interest more than the document you hold. As it is, I 
believe the scholarship here is solid and illuminating, albeit geared towards my own 
interests; the questions I ask echo the earliest concerns of philosophy and anthropology 
and yet relate to my own beliefs and revolve around my own goals. But here we are. So it 
goes.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 This chapter does not contain a synopsis of literature on “games studies” or 
“virtual worlds” to date. I covered a few notable debates within game studies and offered 
my working definition of virtual worlds in Chapter 1, and in Chapter 3 I will return to the 
topic of games and virtual worlds by way of a theoretical refiguring of toys. Rather, this 
chapter is dedicated to delineating the theoretical foundations and anthropological 
perspective of my current research project, the converging avenues through which I enter 
game studies. Because my work is focused as it is on “alternate realities,” careful 
attention is needed to tease out what “reality” might mean, and so some of the following 
uses technical language. 
 A central feature of my theoretical approach to gaming and alternate realities is a 
directed struggle against cognitivism. Admittedly a broad term, I will in each section 
describe the particular facet of cognitivism tackled therein. There are long traditions of 
scholars who share this struggle, vectors of research that have addressed and attempted to 
debunk cognitivism in a variety of forms. This cognitivism, described by Francisco 
Varela, Thomson, and Eleanor Rosch (1993), is precisely the foundation of the objectivist 
cognition that George Lakoff argues against (1988: 119) and the cognitive 
representationalism criticized in Nigel Thrift’s (2008) non-representational theory (for 
detailed discussion see McCormack 2010a). That each of these projects explicitly indicts 
the same family of cognitive science dominant in the 1970s makes the overlap clear.   
 Furthermore, I would suggest that one particular assumption of this broader 
cognitivism—one that has a much longer provenance in the West—what we might call a 
rather strong ontological dualism is also a familiar if perennial bugbear within 
anthropology. Explicitly combatting this dualism has been the goal of certain projects 
within the at times disparate fields of material (Pedersen 2007), linguistic (Keane 1995, 
2003), biological (Bateson [1979] 2002, Ingold 2000), and social (Strathern 1991, 1999; 
Latour 2008) anthropology. Without a mean spirit or a hungry axe to grind, I situate my 
study in line with these other careful, intentional critiques of cognitivism and ontological 
dualism.  
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 This chapter opens with a summary of cognitivism and then offers one key 
argument against such a view from within cognitive science. I then move forward into 
literature reviews of the three subfields of anthropological literature in which I 
participate: Section II deals with Nigel Thrift’s (2008) non-representational theory and 
several related bodies of scholarship that I believe entail similar means; Section III covers 
my adaptation of the semiotics of C.S. Peirce towards presentation; and Section IV traces 
the work of some anthropologists who have already taken up another, explicitly 
nondualist ontology as inspiration, namely the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger.  
I. CONTRA COGNITIVISM 
 
 Along with Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch, Francisco Varela (1993)3 figures 
cognitivism as the founding paradigm of cognitive science, a hypothesis-come-
presupposition of the earlier cybernetics movements. They write: 
 
Simplifying for the moment, we can say that cognitivism consists in the 
hypothesis that cognition—human cognition included—is the manipulation of 
symbols after the fashion of a digital computer. In other words, cognition is 
mental representation: the mind is thought to operate by manipulating symbols 
that represent features of the world or represent the world as being a certain way 
[…] The central intuition behind cognitivism is that intelligence—human 
intelligence included—so resembles computation in its essential characteristics 
that cognition can actually be defined as computations of symbolic 
representations. (1993: 8, 40) 
 
 What cognitivism accomplished between 1943 and 1953 would make possible the 
birth of the digital computer. By hypothesizing for a moment that human brains operated 
in a particular way, as a device of world-independent symbolic computation, engineers 
were able to “replicate” this assumed functionality in the digital computer. However, as 
                                                
3 In full disclosure, I share with Varela et al. an inkling that Buddhism, particularly Zen Buddhism, 
constitutes the oldest tradition of cognitive science and offers a unique breed of phenomenology, one 
unfettered by the dualism of Husserl and resistant to the common critiques lodged at phenomenology by 
contemporary cognitive science (ibid: 28, for an example of such a critique see Dennett 1991: 45).  
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Varela et al. argue, this instrumental hypothesis was by 1953 taken as a founding truth of 
the nascent fields of cognitive science and Artificial Intelligence robotics (ibid: 38), a 
presupposition which arguably hindered the development of both disciplines long into the 
1980s (see Dreyfus [1972] 1997).  
 While both cognitive science and Artificial Intelligence robotics have developed 
beyond cognitivism in a variety of directions in the twenty years since Varela, 
Thompson, and Rosch’s assertion, cognitivism still remains in academia, having leaked 
into other disciplines concerned with human nature and behavior. In fact, the most 
troubling assumptions of cognitivism may prove more pernicious today, precisely 
because they now exist outside fields of study that possess research methods capable of 
refuting them. Moreover, rather than tucked in technological fields that will at the end of 
the day be held accountable to market demands, cognitivism persists in politicized 
corners of academia that directly affect public policy, most notably psychology, 
economics, public health, and education.  
 And in public culture more broadly, cognitivism pervades “common sense” 
understandings of the human subject, bundled as it is with Modern notions of 
individualism, the rational agent, a referential theory of language, and binary thinking. 
Furthermore, the prevalence of digital computers has established cognitivist-informed 
metaphors within our foundational schemas of understanding.  
 
 Though Varela et al. present a theory of “embodied mind” that addresses the 
pitfalls of cognitivism in its own way, the “extended mind” theory of Andy Clark and 
David Chalmers (1998, Clark 2008) is both more compelling and more up to date. Their 
central difference—a significant divergence—is that while Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 
argue against any and all forms of computational thinking, Clark and Chalmers grant the 
brain computational functions but situate whatever computations might occur within a 
much larger apparatus of brain, body, and world. The latter scholars, then, overcome the 
“brainbound” and “world-independent” limitations of the cognitivists without throwing 
out everything that has comes before. I feel that Clark and Chalmers take new 
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developments within cognitive science into account and build evidence against 
cognitivism without requiring as a first step the outright dismissal of every related 
assumption.  
 I discuss “extended mind” theory at length below because the theory offers the 
best model available for how cognition seems to work and does so from an interactionist 
perspective. That is to say, the approach of Clark and Chalmers begins with successful 
cognition, and from there makes claims inward about neuroscience and outward about 
mind. On the other hand, Varela et al., along with related thinkers such as Humberto 
Maturana, base their arguments on then-cutting-edge neuroscience (which is subject to 
constant revision and redirection) and on a renewed phenomenology of mind, and then 
work inward from both edges to what cognition could/should look like. While I trust 
Varela et alia’s conclusions for the most part, I trust Clark and Chalmers’ approach more.     
The Extended Mind 
 Perhaps the most far-reaching critique of cognitivism comes in a provocative 
article designed to refocus a “hot topic” in cognitive science. Andy Clark and David 
Chalmers (1998) present a theory of “extended mind” to challenge the lingering effects of 
cognitivism and representationalism within their field. The theory suggests that the 
human brain is an opportunist, eagerly pulling outside objects and actors into the 
cognitive apparatus of the human body. Mind, as the body’s self-aware experiencing of 
cognition, becomes not only a point of contact but also a domain of ongoing negotiation 
between body and world, and this negotiation—this mind—can incorporate objects, 
activities, and other bodies into the mix. Clark writes: 
 
What makes us distinctively human is our capacity to continually restructure and 
rebuild our own mental circuitry, courtesy of an empowering web of culture, 
education, technology, and artifacts. Minds like ours are complex, messy, 
contested, permeable, and constantly up for grabs. (Clark 2003: 10) 
  
The negotiation is ongoing, and plays out as much in the cultural and technological 
domains as in the biological. Rather than culture and technology being mere products of 
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human minds, the bits and pieces of culture and technology can be drawn into our 
cognitive processes quite literally. According to Clark and Chalmers, thinking very often 
and quite naturally going on outside the head.  
 For instance, from an “extended mind” perspective, the act of writing is not 
always only a representing or externalizing of thinking that has already happened “in the 
head,” but instead an active, tangible thinking that is happening right there out in the 
world. In the same way, “thinking out loud” by talking to oneself not only results in the 
content of thought being represented out in the world; rather, the sounds and signs that 
are made “out loud” are fed back into the ongoing cognitive loop as new stimuli. Talking 
to oneself might be better seen as the building of a verbal “scaffolding” that the brain can 
instrumentalize as part of an ongoing cognitive process (Clark 2008: 44, 59; see Hutchins 
1995). The human produces images in the mind and out in the world to differently 
instigate herself, to trigger further thoughts and access other subsystems and modules 
within the cognitive apparatus. Just as holding onto a handrail while walking up a flight 
of stairs brings your hands into the locomotive apparatus, language can be used by one 
subsystem of the brain to guide another in a risky task. The cognition is happening at 
least partially outside the head, outside the body even.   
 The summation of extended mind theory is this: “If as we confront some task, a 
part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have 
no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is 
(so we claim) part of the cognitive process” (Clark and Chalmers 1998: 11). In other 
words, if something would be called cognitive if it happened “in the head,” then it is only 
a familiarity bias that makes us reject the more embodied thinkings-through as truly 
cognitive.  
 In a work aimed at a more popular audience, Clark (2003) develops extended 
mind theory to theorize humans as “natural-born cyborgs,” organisms with brains 
specifically evolved to permeate their environments and opportunistically adopt, enlist, 
and co-opt the outside world to perform cognitive labor. His insights can fundamentally 
change how we regard the nature of cognition. 
 37 
 
The line between biological self and technological world was, in fact, never very 
firm. Plasticity and multiplicity are our true constants, and new technologies 
merely dramatize our oldest puzzles (prosthetics and telepresence are just walking 
sticks and shouting, cyberspace is just one more place to be). Human intellectual 
history is, in large part, the tale of this fragile and always unstable frontier. […] 
What the human brain is best at is learning to be a team player in a problem-
solving field populated by an incredible variety of nonbiological props, 
scaffoldings, instruments, and resources. In this way ours are essentially the 
brains of natural-born cyborgs, ever-eager to dovetail their activity to the 
increasingly complex technological envelopes in which they develop, mature, and 
operate. (Clark 2003: 8, 26) 
 
Such a formulation welcomes other scientists into the study cognition and opens the door 
for cross-disciplinary research into where Mind comes from, what it does, and what it 
means. In fact, Gregory Bateson’s ([1979] 2002) definition of Mind suits Clark quite well 
and takes into account the integrated systems that work to embody cognition. Innovative 
work that explicitly cites Andy Clark’s “extended mind” theory has already begun within 
the disciplines of material culture (Pedersen 2007) and new media (Hayles 2005). 
Analogies From Locomotion 
 For Clark, and germane to the cognitive anthropologist, cognition becomes just 
one activity of the body among many. It may be highly complex and hard to envision, but 
not unlike other bodily activities. It is not walled off in its own special realm that only 
one field of experts can speak to. A key insight from decades of research into cognition is 
that our Body–Minds are first and foremost perceiving-locomoting organisms. Cognition 
evolved as one part of a larger system, one tool among many that help us along those 
primary tasks. Before the advent of language, before mathematics, before logic, the 
human organism evolved to be very good at perceiving (according to our particular 
needs/environment) and locomoting (according to our particular needs/environment).   
 Everyday locomotion provides two solid analogies that we can carry with us 
throughout this research, what I might call L1 and L2. Together, they act as take-aways 
from our discussion of cognitive science. Andy Clark has long championed locomotion 
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as a fundamental function of the human organism, thus securing its place as a 
fundamental subject of whatever cognition turns out to be. In characterizing our 
locomoting brains, Clark writes: 
 
It is expert at recognizing patterns, at perception, and at controlling physical 
actions, but is not so well designed (as we’ll see) for complex planning and long, 
intricate, derivations of consequences. It is, to put it bluntly, bad at logic and good 
at Frisbee. (Clark 2003: 5) 
 
And by this Clark means that the “higher order” processes we generally take to define the 
human (logic, mathematics, etc.) are not at all what our brains and bodies are best suited 
to do.4 Humans are perceiving-locomoting machines. All that language and logic we 
prize so highly are still rather new and maybe unexpected developments.   
  
Locomotion is a distributed activity of the body in space, the function of a goal-oriented 
feedback loop composed of at least our major muscle groups, the physical substance of 
our limbs and bodies, the eyes and inner ear, and the environment.  
 
 Much more than a stage upon which locomotion occurs, the environment is an 
operating part of the apparatus. To ask what human locomotion would look like in a 
vacuum—although possibly an intellectual curiosity—would be absurd. According to the 
research of a growing number of cognitive anthropologists (see Hutchins 1995; 
Whitehouse 2000, 2001; Day 2004; Pedersen 2007) and cognitive scientists (see Clark 
2003, 2008; Maturana and Varela 1998; Varela et al. 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1999), 
cognition is a similarly distributed, situated, and embodied activity: it is the function of 
an invested, goal-oriented feedback loop composed of brain, body, and environment. It 
does not happen in a vacuum, in a vat, or without being situated toward a purpose. 
Cognition can be thought of like locomotion, not something that happens in the body but 
                                                
4 For a more Heideggerean formulation of this same idea, maybe more directly relevant to anthropology, 
see Dreyfus 1991. 
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with or by the body. Cognition is happening out “in the world,” within the movements 
and mechanisms of bodies, objects, signs, images, and environments.  
  
Running is not fast walking.  
  
 For the human animal, the activity of running is fundamentally, qualitatively 
different from walking. If one wants to learn about running, she cannot study walking and 
then simply imagine the same mechanisms sped up. This is one of the most significant 
insights in Edwin Hutchins’ (1995) seminal work on cognitive anthropology: cognition 
“in the wild” looks nothing like it does when we “stop to think” about it. Deliberate 
reflection and inner monologue, while useful as “scaffolding,” act as poor emblems of 
cognition in general.  
 In other words, when we want to study inner speech, embodied cognition, socially 
distributed cognition, etc., we cannot spend a moment in quiet reflection, enjoying a span 
of inner monologue, and then presume we know how thinking works. Because our minds 
work one way when we consciously slow them down and “walk” through things with 
words, we need not assume that our normal, “running” mind can be understood as 
nothing more than a faster version of that. However, this fallacy arises in several forms.  
 Taken together, we can see a problem in using models that bracket context or 
process in favor of a mechanical or formal understanding of locomotion. Such a formalist 
fallacy informs several projects that look at language and games as closed systems or take 
social norms as fixed “rules” or “guides” that have force of their own to influence 
behavior. Models and systems can serve a great analytical purpose, but they must not be 
misunderstood for existing “in the wild” when they emerge in the mind of the analyst.  
  It is easier to study language as a self-contained system of meanings and value, 
easier to study objects in essentialist terms, easier to study games as self-contained. We 
may tell ourselves that is only the first step: Let us study games as self-contained systems 
for now, to learn what we can, and then we can try the messy, difficult, knotted approach 
after we have a solid idea of what we are working with. The failure of this ostensibly 
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polite arrangement is, of course, that just about every conclusion we draw from the 
cognitivist approach becomes immediately suspect, seen as so much misinformation, 
when we begin to study the same phenomenon “in the wild.” And I would say that the 
reverse is not true. These are not two equal, complementary approaches to the same 
objects of study; the cognitivist approach precludes knowledge about emergence and 
process.    
II. NON-REPRESENTATIONAL THEORIES 
  
 Ian Hacking (1983) shares a compelling picture of how the divide between reality 
and representation arose historically in the philosophical language of the West, a divide 
then built into the structuring metaphors of language and scientific discovery, into the 
very underpinnings of society’s view of itself. Hacking, echoing Heidegger and 
foreshadowing Latour, warns that this divide cannot be overcome once it occurs, that 
such attempts to suture the two are forever doomed to fail. However, his program is not 
one of resignation. Hacking offers that bridging the two sides can be obviated, 
circumvented, entirely avoided: all we need to do is stop making representations of reality 
and start making useful presentations within reality. Hacking suggests that this is quite 
easy to do, too, since the difference between representation and presentation exists only 
in our minds anyway. Should some of those presentations work like mirrors and give us a 
good vision of reality, great; but they remain presentations, things in the world. 
Presentations work and do, not as symbols of reality but as operators in reality. Theories, 
models, laws—they are “likenesses” that help us explain phenomena only enough to 
intervene and interact with them.  
 I feel the best contemporary scholarship that follows in Hacking’s vein to be the 
non-representational theory within cultural geography. The following treatment hopes to 
bring several trends of movements within the social sciences together by means of this 
shared tone.   
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 Nigel Thrift (2008) describes non-representational theory as a possible overhaul 
of traditional theoretical approaches in the social sciences. He presents a sustained and 
compelling argument as to why scholars might want to step away from the production—
and subsequent gotcha applications—of large-scale representational models that do little 
explaining and more explaining away. He also urges the same scholars to produce new 
kinds of academic work, to explore new ideas for what the resulting stuff of scholarship 
might look like. Non-representational theory, according to Thrift, has seven central 
tenets, each worthy of a small treatment here: 
 
1. An emphasis on movement. For Thrift, the always-moving “onflow” of everyday 
life is the central activity of the human body, evident even in the development of 
our “rhizomatic, acentred brain” (2008: 5). This movement is not just about 
purposive action, but also the many moments of mistakes, missteps, fallings, and 
fumblings (ibid: 16). 
 
2. Attention to the pre-individual level. This register is part of Thrift’s cutting away 
at humanism, which he retains only a sliver of (2008: 5, see also Wylie 2010). For 
Thrift, the cognitive, affective, and playful activities of human life are often 
rooted in processes and moments that are sensed/experienced in several ways 
prior to their being reflected upon in consciousness thought. 
 
3. Focus on practices. Thrift wants to look at actions, making-do’s, and moves that 
make up, along with things and people, a world. More than a retooling of 
Bourdieu’s practice theory, which writes on human action a kind of teleology, this 
focus targets practices constitutive of daily life, what Bruno Latour (2005) might 
calls “modes of associating.” Without neglecting the improvisational (see 
McCormack 2010a), Thrift seeks to make sense of unremarkable experience as 
also generative. 
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4. Focus on “things.” Things go along with people and practices as parts of worlds. 
Thrift includes the human body as a thing, particularly a “tool-being,” that ought 
to be contained within the world of physical stuff with which we humans engage. 
 
5. Being experimental. There is no guarantee in non-representational theory. 
Because no pre-given model is brought to the field, there can be no guaranteed 
pay-off to the scholarly work. New approaches, however planned and rigorous, 
will generate unpredictable outcomes that might not obtain a portable, academic 
reward (see Thrift 2011). Again, play is a crucial part of Thrift’s (non-)paradigm. 
An openness to future states/moves that typifies play, argues Thrift, is exactly 
what is needed for open-ended social science.  
 
6. Attention to affect and sensation. I feel this builds on Thrift’s emphasis on the 
pre-individual. For Thrift, affect and sensation touch on the virtual, a register of 
potentiality and present-ness (see Massumi 2002, McCormack 2010b). This 
register of the virtual exists for Thrift as “multiple registers of sensation operating 
beyond the reach of the reading techniques on which the social sciences are 
founded” (2008: 12).  
 
7. Foregrounding of space. Coming from cultural geography, Thrift emphasizes the 
brute fact of space as an important element of human life—and one of the trickiest 
elements to experience and experiment within non-representationally. He writes, 
“This is a sense of the concreteness and materiality of the situation which is hard 
to put into words, a need to capture being there which is not just a report back – a 
finding which is also a leaving” (ibid: 16).  
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 The proper objects of such a non-representational theory are precisely worlds,5 
which must be seen as both the assemblages that emerge from everyday living—of 
things, movements, spaces, practices, affects, and sensations—and, at the same time, the 
felt order or logic that these assemblages seem to imply.6 Each world is a something 
caught in the act of moving and changing, apprehended by the researcher only in part and 
experienced only through intervention (see McCormack 2010a), what might be more 
poetically grasped as a worlding. While the individual is at once part of and caught within 
a world, the world is also encountered as an object insofar as it resists the human will. 
The exact nature of a worlding, then, is something still open and still worthy of study.  
 While Heidegger, as we shall see, figures the worlding of history as a monolithic 
process shared by the entire human species, I do not feel it without precedent in a post-
structuralist age to borrow his notion while multiplying its instances. This sense of 
worlding and the arresting moments of poiesis are precisely what my dissertation hopes 
to address by questioning what roles fantasy, fiction, and the imagination might play in 
the process.  
Cultural Geography 
 John Wylie (2010) discusses two aversions manifest in Thrift’s non-
representational theory, arranging non-representational theory in opposition to the tenets 
of humanism on the one hand and to language-based “social construction” theories on the 
other. Wylie finds that resistance to non-representational theories often stems from the 
ubiquitous, unquestioned commitment to “an undisturbed humanism.” He continues, “I 
mean by this the persistence of beliefs in the inviolate, coherent and given existence of a 
free-standing ‘creative’ subject—an undisturbed ‘I’ who feels, speaks, expresses and so 
on” (2010: 102). Wylie shares how his attempts to communicate the careful 
experiment/experience of rigorous non-representational theory are somehow taken up as 
                                                
5 The idea of “worlds” is tricky, and the term will be mobilized by myself in a particular way not precisely 
as Thrift uses it here but not at odds either. See my discussion in Section IV. 
6 My formulation of worlding in Section IV will hold these two views of world in tension as two sides of 
the ongoing ontologizing any organism experiences. 
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calls toward creative self-expression. The humanist subject proves difficult to supplant 
and stands directly against what Wylie calls the “affective ethos” of non-representational 
theory.  
 In terms of the second aversion, Wylie argues that Thrift “heralds a move away 
from, perhaps even a rejection of, the discursive cultural politics of identity and 
representation that characterized cultural geography in the early 1990s…” (2010: 103). 
Anthropologists will be familiar with such politics also, and Wylie finds in non-
representational theory a method for addressing a world in bodily, active terms, 
circumventing the traditional reliance on language-as-meaning and language-based 
philosophy.  
 Derek McCormack (2010a) likens Thrift’s overall project to the intuitions of 
earlier scholars from a range of traditions, citing the work of John Dewey, William 
James, Alfred North Whitehead, Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guatarri. His own adventure 
in non-representational theory led him to a series of experimental academic workshops 
and public art events. Following Wylie, McCormack sees the two crucial moves for non-
representational theories as turns away from humanism and from “versions of social 
constructionism in which world is conjured into being through the performative effect of 
discourse” (ibid: 202).  
 From American pragmatism, McCormack focuses on how the individual must 
think and learn throughout ongoing experience, ongoing life. He equates learning to how 
one finds “different ways of being in and of the movement of things” (Dewey 1981:91, 
qtd. in McCormack 2010a: 205). Towards his own work, McCormack borrows 
Whitehead’s formulation of “experiment,” which echoes the French usage and conflates 
“experiment” and “experience” into one act. Ongoing life must become an experiment in 
the midst of being, a virtual trying on of new modes and movements. This kind of 
experimentation can—and needs to—happen anywhere. McCormack offers that “at any 
given point something might happen to force us to think, to create new lines of thought, 
to allow us to sense the genesis in affirmation of the moving midst of things […] The 
sense of the world is as virtual as it is actual in any given occasion” (ibid: 206). This 
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virtual is the “more” and “and” of James and Dewey, an excess of world that is in the 
open possibilities being experimented with in the present. As in Peirce’s retrospection, 
ideas and affects are held in the mind and fit together, toyed with, lined up to see where 
the edges might fit. It is a trial-and-error attitude that plays with new possibilities.   
 McCormack is also quick to point out that there is no guarantee any of these 
experiments will turn out useful results. The workshops he attended, starting with 
Dancing the Virtual in Montreal in 2006, led to good work for some and little of value to 
others. This is like the tension of Huizinga’s play and the “worlds—or not” of Latour’s 
(2008) actor-network theory.  
Lifeworlds, Inc. 
 In one such foray into non-representational theory, Thrift (2011) presents a 
striking analysis of self-surveillance technologies that engender what he calls a “security-
entertainment complex” present in the global North, an assemblage of market and 
military technologies that works to dislocate and reassemble everyday life as a 
phantasmagoria of incomplete, ultimately unsatisfying worlds. He dubs this ubiquitous 
cultural machine “Lifeworlds, Inc.” and addresses several technosocial movements that 
engender and sustain the processes of multiplying worlds.  
 For Thrift, at least as far as everyday life in the modern North and West is 
concerned, “there is no world that is somehow more complete, in other words, but rather 
a series of incompletes” (2011: 6).These worlds emerge as manufactured systems of 
significance and relating, systems that generate affect and pull bodies into motion, tuning 
those caught in the movements towards behaviors—potentially purchasing and valuing 
behaviors, yes, though not necessarily malignant or dominating—intimated in the 
machine.   
 Exactly how does one world float atop another? In what situations do they come 
into contact? Compete? To experience everyday life, then, the researcher 
invokes/evokes/provokes an intentionally incomplete world. It would take a careful 
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analysis of moments and mechanisms to tease out how these worlds emerge and what 
individuals might feel like in their centers, at their peripheries.  
Actor-Network Theory 
 Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory parallels Thrift’s concern with social 
scientists making their work about explaining and translating phenomena through 
normative theoretical grids rather than taking seriously/fully what is already happening. 
In Reassembling the Social (2005), Latour positions the term “Social” as a kind of 
chimaera, a false substance that offers no explanations and instead requires them. He 
laments:  
 
ANT scholars are mainly defined as those who have drawn, from the thirty odd 
years of sociology of science, a completely different conclusion than those of 
their best and closest colleagues. Whereas the latter have decided that social 
theory works even on science, we have concluded that, overall and in the details, 
social theory has failed on science so radically that it’s safe to postulate that it had 
always failed elsewhere as well. (ibid: 92, italics in original) 
 
The Social cannot be used to explain anything, says Latour, and instead it must itself be 
explained. Moreover, that is precisely what a social scientist is charged with doing. How 
is something social? What does sociality look like here? How are actors coming together 
and associating? He writes, “A good account will perform the social in the precise sense 
that some of the participants in the action—through the controversial agency of the 
author—will be assembled in such a way that they can be collected together” (ibid: 138). 
This account is the network, a description of an organic trail of significance from one 
mediator to another. In a very real way, the network traced is an Interpretant that figures a 
chain of Signs all getting at some virtual Object that promises to be The Social.  
 Thrift (2008) is generous with his reading of Latour and draws many similarities 
between actor-network theory and his own strain of non-representational theory. I see the 
projects overlapping in key areas as well and hope to follow insights from both 
trajectories.  
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Science as Intervention  
 Ian Hacking offers a serious critique of naive representationalism in his book 
Representing and Intervening (1983). Dissecting generations of philosophical positions, 
Hacking argues that Western philosophy has long been too obsessed with representation 
when discussing reality. His account (extended in Hacking 1999 against “social 
constructionist” theories) is a defense of natural scientists as scientists, not philosophers. 
Hacking distrusts much of what philosophers, who are generally not laboratory scientists, 
have to say in defense or critique of science.  The central push of the book is that 
representing and intervening are two different enterprises, and that scientists are more 
often than not content with intervening.  
 It might sound ridiculous to an STS scholar, but Hacking does a compelling job 
presenting the work of natural scientists as a kind of non-representational theory. He 
writes: 
 
We will have models and theory sketches […] No one thinks that one of these is 
the whole truth, and they may be mutually inconsistent. They are intellectual tools 
that help us understand phenomena and build bits and pieces of experimental 
technology. They enable us to intervene in processes and to create new and 
hitherto unimagined phenomena. But what is actually ‘making things happen’ is 
not the set of laws, or true laws. There are no exactly true laws to make anything 
happen. It is the electron and its ilk that is producing the effects. The electrons are 
real, they produce effects. (1983: 37-38) 
 
The theories of science, argues Hacking, are not for producing large-scale representations 
and models, but should instead be seen as heuristic tools for building physical 
technologies and aiding in future interventions. Representations, or “likenesses,” are used 
only to produce more probes and more material phenomena, not to answer theoretical 
questions about what is real. If the doctor describes his hand as an organ of flesh and 
bones and skin, Hacking asks, is he less right than a physicist describing the same hand 
as a cloud of atoms? What does arguing over representations matter to the actual world? 
The goal of science for Hacking is experimental tinkering with the world, and the 
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doctor’s model could be just as right as the physicist’s depending on its usefulness. No 
model, no likeness, is real; it is a conjecture useful or not.  
 Hacking continues, “Most scientists are fairly humble about their work, which 
they gladly admit is a string of tentative conjectures, temperamental apparatuses, and 
nervous results” (1999: 94). I would agree. I have never had such a hard time changing 
the mind of a chemist or physicist about his or her work as I have that of a social 
scientist. That is to say, following Hacking’s “diagnosis,” that I feel those who deal in 
representations tend to be more touchy about how their work gets represented than those 
who deal in intervening.    
 In the lines as much as between them, I see Hacking addressing foes surprisingly 
similar to those of Thrift. While Hacking at face value seems to have little in common 
with social scientists, his project sits against representationalism as a whole, which had 
become the dominant voice among social scientists long before 1983. Even his treatment 
of Latour is generous (1999: 39-41, 65), and Hacking seems genuinely confused—as was 
Latour (2005: 94)—with how Latour’s work was taken up by self-proclaimed “social 
constructionists.” 
 The observations of Latour and Woolgar’s collaborative work, says Hacking, 
address quite well one side of science, the “processes of laboratory labor.” In defense of 
Latour and Woolgar, Hacking writes, “The pursuit of truth and reason will doubtless be 
organized according to the same social formulae as other pursuits such as happiness or 
genocide. The fact that scientists are people, and that scientific societies are societies, 
does not cast doubt, yet, upon scientific rationality.” (1983: 11). He gives Latour all the 
room needed to perform studies of laboratory labor and societies of scientists, and even 
welcomes more historical accounts of scientific discovery, admitting that textbooks—the 
most predominant source of scientific knowledge for the public—present too tidy a 
picture.  
 But what of the other side of science, what Hacking coins the “assemblage of 
knowledge produced?” Surely the systems, models, maps, and diagrams of natural 
science constitute exactly what Thrift is averse to. But, as we have already seen, 
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knowledge for Hacking is not representational at all; it is technological and use-oriented, 
geared towards more intervening. What Hacking is truly critiquing in Representing and 
Intervening is representational philosophy about the assemblages of knowledge produced 
by science. Speaking of Hilary Putnam, Hacking writes: “His is a philosophy founded 
upon reflections on language, and no such philosophy can teach anything positive about 
natural science” (Hacking 1983: 92). Representations accrue at the edge of natural 
science as scaffolding for future discoveries but are not what motivate or define the work 
of the scientist for Hacking.   
 Intervention is the production of new spaces, new phenomena, new moments. 
Representing, on the other hand, is a play of metaphor and language (see Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980/2003). The fact that scientists must take part in representation does not 
detract from the fact that everyday “normal science” (to borrow Kuhn’s term) is about 
intervention, experiment, problem-solving, and a little bit of creativity.  
 Granted, this is one particular view of natural science, a view coming from a 
philosopher of science no less. But I find Hacking’s insistence on intervention as the stuff 
of science and his thorough dismantling of several strains of representational philosophy 
trenchant and convincing. Others may not, but my broader point is that non-
representational theories may have more (and stranger) bedfellows than initially 
imagined.  
Philosophy Beyond Representationalism 
 For Ian Hacking, philosophy not natural science is the representational theory par 
excellence, but philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy (1997) opens up the idea of sense to new 
scrutiny, exploring what meaning means and how the various levels of reality, symbol, 
feeling, and idea intermingle (see also Stewart 2011). When does sense-as-perception 
become sense-as-meaning? How and in what ways does a thing felt become a thing that 
means? And what about those things that do not mean anything, things that resist 
meaning and instead do things, are things, generate things? I feel Nancy smudges the 
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border between object and meaning, making the act of signifying a lateral rather than 
vertical move.   
Material Culture 
 Daniel Miller (2005, 2008) focuses on how humans attach to and think through 
objects. His project is explicitly nondualist and non-representational, and Miller avoids 
the pitfalls of Gell (1998), who uses material culture as a replacement or transparent 
bearer of symbolic meaning.7  
 In an interesting online debate that grew from Miller’s (2007) review of Thinking 
Through Things (Henare et al. 2007), Miller and Martin Holbraad discuss the field of 
material culture and its relationship to social anthropology. Early in the exchange, 
Holbraad accuses Miller of a latent dualism, citing the latter’s distinction between 
“world” and “worldview” from his introductory chapter in Thinking Through Things. In 
response Miller offers a useful reminder to anyone pursuing non-representational 
theories: 
 
[The] colloquial world of everyday speech constantly affirms a dualist 
representation of the world with many terms for things and materials, and I think 
we have to respect that also. Otherwise we lose our power to even speak to others 
in a way that still communicates and can be understood and we also appear to 
repudiate the understandings of whole populations. The trick is to recognise the 
register of perception from philosophical transcendence to everyday dualism. 
(Miller 2007, materialculture.org blog) 
  
I feel that Miller is right to defend representative language in academic work and 
everyday speech from claims of representationalism or dualism. Miller has no motive to 
“repudiate” understandings and institutions that rely on representations. That language, 
art, physics, or photography can be said to represent is not in itself the problem. That a 
scholar uses symbols at all or writes descriptive accounts, e.g. in ethnography, does not 
                                                
7 What Latour (2005) would call an intermediary rather than a mediator. 
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belie her focus on and dedication to nondualist, non-representational theories “in the 
wild.”  
Aesthetics & Performance 
 Jacques Rancière (2004) proposes that aesthetic practices can agitate or reshape a 
“distribution of the sensible,” rearranging the felt world of a society. He writes: 
 
I call the distribution of the sensible the system of self-evident facts of sense 
perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common 
and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it […] 
This apportionment of parts and positions is based on a distribution of spaces, 
times, and forms of activity that determines the very manner in which something 
in common lends itself to participation and in what way various individuals have 
a part in this distribution […] The distribution of the sensible reveals who can 
have a share in what is common to the community based on what they do and on 
the time and space in which this activity is performed. (2004: 12) 
 
I believe this argument to be a robust musing on the kinds of “practices” also introduced 
by Thrift (2011) as “cultural probes.” Such practices do not simply address the world, but 
intervene in a political way, shifting and tweaking exactly what kind of world can be said 
to exist. Rancière’s aesthetic practices “are ‘ways of doing and making’ that intervene in 
the general distribution of ways of doing and making as well as in the relationships they 
maintain to modes of being and forms of visibility” (2004: 13).  
 If connecting Rancière’s admittedly fanciful discussions of aesthetic practices to 
Thrift’s probes seems a stretch at first, Rancière can be seen to share the cultural 
geographers’ hesitation to allow a representing subject an objective perspective from 
which to map or model the world: 
 
I always try to think in terms of horizontal distributions, combinations between 
systems of possibilities, not in terms of surface and substratum. Where one 
searches for the hidden beneath the apparent, a position of mastery is established. 
I have tried to conceive of a topography that does not presuppose this position of 
mastery. It is possible, from any given point, to try to reconstruct the conceptual 
network that makes it possible to conceive of a statement, that causes a painting 
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or a piece of music to make an impression, that causes reality to appear 
transformable or inalterable. (2004: 49) 
 
These aesthetic practices work in a world of motion and horizontal attachments. There is 
no outside perspective from which to act, and practices shape the world more than simply 
participate in it. His purpose and his language echo Sloterdijk’s argument that there is no 
natural space from which to view the globe (2009: 34). The globular earth, argues 
Sloterdijk, is a philosophical invention, a representation made with the aim of mastery 
and domination.   
 I find the practices of Rancière a helpful picture of what non-representational 
theory can look like politically; and just as Thrift calls for intervention in the moment of 
Lifeworlds, Inc., Rancière likewise calls for political action to change current modes of 
being within a heavily policed society.  
Movement & Space 
 Another move away from representational thinking highlights the political effects 
of aesthetic performance and comes from studies of space and rhythm, foci explicitly in 
tune with Thrift’s central tenets. Michel de Certeau (1984) opens up a way of looking at 
space and everyday life that is not aimed at recovering or decoding meaning, but instead 
at tracing how habit, interaction, and use make space what it is. He explores how a city is 
opened up as one walks through it, privileging the route of the pedestrian as a critical 
intervention in the state-planned character and space of the city. He asks: How is 
something inhabitable, and it what ways is it then inhabited? De Certeau’s focus on 
small, personal practices in navigating and sustaining a space underlines the greater scope 
of his work, the agency of the navigator.  
 De Certeau’s work becomes a kind of “reader response theory” for lived space. 
He separates practices from tactics; the former being an intended use of the space, while 
by the latter he means some kind of oblique or diagonal use of the space. Cultural 
Geographer Cameron Duff (2010) faults de Certeau for relying too heavily on linguistic 
models and walking as “speech,” offering Edward Casey’s notion of “thick” places to 
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refocus pedestrian meaning-making in affective terms. This seems a fair critique of de 
Certeau, though I feel that his project and the project of Casey do not overlap as evenly as 
Duff suggests. While Casey is concerned with affect, belonging, and identity, de Certeau 
seems to me to be more focused on political actions that do in some ways communicate 
or signify, even if only to the walker herself. In either case, we can imagine the flaneur 
walking his city with a sense of toying or playfulness.  
 Henri Lefebvre (1991) also makes of space something worth studying and 
discussing outside the realm of signification. In a later work, Lefebvre (2004) offers 
another way of studying spaces apart from what they mean or signify. Rhythmanalysis is 
a way of describing the movements, fluctuations, and patterns of motion without reducing 
all of bodies in space to some underlying meaning or symbolic dimension. The real 
potency of this work, I feel, comes from its insistence on making of the rhythms and 
patterns nothing more than what they are. The goal is to describe them, not to explain 
them.  
III. SEMIOSIS AS PRESENTATION 
 
 Ferdinand de Saussure, the father of structural linguistics and the root of what 
would inspire structuralism in the social sciences, developed a seminal definition of the 
sign that thoroughly dressed down the older “referential theory” of language. We can say 
that a referential theory of language holds the belief that any given word will necessarily 
refer to a specific object in the world. The “meaning” of a word is then the 
corresponding, real-world object to which it applies. A popular historical instance of this 
view can be seen in the book of Genesis, where Adam “names” the animals and by 
extension establishes a word/name for each thing/object in existence. Now, because 
humans are rational creatures and live in worlds of abstractions, there are certain abstract 
“things” that need names too: freedom, love, victory, etc. These things exist in the world 
albeit abstractly, and a referential theory of language affords heated argumentation over 
semantics, as any longstanding theory would need to. It sounds well and good, but 
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referential theories developed several tricky consequences, maybe epitomized in certain 
kinds of magical thinking wherein learning the name of an object grants power over it. 
 Saussure’s theory of structural linguistics refutes referential theories of language 
with a two-prong approach. Again, in simple terms, Saussure offers that: (1) a sign 
consists of a signifier (signal image or sound) and a signified (its meaning), and the 
relationship between this sound/image and its meaning is arbitrary; and (2) the value of 
any given sign results not only from the one-to-one, signifier–signified relationship but 
from that relationship’s participation within a larger system of other arbitrary signs that 
mean related things, thus rendering the conceptual world of meanings not necessarily 
attached point-by-point to things/objects in the world. What results is a world of objects, 
bodies, and images on one side and a detached world of meaning, value, and concepts on 
the other: textbook dualism.      
A Critique of Saussure 
 Such a theory of language leaves out the actual world. In moving beyond a 
referential theory of language, his account of signifiers and signifieds now precludes a 
way for signs to point toward an object in the world. Moreover, there is no way to speak 
of the operation of signs, how signs produce meaning for an observer. The real-world 
context of speech is less important to Saussure than the grammar of signs that allows for 
relational value to be recognized. As Paul Kockelman puts it, “Saussure’s theory has 
fewer dimensions than the processes it attempts to theorize” (2006: 84). That third 
dimension of actual life, world, is also the dimension of process and interaction. Webb 
Keane notes this lacking dimension as well. He opens his essay on semiotic ideology 
with a question:  
 
Have we even now escaped the ontological division of the world into ‘spirit’ and 
‘matter’? To be sure, social analysts may no longer feel themselves forced to 
chose between ‘symbolic’ and ‘materialist’ approaches […] Yet some version of 
that opposition seems to persist in more or less covert forms (2003: 409).  
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Philosopher Susan Blackmore (2005) names the same pernicious binary “the vestiges of 
Cartesian dualism” and traces the lineage all the way back to Plato in the Western 
tradition. Closer to home, other anthropologists tackle the same pervasive dualism under 
various names.  
 Tim Ingold (2000) characterizes what he calls the “complementary fallacy,” a 
widespread academic practice of studying human life as though it consisted of two 
disparate yet complementary worlds, the biological (matter) and the social (spirit). 
Anthropologists, he argues, have acclimated to this division and stick to one world 
without making claims about the other. There forms a kind mutual disregard between the 
“hard” scientists and the “soft” scientists; of course, a mutual disregard may at times feel 
more like a cold war to those near the borders. What Ingold calls for is a singular vision 
of the human, as at once organism and individual, a vision capable of giving the 
biological scientist and the cultural anthropologist a commensurable language.  
 Bruno Latour (2008) argues vividly against bifurcating reality into two opposing 
realms, the cultural and the natural, with “meaning” on one side and “world” on the other. 
The staunchly objectivist view, held by the Natural side, holds that only matter and 
physical Laws exist, considering the proliferation of social scientific theories as so much 
nonsense, nothing but aestheticism and moralizing. On the Cultural side, constructionists 
hold that science is itself “culturally constructed” and that “scientific facts” are political 
tools devoid of objective reality, which, after all, does not exist. The result of this 
bifurcation is “to make impossible the truth of poetry, as well as […] the realism of 
science” (2008: 12, emphasis in the original). He asks, “What will happen if, instead of 
trying to bridge the distance between words and worlds, we were trying to move 
sideways along with the various elements that appear to go in the same direction?” (ibid: 
14). His answer is to acknowledge the differences but move together regardless.  
Mentalism 
 And so, whether he intended to or not, Saussure’s linguistic model fed into these 
“vestiges of Cartesian dualism,” and even went on to effect precisely what Plato’s and 
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Descartes’ dualisms had before him: an idealism. For, if the philosopher takes for granted 
a dualism wherein one side contains everything tangible, earthly, bodily, subject to 
failure, and transient, the other side will inevitably contain all meaning and all truth. And 
which side seems the more important? From Plato to Descartes, and now Saussure, a 
dualism of Spirit (the Forms, mind, langue, respectively) and Matter (the material world, 
body, parole, respectively) will inevitably privilege the former over the latter.  
 While Saussure’s structural linguistics acted as a needed counter to referential 
theories of language, his approach had limitations of its own. Words no longer related to 
objects/concepts that existed “out in the world” but, instead, to objects/concepts that now 
existed only in the head. Furthermore, these purely mental concepts were governed by a 
rigid, rule-oriented system that also existed mentally and yet out of reach in the social 
ether. In Saussure’s model, language is a self-contained system of meaning. In fact, it 
only makes sense when it is assumed to be a closed, world-independent system. Scholars 
of language would go on to critique this specific brand of idealism as mentalism: wherein 
all linguistic meaning pre-exists as a concept/signified in the mind, is represented in the 
world via signifiers, and is then subsequently “read off” those signs to be replicated as the 
same concept/signified in the mind of the viewer. That this echoes the shortcomings of 
cognitivism should be no surprise since many of those who developed cybernetics theory 
into what came to be the cognitive sciences were structural linguists.8   
The Sign as Fetish 
 And this is what the “hard” scientists see from their side of the wall when they 
look over at the cultural anthropologists; when the meaning of any sign is forever 
cloistered within the realm of mental representation, no individual has trustworthy access 
to that meaning. The sign, as sole guardian of the signified, and thus keeper of all that is 
conceptual, subsumes any other form of apprehension and claims a monopoly on all 
forms of meaning. The social scientists appear to be thrown back into Plato’s cave of 
shadows, and everyone is left to grope and guess after what signifieds might lie behind 
                                                
8 See, as examples, Varela et alia’s treatments of Noam Chomsky and Marvin Minsky in particular (1980: 
40). Also Dreyfus (1972), Agre (1997), and Maturana et al. (1998). 
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any given signifier. The result is a free-for-all among academics who chase after “floating 
signifiers” and have no choice but to mobilize pure rhetoric and pathos to argue what any 
given sign means. And any opinion is as good as the next.  
 And so, just as the best cognitive science takes cognition (the “language of 
thought”) out of the brain and makes it part of social life and body-to-body interactions, 
we must build a theory of language that does the same. Fortunately, such a theory of 
language has already been built.    
The Semiosis of C.S. Peirce 
 Charles Sanders Peirce was an American philosopher and logician. While Ian 
Hacking considers him a rather odd duck in the lineage of American pragmatic 
philosophers, it is hard to deny Peirce’s broad ranger of insights and observations 
(Hacking 1983: 61). Peirce famously defines the elements of a Sign as threefold:  
 
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something 
in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of 
that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which 
it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its 
object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of 
idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. 
 
That is, a Sign stands for an Object by virtue of some “idea” or some “ground” of 
understanding, and in so doing it generates for some agent another Sign, an Interpretant, 
that regards the same Object in an equivalent or more developed way.   
 Importantly, the Interpretant is another Sign that “stands for” the same Object in a 
related way. Early in his work, Peirce distinguishes a Sign from the more general 
Representamen by positing that “a Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant” 
(2011: 100; see also CP: 1.564). While he moves away from this specific usage, and we 
will too, the phrasing can anchor in our minds two things: first, that the mental nature of 
some Interpretants does not disqualify them as Signs; second, that many Interpretants 
 58 
function as little more than recognitions of a Sign–Object relationship and will not 
always be glossed as fully developed Signs or representations of their own.  
Triad of Grounds: Icon, Index, Symbol 
 While Saussure recognizes only the arbitrary and conventional (Symbolic) aspect 
of the Sign–Object relationship, Peirce allows for Signs to “stand for” Objects by sharing 
a likeness or quality with the Object (Icons)9 or by being “contiguous” with the Object 
(Indices).  
 Symbols work as the arbitrary and conventional, encompassing most concepts and 
words in language; Icons manifest as diagrams; and Indices open semiosis up to the 
world: weathervanes Index the direction of the wind, a cocked arm Indexes an incoming 
punch, a footprint Indexes the person who made it, smoke Indexes fire, a bullet hole 
Indexes the bullet and by extension a gun and a shooter, etc.  
 While it appears easy to gloss Symbols as words, Icons as images, and Indices as 
physical evidence or action, this simple parsing works only in the most rudimentary 
sense. The word “that” for example is not a Symbol for Peirce because it does not denote 
a concept in itself. The word “cat” has a world-independent definition that brings to mind 
a concept, while “that” is a word that acts only as an Indexical point of contact between 
words and world. The photograph seems a likely Icon at first, but we soon realize that the 
photograph functions differently than the portrait precisely because of its nature as an 
Index; that is, because it does more than “share a likeness” with the subject and instead 
traces or records actual contact with the subject. Peirce famously explains the imbrication 
of Symbol, Index, and Icon in a short clause about love. I will work through the same 
example here with updated names. 
 Let us take the sentence “Alex loves Juno.” This sentence of words is meaningless 
unless we have some prior knowledge of Alex and Juno. These names function as 
pronouns with no antecedents if we have yet to encounter in the world, in the story, in our 
                                                
9 Of course Saussure did have a notion of the Icon (what he called “symbols” rather than “signs”), and his 
dismissal of them as too unruly for a tidy system of signs is precisely why his structural linguistics works as 
it does. 
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dreams, etc. both Alex and Juno. Proper nouns function as Indices of actual individuals. 
Moving on, “love” is a Symbol that refers to a concept. However, the clause remains 
hollow unless we very quickly move from concept love in our minds to a series of Icons 
and Indices that extrapolate and expound on the idea. Peirce traces these meanings down 
to a base tone or qualisign, an Icon or “likeness” which is at the edge of all meaning. 
Without this chain of interpretation, the sentence is hollow. Furthermore, as several 
scholars are quick to note, the Index and Icon will likely take on conventional valences, 
rendering them Symbol-ish, and any Symbol will be materialized in a tangible form (font, 
handwriting, color, material, etc.) that likewise affords Iconic and/or Indexical valences. 
However, in shorthand, it can be useful to refer to particular Signs as Symbols, Indices, 
or Icons when we wish to note the pivot point or initial Ground upon which the Sign 
works.  
 Moreover, Signs can scale to a great degree in a Peircean paradigm. For instance, 
a book can be a Sign, a theory can be a Sign, a river can be a Sign. As I will discuss 
throughout this dissertation, games can function as a Sign and at the same time a system 
of Signs.  
Semiosis as Process 
 Key to the paradigm, a Sign does not exist as Sign prior to its being interpreted as 
such; the Interpretant is what regards a Sign–Object relationship, and the nature of the 
Interpretant figures exactly what is Sign and what Object. This is why Keane identifies 
the Interpretant as the “meaning” of the Sign and not the Object alone; it is in the 
Interpretant that the force of the Sign is felt. The relation between the Sign and Object is 
not fixed but must be regarded in process at each moment, according to the ideology, 
ontology, or dictionary of the agent. That Signs are so deeply rooted in the lived and felt 
ontologies of Sign-users is of critical importance to my use of Heidegger’s worlding 
below.  
 Anthropologist Webb Keane (2003) presents the semiotics of C. S. Peirce as an 
alternative to the dualism-cum-idealism latent within Saussurean structuralism and the 
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social sciences as a whole, as a framework uniquely suited to bring sign and world 
together again. For Keane the strength of Peirce lies in two primary places: the processual 
nature of connecting Sign and Interpretant to Object that may very well be material in 
nature, and the subsequent “radical materiality” of the Iconic and Indexical grounds 
(2003). Of the nature of Signs as processual, he writes: 
 
Signs give rise to new signs, in an unending process of signification. This is 
important because, viewed sociologically, it can be taken to entail sociability, 
struggle, historicity, and contingency. This interpretation of the model offers a 
challenge to the facile but commonplace claim that to take things as ‘signs’ is to 
reduce the world to discourse and its interpretation, to give in to the totalizing 
imperative to render all things meaningful. (2003: 413)  
  
Signs giving rise to more Signs is how meaning is created, and this process pivots around 
Objects that can take any imaginable form. Words, actions, mental images, objects—the 
world participates together, and things operate as Signs by giving rise to other Signs.  
 Peirce frames Signs as but one part of meaning-making pivots. Meaning is 
produced around an Object as Signs are made/seen and Interpreted “in the wild.” We 
might say that meaning occurs only in an act of interpretation, an act which can itself 
become another Sign as it is interpreted in turn. This is in bold contrast to the signifier–
signified relationship inherent to Saussure’s notion of the sign having or possessing 
meaning/value within a fixed system. For Peirce, meaning is manifest as emerging from 
the process. A Sign is said to do something precisely and only because it forces some 
agent to do something else, which can then force something else to do something else. 
Systems and grammars exist, but they govern only the deployment of literal Symbols, a 
fraction of a fraction of usage.  
    
 I might offer that a Sign is like a three-sided coin. To be a Sign is to represent an 
Object is to elicit an Interpretant. These are not discrete moments, but three sides to the 
same event. I have found the broken metaphor of the “three-sided coin” invaluable in 
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conceptualizing Signs in a Peircean mind. Its brokenness only adds to its usefulness (as 
far as theory is concerned, conspicuous tools are best).  
Material Semiotics 
 The consequence of this processual semiosis is that words and worlds can get 
tried up and tangled in the complex onflow of meaning-making. Keane writes, “What 
iconicity and indexicality begin to do is open up signification to causality, to the possible 
effects of material qualities, and of their logistical impositions, on persons and their 
social worlds” (ibid: 417). That objects or artifacts can function as Signs is not a new 
concept, but letting those objects be Signs of the same rank as words and ideas is 
something else entirely.  
 Saussure’s paradigm of structural linguistics allows people to study material 
objects, but those material objects can only be rendered meaningful as signs for mental 
concepts. The brute physicality of any object cannot have meaning in any way outside 
serving as a representation of a concept or idea. Activity, the body, artifacts, the natural 
world—any given object is a placeholder at best and entirely inconsequential at worst. Of 
the structuralist approach, Keane writes: 
 
The result is that even those who would study ‘things’ too often turn them either 
into expressions or communications of ‘ideas,’ or relegate those ideas to an 
epiphenomenal domain. Those who would study ‘ideas’ too often treat the 
associated material forms as transparent, taking their consequentiality to be 
suspect, and, at times, imputing implausible powers to human desires to impose 
meaning on the world. (ibid: 410). 
 
To take one example—though, to be sure, hundreds exist—Dick Hebdige writes in his 
seminal work Subculture: The Meaning of Style that the purpose of social analysis is to 
“discern the hidden messages inscribed in code on the glossy surfaces of style” (1979: 
18). The task he sets for himself is to uncover and decipher a secret code, hidden in plain 
sight but visible only to the expert. The ostensible object of his study, the material objects 
of the punk subculture—safety pin piercings, cut denim, shaved heads, makeup—become 
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mere placeholders for abstract ideas, a code that Hebdige must translate into words. The 
fact that punks communicate through style rather than words can only be seen as 
intentional trickery or shameful illiteracy. The objects become unimportant and 
ineffectual themselves and are rendered entirely equivalent to the words of the theorist 
insofar as both are said to signify the same mental concepts.  
 There is no such translation needed within a Peircean model, no need to “discern 
the hidden message” of material objects. They give rise to Interpretants insofar as they 
give rise to Signs and/or become regarded as Signs themselves. In fact, the Object must 
be taken as part of the world to some extent. Likewise, the Sign and Interpretant both 
participate in the world as well. This is a radical materiality entirely absent in the work of 
Saussure.  
 As a philosopher, Peirce was by any account unaware of the “general linguistics” 
of Saussure and concerned not with language per se but with issues of logic and 
pragmatic thought. While a growing number of contemporary anthropologists diverge 
from a previous generation’s reliance on Saussure, the idealist paradigm Peirce himself 
pushed against was that of G.W.F. Hegel. Of course, either idealist offers the same 
problems to the materialist, and Peirce uses a bit more humor than Keane when 
distancing himself from a philosophy of pure spirit. Regarding Hegel, Peirce offers, “In 
other words, he has committed the trifling oversight of forgetting that there is a real world 
with real actions and reactions. Rather a serious oversight that” (CP 1.368). 
A Theory of Significance: Roland Barthes 
 Another example, something less technical, can help get at the wisdom and 
usefulness of Peirce from another tack. To get at a world of meaning apart from 
structuralism and strict symbolic signification, Roland Barthes (1970) delineates three 
kinds of meaning that typify the experience of watching a film, Ivan the Terrible (1958). 
He calls the first, second, and third meanings of the text.  
 The first meaning, according to Barthes, arises at the “informational level, which 
gathers together everything I can learn from the setting, the costumes, the characters, 
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their relations […] This is the level of communication.” He calls this the level of the 
“message” and considers it easy enough to analyze with a “basic semiotics” of 
recognition. Attempting to draw useful associations to the three grounds of Peirce, we 
might say this layer of meaning relates Signs (the visuals on the screen) to their Objects 
(objects in the purported world of the narrative) through Iconicity (resemblance). It might 
also be worth noting that even to an observer on set during filming, many of the objects at 
hand would be Icons of other, absent objects: King Ivan’s crown, for instance, would 
appear to be made of gold even on the set, but those of the cast and crew would know the 
prop to be a painted aluminum replica, an Icon of an authentic golden crown.   
 Barthes continues that the second meaning of any scene or representation on 
screen would be that of symbolism. Barthes spends a small amount of time pointing out 
the various symbolic meanings of a scene in which Ivan is doused in a downpour of 
golden coins. He works through at least four levels of symbolism (referential, diegetic, 
Eisensteinian, and historical) and ends by declaring the second meaning that of 
“signification.” These fields of symbolism collect the various traditional and accepted 
meanings of gold (authority, wealth, royalty, corruption) and dousing (chiefly baptism) 
familiar to the target audience of the film. The array of these connections resemble 
Peirce’s notion of the Symbol, conventional meanings attached to particular words or 
objects, as well as the Icon.  
  In a Saussurean model, the first and second meanings could be seen as the realms 
of symbols (Icons for Peirce) versus signs (Symbols for Peirce), respectively, which 
Barthes acknowledges. But Barthes, as Keane alludes to in his own essay, is not 
completely satisfied with Saussure’s detached world of arbitrary signs and sign-relations. 
In fact, the level of meaning most pressing and intoxicating to Barthes is the third 
meaning. Here Barthes finds the ineffable feel or “emotion-value” of the scene. This is 
the level of “significance,” the thick eye make-up on the courtier, the trembling hands of 
the peasants, the coarse felt of the costumes. These markers or features are meaningful, 
but they do not signify or “stand for” any other object in particular. These objects, the 
make-up of the victim and the “stupid nose” of the officer in the film, Barthes calls 
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“incomplete signs.” They seem to hint towards something, but there is no recognized 
signified, no take-away meaning, no greater register above the individual scene. 
Translation is impossible because there is no external reference or quality that could be 
used as a basis to liken these particular qualities or artifacts to another.  
 However, this “incomplete sign” is readily likened to Peirce’s notion of the Index. 
The “stupid nose” of the officer Indexes a known stereotype; the thick eye makeup 
Indexes the shaky hand or garish taste; the coarse felt of the garment Indexes the 
economic class of the wearer as much as the bodily memories of the observer. These are 
“incomplete” insofar as the meanings are not fixed but instead alive, open, awaiting on 
their meaning to arise in the mind/activity of the interpreter. I find this use of 
“significance” appealing, not as an anti-intellectual or anti-semiotic “feel” or sentimental 
excess; but as a mode of meaning-production that resists translation or paraphrasing, 
precisely affording the poiesis of Heidegger. The significant features of the film are 
somehow more than themselves and point away from themselves, but at the same time 
they do not take or “stand for” anything else, exactly.   
Presentation Over Representation 
 When I talk of meaning-making over meaning-preserving in Chapter 3, I use the 
notion of presentation that Huizinga introduces to focus on the moment a Sign is given, 
or, the moment a thing is given that may or may not be recognized as a Sign. In Peircean 
terms, we might say that the Object can be said to both give rise to the Sign and be 
formed by it. The triad does not break down so much as overlap onto itself. Take an 
example from Huizinga, where a child engages in some fleeting make-believe: 
 
The child is making an image of something different, something more beautiful, 
or more sublime, or more dangerous than what he usually is. One is a Prince, or 
one is a Daddy or a wicked witch or a tiger. The child is quite literally “beside 
himself” with delight, transported beyond himself to such an extent that he almost 
believes he actually is such and such a thing, without, however, wholly losing 
consciousness of “ordinary reality.” His representation is not so much a sham 
reality as a realization in appearance: “imagination” in the original sense of the 
word. (Huizinga [1938] 1971: 14).  
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The child is offering a kind of Sign, but it is more than this. The child does not want to 
represent the tiger, the witch, the Prince; rather, he becomes it. The child projects a world 
outward in which he is the tiger, and a friend can only be said to truly play with the child 
if that world is donned intersubjectively.  
The Virtual Object 
 That there is no cosmic Law governing the use of Signs does not mean that 
meaning is “up for grabs” or risks spiraling into wild conjecture. Humans have a very 
good talent for recognizing the intentions of others. The fact is we do understand one 
another, and we are very good at it. What Peirce’s semiotics makes clear is that Objects 
often function as converging points for intentions and imaginations. As Kockelman 
observes:  
 
Given the definition of semiotic process offered above, the object of a sign is 
really that to which all (appropriate and effective) interpretants of that sign 
correspondingly relate (Kockelman 2005). Objects, then, are relatively abstract 
entities by definition. They should not be confused with ‘objects’ in the Cartesian 
sense of res extensa. Nor should they be confused with the ‘things’ that words 
seem to stand for—be they entities like Saussure’s ox and tree. Indeed, it is best to 
think of the object as a correspondence-preserving projection from all 
interpretants of a sign. (2006: 82)10 
  
The Object is then an intuited aggregate or average of these Interpretants. No doubt, any 
given community would consider which Interpretants were “correct” or “felicitous” and 
which were not, thus limiting what could constitute the Object. What a “house on fire” 
precisely means, while not imaginary or up for grabs, is still taken as a virtual object that 
allows for certain affordances and refuses others.  
 The sum, then, of these Interpretants constitutes via projection a virtual Object, at 
once material and abstract, an Object that has certain affordances to the degree it is 
                                                
10 Kockelman’s account includes a footnote clarifying that, of course, objects can be physical objects 
represented by the Sign; they just need not be by necessity.  
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projected. Once it accrues enough Signs, enough vectors converging on it, the Object 
begins to function in the world in a more complete way. It exists not as imaginary 
projection, but intervening entity. Not as agent, but as entity. Like an “elephant in the 
room,” there can be Objects that give rise to and carry Signs outside tangible reality or 
abstract denotation.  
 These “virtual Objects” are the very stuff of Lakoff’s “schemas” in a way. It is not 
that representations in the mind are signs of objects in the real world. Objects, artifacts in 
the real world as taken as Signs of some virtual thing, and then that virtual thing is 
accepted as part of the world and interpolated into the bodily and cognitive system of the 
organism. As Clark offers in his discussion of “epistemic objects” that are in one sense 
representations but in another sense objects gripped and operated via imagination: 
 
Internal representations worth their salt, then, turn out to be identifiable inner 
states or processes that stand in for features that may be distal or currently absent 
and where that mode of standing-in follows some kind of scheme determining a 
space of possible semantically related encodings. (2008: 150)  
 
Dozens of studies in cognitive science work to trace how physical objects can be used as 
operators in the world and then internalized to have the same power within the mind. As 
apes are trained with blocks to recognize higher-order logical types, these mental images 
seem to function as more than imagined representations of objects. The mind has a great 
capacity for utilizing imaginary tools. Hammers and staircases might not work well as 
imaginary objects, but rulers, pencils, nametags, “memory houses,” etc. can all work as 
well in the mind as out of it.  
 What are the grounds upon which virtual Objects work? I think the grounds are 
ontological as well as intersubjective, which is to say they are social. This observation 
dovetails to how Erving Goffman formulates broader meaning-making processes as 
negotiations of an intersubjective projection of sorts: 
 
The individual, it is true, can be ‘wrong’ in his interpretations, that is, misguided, 
out of touch, inappropriate, and so forth. ‘Wrong’ interpretations will be 
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considered throughout [this book]. Here, I want only to mention the belief that in 
many cases the individual in our society is effective in his use of particular 
frameworks. The elements and processes he assumes in his reading of the activity 
often are ones that the activity itself manifests—and why not, since social life 
itself is often organized as something that individuals will be able to understand 
and deal with. A correspondence or isomorphism of what is perceived, in spite of 
the fact that there are likely to be many valid principles of organization that could 
but don’t inform perception. (Goffman 1974: 26; italics mine) 
 
It seems to me that this frame is then a habit or familiar situation that takes for granted 
certain virtual Objects as meaningful affordances of the situation. The frame is the 
ground upon which the virtual Object can be shared as a point of convergence, a semi-
tangible thing that everyone plays with or at least must regard to fully participate. The 
frame becomes the grounds on which “effective” attention and activity is performed, the 
understood “we intentionality” of Searle.  
IV. WORLDS & WORLDING 
  
 Theories of worlding now circulating in anthropology borrow from the 
philosophy of Martin Heidegger an emphasis on incompleteness, the body, and non-
representational modes of meaning. Taken centrally from Heidegger’s philosophy of art, 
adaptations of worlding highlight the ongoing but ultimately incomplete labors of 
everyday sense-making. 
 I adopt Heidegger’s World as: the historical, aggregate, emergent current of failed 
or waning collective poiesis, the onflow and vector of a figuring that drags behind it a 
particular distribution of the sensible that presumes a totality while remaining in itself 
incomplete. World is neither agent nor substance but a state of affairs, the heretofore 
resulting intelligibility and tentative totality that contains meaning, truth, sense. Any 
world is then better understood as a worlding. While this process of unconcealing and 
rendering is historical for Heidegger, I move to multiply worldings as tentative totalities 
that may be seen to exclude, cut, and contest with each other. The Human might not be so 
monolithic as the Moderns, especially the romantics among them, supposed. 
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 Following such a treatment of worlding, I use the term ontology to denote the 
individual’s figuring out from such a processual ground. The ontology of a body—public, 
private, at whatever scale we select—is an Index of the drag it feels when navigating 
some worlding, all those impressions, scars, traces left on the body. It is the inverse of the 
world as felt, as carried, as trudged. More than the “semiotic ideologies” of Keane 
(2003), an ontology is what makes regarding figures and grounds—not only Signs and 
Objects—possible, for the ontologizing body suffers also the excess of those systems and 
grammars that regard signs. Any body’s ontology is its responsive memory of the 
clashing, the failings, and the flaws of those systems and grammars and has suffered 
because of them.  
 And insofar as this ontology is in process, always becoming, each body—at 
whatever scale—is best seen as the figured locus of some ongoing ontologizing. The 
body becomes something like Latour’s “actors,” which arise not as agents making 
attachments but as bundles of attachments in progress (2005: 46). This adaptation of 
ontology dovetails to Deleuze and Guattari’s “assemblage,” which I will mobilize below. 
I might use ontologizing when I speak to the smaller scales, the singular animal body or 
agent, and worlding when I speak of the larger, aggregate, collective processes of sense-
making and world-trudging.  
 Finally, I figure poiesis as that special working of art—that bundle of 
Interpretants caught up in the “essential strife” that is World and Earth—which refuses to 
settle, to translate, to be made commensurable with anything else. Poiesis comes as a 
pocket of instability, an air bubble in the plaster of World. Sometimes the ontologizing 
body experiences an outward clash that cannot be assimilated into the sensible, taken in 
stride. When the body produces Interpretants that are themselves unstable, we get poiesis. 
The working of art is not a Sign of an Object, not a representation of some thing we can 
recognize, but an Interpretant that resists offering its final opinion and holds both Sign 
and Object in relation somehow. The nature of poiesis will be discussed at greater length 
below.  
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Living in Different Worlds 
 If we multiply World into worldings, then there is something that needs to be said 
about people living in different worlds. More than an idiom used to express a feeling of 
disparate values, expectations, or experience, the notion of “different worlds” can hint at 
divergences more fundamental than opposing political views or differing tastes in art.  
 Donna Haraway (2008) pulls her reader into the modes and motives, routines and 
ritornellos of dog agility training with her pet, Cayenne, marking out the objects, affects, 
bodies, practices, and spaces that constitute the world, the thing, of canine agility training 
in Northern California. Is this a world or a subculture? Does such a hobby require a move 
into multiple worlds?  
 In The Book of Jerry Falwell, Susan Friend Harding (2001) recounts her 
participation in the subculture of Evangelical Fundamental Christianity in the 1980s. 
After immersing herself in the language and politics of the Fundamentalists, Harding 
begins to see the world through their eyes, feel the world in a new way. In the tradition of 
other anthropologists who find themselves thinking in “native” ideology, Harding shares 
a crisis of ontology that strikes her on the side of the road, where she finds herself almost 
“caught” in prayer (2001: 58–59). That her book focuses so much on language and 
politics, as the subtitle attests, her account does present her struggle in ideological terms. 
But is she in a new world?  
 About either case, I confess that I do not rightly know. Taking the distributed, de-
centered subject of Andy Clark, the non-representational theory of Nigel Thrift, and the 
nondualist semiotics of C.S. Peirce, I see worlding begin at the pre-personal, bodily level. 
Questions of ideology and subculture are very much allowed after the fact, but a new 
world begins when a body first pulls itself up from the muck and feels the muck pull 
back.   
 Different bodies feel the same objective space differently. Rather than a 
subjective difference of perspective or memory, these felt differences then affect different 
bodies differently, mark and scar and bang them differently, rendering different bodies 
differently able even after the world is gone. A few mundane examples may suffice.  
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 I take my date to a bar in Austin, TX, and after a few dances in the center of the 
room she needs to use the restroom. After three attempts to hear her question, I lean my 
head down to her height and am struck simultaneously by corollary realizations. One, she 
is asking me where the restrooms are; and two, at her height the bar is an entirely 
different animal. At 6’1” tall I rarely know what it is like to exist in a room without 
visible walls, visible doors, and perceivable avenues of navigation and exit. At 5’1” tall, 
she exists in a world that differently figures/renders her body; and this affects her 
ontologizing in a hardly negligible way. That the world around her be cultural or natural 
matters not one bit to the body; it must be regarded and negotiated. Same room, different 
world. While this anecdote is entirely mundane and hardly worth noting in a sense, are 
not the implications—the violent, pervasive, celebrated and protected, dehumanizing 
implications—of such a deliberately manufactured cultural world precisely the subject of 
feminism?  
 That the biological, the objective, the natural can play a role in producing 
meaning for bodies and societies is precisely what Cartesian dualism precludes. In the 
dualist paradigm, the world cannot mean anything unless we make it so; but as Webb 
Keane so rightly observes, when Max Weber underscores the divide between the Natural 
and Social in his birthing of sociology, he forever precludes the meaningfulness of 
natural phenomena such as floods, demography, and famine. Keane writes: 
 
When Weber excludes these from interpretive social science, he is reproducing 
the very dichotomy between subject and object that also underwrites objectivism. 
For those things that are excluded because they are not elements of meaningful 
actions by self-interpreting humans are the ‘objects’ of objectivistic science. The 
efforts of people like Daniel Miller (1987, 1998), Marilyn Strathern (1988), and 
Bruno Latour (1993) to overcome this dichotomy and its exclusions have been 
crucial to making the question of materiality useful again. (2003: 411)  
 
In the objectivist view the natural world is either a blank slate, even and equally empty 
for any individual to fill with meaning, or an agent possessed of gods and spirits that 
communicate messages through natural phenomena. Against such a view, Keane charges 
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himself to bring the natural world back into the operations of Signs and meaning, not as 
canvas or ghost, but as co-operant. This happens on the levels of bodies and worlds.  
 Especially after our invocation of “natural-born cyborgs” (Clark 2003), we must 
understand that the Body–Mind does not only open up to enlist objects smaller than itself; 
it likewise opens upward and outward to be enlisted differently into projects and systems 
larger than itself. Situation and circumstance can “come to mean” varying things to 
varying bodies, and as this meaning is made sensible and circulated it is precisely a 
worlding.  
The Essential Strife: World & Earth 
 Heidegger makes much of the distinction between World and Earth. The very 
course of Dasein is tangled in the “essential strife” between these two modalities of 
history. Heidegger uses the terms to explore what it is that human-being consists in and 
might be characterized as. In Holzwege, his text of “woodsy” meditations along the forest 
trail, Heidegger offers: 
  
Much of what is cannot be brought under the rule of humanity. Only a little 
becomes known. What is known remains approximate; what is mastered remains 
unstable. What-is is never something [entirely] man-made or even only a 
representation, as it can all too easily appear […] The world grounds itself on the 
earth and the earth juts through the world… The world, in resting upon the earth, 
strives to raise the earth completely [into the light]. As self-opening, the world 
cannot endure anything closed. The earth, however, as sheltering and concealing, 
tends always to draw the world into itself and keep it there. (trans. Hofstadter 
1971: 45, 53; interjections in original translation) 
 
For Heidegger, the struggle between World and Earth is best made visible in the 
work(ing) of art, where sense-making is not so much an act of representing but of 
“unconcealing.” The artist renders sensible—and necessarily only to a partial extent—
that which yet remains outside, gnarly, ineffable. The successful work of art is a poiesis, 
or bringing into being, that presents a tension and a frustrated worlding to the senses (see 
Dreyfus 1991).   
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 Art is an arresting of the ongoing worlding. And while Heidegger may reserve 
poiesis for cathedrals, poetry, and peasant’s shoes, I think lesser art, lesser poetics, may 
still exist as incomplete Interpretants, presentations that maintain to some degree the 
inexhaustibility of meaning.   
Poiesis as Successful Art 
 The central feature of poiesis is that it plumbs what cannot be exhausted. While 
representations foreclose meaning by purporting to contain and translate one to another, 
presentation precludes such containment. More meaning, more connections, more 
arrangements are always possible. The art does not mean any translatable paraphrase.  It 
is not information, it cannot be rendered in digital. Philosopher Ian Thomson defines 
Heidegger’s view of art as: 
 
the unending creative struggle to express that which conditions and informs our 
worlds of meaning and yet resists being exhaustively articulated in terms of these 
worlds. […] Art teaches us to embrace the initially tragic insight that being will 
never be completely revealed in time as the very thing that makes it possible for 
human beings to continue to understand what-is in new and potentially more 
meaningful ways. (Thomson 2014: 3.1) 
 
It is this inexhaustibility that makes art so key. The poiesis contains the struggle because, 
just like the onflow of life itself, the work of art is inexhaustible. It is pure presentation 
and cannot itself be re-presented. It will never be fully contained in any other set of 
symbols or rules or representations. The work of poiesis cannot be paraphrased. 
 An anecdote of the virtuoso John Cage comes to mind: after playing an original 
composition that lasts somewhere around eight or nine minutes, an audience member 
asks Cage what the piece “means.” By way of reply, Cage sits back down and plays the 
piece again from start to finish. Beyond simply a call to reflect on beauty, the piece could 
be said to mean something apart from and in excess of any significations or 
representations offered as a paraphrasing or gloss. Cage’s music is an Index of 
something, some Object, some thing maybe different for each audience member in a way, 
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but also recognized as something that Cage too experienced. It is as though the observer 
takes the piece of music not as Sign but as Interpretant; the observer feels interpolated 
into an ongoing process of meaning-making and the music does not work as a transparent 
Sign. Something is arrested for the viewer, who somehow senses that some struggle is not 
finished yet.  
 Heidegger’s notion of poiesis is like the “incomplete sign” of Barthes that brings 
into being something new by presenting its own incompleteness and instability. The 
successful, worthwhile work of art is then an Index of this “eternal strife;” it has 
significance in what it presents to the senses more than in what is may be said to 
represent. As the saying goes, suited to the tastes of the speaker of course, country music 
says what it means, but rock-and-roll means what it cannot say.  
Representations Welcome Outside Art 
 Heidegger positions himself explicitly against art as representational in two 
directions. He holds that art should not aim to represent objects in the world, whether 
“realistically” or not; and neither should art aim to represent the feelings or ideas of the 
artist. In either case the representation purports to contain that which is represented: as 
idea-representing-object or object-representing-idea. This is why good art cannot be 
taken as Sign alone. It does not regard an Object. Rather, poiesis embodies what we 
might call, following Barthes’ chasing after the Index, an “incomplete Interpretant.” 
Poiesis demonstrates an Interpretant in progress. It does not so much aim to elicit 
Interpretants in response in a chain of communication, but to instigate some kind of 
ontological contest or struggle. Entering the cathedral should give someone pause in its 
inexhaustible depths. The cathedral holds a charge that resists dissipation.   
 There is a two-fold flaw in seeing art as anything concerned with representations. 
“Of course, Heidegger does not deny that representations sometimes mediate our 
experience of the world,” writes Thomson:  
 
What he denies is that representations go ‘all the way down,’ that they plumb the 
depths of existence. Instead, representations presuppose a level of existence they 
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cannot explain. Heidegger’s fundamental phenomenological critique of the 
modern theoretical picture is that it overlooks and then cannot recapture the more 
basic level of engaged existence, a practical coping with equipment in which no 
subject/object dichotomy has yet opened up because self and world remain 
integrally entwined and mutually determining. (Thomson 2014: 3.3)  
  
On the one hand, representations of the Saussurean or Cartesian variety presuppose that 
such grounds exist to fully represent one thing in another; and on the other hand, they 
overlook the underlying connectivity that could hope to help make presentation and art 
meaningful. Heidegger explicitly reframes the Modern dualism in organic, nondualist 
terms. This critique of aestheticism can be equally directed at the cognitivism Clark 
criticizes and the objectivism Keane targets.   
Theories of Worlding 
 Katie Stewart (2011) figures worlding as the circulation of affects and 
attachments, motives and memories, tunings, tempos, and touches—the process of 
accruing space, atmosphere, that makes experiences of self and environment a something 
and something other than meaning-full. Echoing Karen Barad’s “new materialism,” 
Stewart defines a world as something “material yet abstract” (ibid: 445). Because the 
worlding happens in working, in living, the material products are but “traces” of the 
abstract verbing.  
 In later piece, Stewart (2012) describes time spent in a New England town as a 
movement through tactile compositions of bodies, objects, and environments that touch 
and weigh on the traveler as much as the native, but escape understanding within a single 
logic. These assemblages resist representation in terms of meaning and instead make 
sense only in part, in parts, on disparate yet simultaneous registers, registers of affect and 
sensation. And what they—the flags, porches, fountains, roads, shutters, colors—at one 
time did for the native they may not still do. In these ways, the very concrete 
environments built within these New England towns are themselves but traces of a 
worlding that may in the present exist intangibly, as much to the native as much as to the 
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visitor. Much of Stewart’s work on such towns evokes worlds that seem not dead but no 
longer living (see 2007, 2011: 451).  
The Assemblage 
 Drawing on the same strands of Friedrich Nietzsche as Heidegger, Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari’s notion of the “assemblage,” now familiar to anthropologists (Marcus 
and Saka 2006) and scholars of the Humanities (Hayles 2006), draws from the same 
sources as Heidegger to figure a non-modern process of becoming. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, existence is assemblage all the way down, and the individual is literally but one 
figure among many potentially distilled from the greater ground: one assemblage maybe 
routinely and regularly figured, but an assemblage nonetheless, bound and tangled in 
desires, affect, motive, memory, pulse. They describe any living body as a “desiring 
machine” that comes into view less as a Subject, and more as a durable vector or bundle.  
 Underscoring the permeable boundaries within and among desiring bodies, Donna 
Haraway (2008) questions exactly whom and what she touches when she touches her 
dog, Ms. Cayenne Pepper. The question is at first mundane—the image of a middle-aged 
woman kissing her dog on the nose—but Haraway’s description quickly evolves into an 
unfolding of molecules, a bleeding, a seepage from dog to master and back. There 
emerges a world shared by just those two, a world of microbes, tonsils, and tongues. The 
assemblage is not just “out there” in the world but within the individual body. On a larger 
scale, of course, the assemblage is “out there” worlding—the world of dog agility 
training.  
 I like the process and becoming inherent to Deleuze and Guattari’s “assemblage,” 
and I will put the image to use throughout, often tied to Latour’s “bundle,” which see 
vectors, drives, and attachments as prior to and constitutive of actors and subjects.   
From World to Ontology 
   Heidegger defines ontology as “non-theoretical knowledge” of the world, a kind 
of learned but under-the-skin practical experience. Like Latour’s “actor,” which comes 
not prior to its bundles and attachments but arises from them, I view the individual as 
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ontology-in-progress, as ontologizing. The subject is the desiring machine, the vector that 
traces an experience of world.    
 Figured this way, ontologies cannot be shared insofar as they are the Index of the 
outer world and the individual clashing and mutually emerging. While similar beings—
siblings, genders, classes—may have decidedly similar ontologies, this is only because 
both shared similar experiences, not because they share “information” among themselves.  
An ontology is, then, a durable mode of being that arises as a thing individuates from its 
background, a vector of movement that is itself the figuring of individual from ground. 
Hence, ontology is a feature of all animals, unlike mind or self-consciousness. It is the 
process of individuation that precedes self, a necessary but not sufficient cause of 
mind/self.  
Ontology vs. Semiotic Ideology 
 Instead of finding the “hidden meaning” behind the signs of culture, Keane 
suggests that one of the roles of the anthropologist is to uncover and make sense of the 
“semiotic ideologies” that ground a community. He writes:  
 
By semiotic ideology I mean basic assumptions about what signs are and how 
they function in the world. It determines, for instance, what people will consider 
the role that intentions play in signification to be, what kinds of possible agent 
(humans only? Animals? Spirits?) exist, to which acts of signification might be 
imputed, whether signs are arbitrary or necessarily linked to their objects, and so 
forth. […] A yam prestation that falls short of expectations, or a telephone call not 
returned, index malevolent human intentions, an individual’s character (but no 
specific intention), the disfavor of spirits, abstract social forces, one’s own fate, 
mere happenstance, or something else only with reference to a specific ideological 
context that makes these plausible and relevant inferences. (2003: 419, 422)  
 
The work of the linguistic anthropologist now includes scientific understandings of the 
language group, their ontological beliefs, conversational practices, and material goods. 
The work of semiotic analysis is no longer detached from social analysis at all, and the 
two projects coincide in a study of the manifold meaningful activities of the group.   
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 I entirely agree with Keane; however, I find “semiotic ideology” too narrow a 
term for my use in this research project. What I use to complement Keane’s concept is 
the weight of the assemblage, the body that holds these ideologies not as representations 
in the mind but as virtual parts of itself. The body works out an ontology as a “making 
do” or the like, less a system than a working muscle-memory of wins and losses. My use 
of ontology privileges the unconscious bodily interpretations and negotiations of reality 
in addition to any set of beliefs, relationships, or systems that Keane might otherwise be 
taken to mean.  
 In a way, questions of ontology are at the very heart of anthropology. 
Paraphrasing Clifford Geertz (1973), culture is exactly the lived process as well as the 
evidence/residue of the human interpretation of social and natural realities. Key to 
understanding Geertz’s seminal work, the task of the anthropologist is not the interpret 
our subjects’ culture, but to see how their culture is interpretive, how their culture is 
precisely the “trace” of their own active interpretation. We “look over their shoulder” to 
learn how they interpret.  
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Chapter 3: What’s in a Game? 
 This chapter theorizes the distinction between games and toys as germane to the 
study of worlding and virtual worlds, and even makes claims to broader implications as 
well. Much has been said about the distinction between games and play, and my own 
understanding is indebted to the distillations of Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman (2003), 
Markus Montola (2012), and Jesper Juul (2001, 2005). However, as this dissertation 
focuses on forms of play that can exist outside structures of given meaning (see Huizinga 
[1938] 1971, Suits [1978] 2005), I frame my study of play around a distinction between 
games and toys. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, too easily are games theorized as systems 
and play as movement or activation within such systems. This formulation readies game 
studies for relevancy within discourses surrounding software and game programming, 
information sciences, organizational anthropology, UI design, and marketing; however, I 
will argue that such an approach precludes recognizing how playfulness—light or dark, 
shallow or deep—can function through games, even complex and rule-heavy games.  
 In contrast, I propose approaching games as open-ended toys that are played 
through, rather than closed-off systems that are played within, which I believe will help 
us better understand games in themselves and at the same time illuminate mechanisms of 
playfulness circulating as the social poetics of everyday life. The result is an image of 
games as focused and intensified instances of preexisting play, rather than systems or 
structures that host play. My goal is not to take a sociological stance about the content of 
games or an anthropological stance about how games operate in contemporary culture. 
On the contrary, I look at semiotic operations occurring within particular forms of 
gaming to see how different genres/forms afford new meanings to be keyed and new 
frames conjured with implications in ongoing social life. This study then analyzes the 
unique power of games to summon and sustain analog virtual worlds.    
 The work of Salen and Zimmerman (2003, 2005) is invaluable when studying 
games as formal systems, and I rely heavily on their insights in my own analyses of 
alternate reality games in Chapters 5 and 6 below. What elements of their paradigm I 
critique in the following reflect only their use of semiosis in characterizing “meaningful 
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play” (2005: 63), not their observations about systems design or implementation in 
general.  
 I first describe the games-as-system approach to “meaningful play” and work 
through various interpretations of play within that paradigm, demonstrating how each 
stumbles across the same pitfalls as structural linguistics and cognitivism, rendering any 
form of user-generated meaning impossible (Section I). I then introduce a different 
approach to play based on the work of Bernard Suits and John Searle (1995) that defines 
a game—even a video game—as a social institution that conjures through collective 
intentionality a context wherein new meanings can be donned, tested, and tried out 
(Section II). Building on the social poetics of John Searle and Erving Goffman (1959, 
1974), I propose a higher standard for meaningful play and figure toying as a semiotic 
process that suspends the resolution of meaning and thereby destabilizing grounds. 
Toying both animates and agitates the ongoing worlding of everyday life, engaging 
playfulness as meaningful and generative activity (Section III). The chapter continues 
with a handful of case studies that look both quick and deep at various kinds of games 
and social institutions for insightful evidence of toying. My goal therein is to uncover 
what a strictly formalist or structuralist reading might omit (Section IV). I then conclude 
What’s In a Game? with a look towards the virtual worlds of my ethnographic case 
studies and a repackaging of virtual worlds suited to an anthropology of toying and social 
poetics (Section V).  
I. HOW TO PLAY A GAME 
 
 When ludology was emerging as a field in the 1990s, there was already afoot 
lively debate among scholars from various fields who saw games differently. That games 
were philosophically and culturally meaningful was well accepted; that they required 
academic attention was now taken for granted; that they were more than lists of rules was 
a growing opinion (Laurel 1991; Turkle 1995). As the field developed, what divided 
scholars was typically dependent on what fields of academics they belonged to. 
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Narratologists wanted to study games as narratives (Murray 1998, Jenkins 2003); 
sociologists considered how the content of games might factor into social behavior and 
how interactivity could better public education (Malone 1980, Gee 2003); economists and 
anthropologists studied games as fantasies, escapes, and little worlds (Fine 1983, 
Castronova 2001, Klastrup 2003, Mortensen 2004).  
 Camps were not hostile, and great work was produced; however, the nascent field 
was generating theories and approaches that were more complementary than truly 
commensurable. Of course, as things go, this could not last for long. Espen’s Aarseth’s 
seminal book, Cybertext; Perspectives on Ergodic Literature (1997), proposed that 
games needed to be studied explicitly as games, by which he meant formal systems 
characterized by interactivity but not entirely devoid of narrative elements. This text 
single-handedly founded ludology around two equally formalist poles: those who would 
privilege the analysis of interactive systems on one side and those who would study the 
scope of narrativity in games on the other. Scholars who would study the “soft” side of 
the debate (e.g. player or audience experience, cultural significance, economics of the 
industry, aesthetic import of games, etc.) were politely invited to continue studying 
games from their own respective disciplines. Within ten years a games-as-systems 
approach had all but marginalized narrativity in favor of “interactivity” and “navigation” 
to establish formal systems as the legitimate, proper subject of the discipline (see Aarseth 
2001, Salen and Zimmerman 2003, Eskelinen 2004, Bogost 2009). These games-as-
systems scholars theorize play as the interaction with or activation of a rule-driven 
system. According to this view, playing a game is in every way synonymous with 
navigating a website, where meaningful user experiences arise from a fluid and 
responsive exploration of a fixed structure. While I find this literature useful and 
compelling in how it figures spatial metaphors toward the study of games, I see 
limitations in how it figures what it is that is being explored.   
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Games & Algorithms 
 Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman define a game as “a system in which players 
engage in an artificial conflict, defined by rules, that results in a quantifiable outcome” 
(2003). First and foremost, what this definition does is divorce the game from its 
execution, i.e. it separates games from play as noun from verb. The system provides a 
challenge to the players, and quantifiably overcoming this challenge affords a meaningful 
experience. This “artificial conflict” need not be direct competition, and many systems 
afford cooperative play against objective hurdles, time limits, random obstacles, etc.  
 This is no doubt a pervasive and sensible understanding of games, hitting each of 
the big titles: Chess, Monopoly, football, Super Mario Bros., Halo, and marbles. What 
this definition initially leaves out (all forms of role-playing, the dozens, tag, duck-duck-
goose, etc.) typically do not make the cut because they forestall an outcome indefinitely 
or see qualitative evaluation as the outcome. Some of these modes of play can be granted 
the status of “game” if rules can be added to determine a “quantifiable outcome” (even if 
this is as “soft” as voting by audience applause or putting a time limit on the game). The 
idea of a “quantifiable outcome” is crucial to games-as-systems, because it galvanizes 
Symbolic value as the sole source of meaning in a game.  
 This divide between games as quantitative and play as qualitative has early roots, 
but the best modern example is Roger Caillois’ Man, Play, and Games (1961), which 
attempts to privilege play outside of games by figuring the latter as quantified or 
systematized forms of the former. It can be argued that Caillois felt Huizinga had focused 
too much on contest and games when theorizing play, inspiring the former to offer an 
account of play outside proper games. However, what results from Caillois’ account is an 
essentialist division between play and games that inadvertently figures the latter as 
organized, rational, sophisticated, or more mature evolutions of the former. In this light, 
that a games-as-systems approach leverages a reading of Caillois more than building on 
Huizinga ([1938] 1971) or Suits (1978) makes perfect sense.  
 Therefore, the current and commonsense use of “game” denotes a set of rules and 
markers that constitute a certain frame or activity for yielding an unpredictable, 
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quantifiable outcome. The privileging of constitutive rules over regulative rules—a 
historically traditional typology within scholarship of play and games (Searle 1995)—is 
important because only the former are world-independent. For example, there is no such 
thing as a touchdown outside the world of a football game. The rules of the game are 
what constitute the type touchdown and what work to guide meaningful iterations of 
token “touchdowns.” In games-as-systems language the rules of the game constitute the 
syntax and semantics of any action (what types exists and how they relate, i.e. their 
Symbolic values), and the playing of a game generates through contingent interactivity 
the quantifiable meaning (the comparative Symbolic value of the sum total of tokens 
activated within the system, e.g. a score). This figures the touchdown precisely in the 
same way Saussure figures his signifieds. The definition of the type only exists according 
to the system, giving the system priority.   
 Crucial to understanding this definition of games, what I have by now taken to 
calling the “games-as-systems” paradigm, is to recognize that a game must and only can 
exist as a fixed structure of algorithms that translate consistently input into output (see 
Manovich 2001: 222; Galloway 2006). This removes all points of contact between game 
and world, instantiating a langue with sole purchase on meaning. Following, to play a 
game is meaningful in one primary and one secondary way. Primarily, the game hinges 
on Symbolic meanings manifest in a system of algorithms that figure quantifiable 
outcomes. This meaning must be uncovered and learned as players interact with the 
game; play becomes an experience of the game-system (its various symbolic values and 
algorithmic relationships) through “free movement” within the game-world. Take for 
example a maze. A maze has a single quantifiable outcome: you eventually solve it—or 
not. This is the game as a system, and Salen and Zimmerman’s (2003) definition of play 
as “free movement within a more rigid structure” is perfectly suited to figuring a maze as 
game-as-system par excellence. Secondarily, playing the game may display more or less 
“evocative objects” that evoke meanings, attachments, and values for the player (see 
Sherry Turkle’s Life on The Screen in Ward 2007: 36n). While the latter is of course of 
interest, it is strictly outside the purview of ludology.    
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 Unlike mazes, most games produce several symbolic values that can be seen to 
reach outside of the game, which becomes more a nuisance than a joy to the formalists 
who would see such entanglements as red herrings for the humanities scholars still 
banging on the door. Most professional sports, for example, produce dozens of 
quantifiable values within the fixed system of the game that come to have meaning 
outside it: win–loss records, league standings, statistics, awards, fines, etc. What any of 
these might mean outside the system of the game is inessential to the game itself. For 
example, monetary fines or sanctions levied at a player for unsportsmanlike conduct 
during play would not be considered part of the game itself but rather an instance of the 
“real world” dipping in to add its own meaning to some specific action made by a player. 
This sounds valid enough, and the reasonable observer may accept that fines and 
sanctions are more part of the “sports industry” than the “game.” However, that a 
baseball player’s batting average or a quarterback’s completion percentage is only 
meaningful outside the formal system of the game might seem less logical. Even the 
notion of durable teams that persist from game to game is decidedly outside a formalist 
study. That someone could offer a “meaningful” representation of baseball without 
acknowledging that teams exist might seem to miss a great deal. In either case, it 
becomes the task of the ludologist to bracket the game-as-system from these incidental 
anomalies.11 My point is not to fault the ludologist for not taking enough into account but 
for how what it taken into account is decided.  
Oblique Play 
 McKenzie Ward (2007) theorizes the contemporary world of ubiquitous 
computers and pervasive games in the West as “gamespace,” a mode of life wherein the 
individual’s constant exposure to and participation in gaming realizes the glaring 
dissimilarities between the objective algorithms of games and the putative algorithms of 
meritocratic capitalism. Using Walter Benjamin’s notion of allegory, Ward figures the 
force of “allegorithm” as that “gap between the intuitively knowable algorithm of the 
                                                
11 I would argue that the invention of a “stat,” batting average, for example, is the very first step in Toying 
with a sport. We will discuss this in more detail in Section IV. 
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game and the passing, uneven, unfair semblance of an algorithm in the everyday life of 
gamespace” (ibid: 31). That individuals can come to see “real life” as an imperfect or 
unfair game is a cruel consequence of our virtual minds, but what Ward theorizes around 
without considering too closely is that, properly speaking, the game is always an 
incomplete overlay, an invasion.  
 A game does not exist in an Ideal, pure state before it is somehow cluttered with 
or mired by the actual world and all its untidy entailments; rather, the game must pull 
itself out of the world somehow, figure itself, make for itself a pocket, a vacuum, a 
hollow space. This worlding is always incomplete, and the best games—as poiesis—will 
in fact rely on their incompleteness. From mazes to sports, video games to parlor tricks, 
games are nested within ongoing social activity and sociality will always be happening 
around and through them as much as within them. Ward’s theory of gamespace will 
feature importantly in my figuring of analog virtual worlds in Section V, but for now it is 
worth noting that the ludologists’ insistence on studying games as world-independent 
systems of objective meaning only renders this “allegorithmic gap” wider. Such an 
insistence obfuscates the way all games—even, or especially, video games—can be 
played sideways, obliquely, against the grain. I will argue throughout this dissertation 
that, in spite of the predominance of video games in the literature, the games that typify 
our present moment most acutely are precisely those games that afford such sideways, 
oblique play.   
Game as System of Signs 
 To explore how games might be played sideways without denying their 
algorithmic nature (and thus studying them from the outside), we must first interrogate 
how the games-as-systems approach engages theories of the sign and symbolic meaning. 
I here collect two lengthy quotes to provide us sure footing as we work to unpack the 
implications of a games-as-systems theory of signs. In The Rules of Play (2003), Salen 
and Zimmerman characterize a game as a system of signs that constitutes a structure, as a 
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grammar that ultimately provides sufficient grounds for the production of meaningful 
play. They write: 
 
Games can be characterized as a system of signs. The meaning of any sign 
(object, action, or condition) in a game arises from the context of the game 
itself—from a system of relations between signs. 
 
[…] In language, for example, we refer to structure as grammar. The grammatical 
rules of a sentence create a structure that describes how words can and cannot be 
sequenced. We might refer to these rules as invisible structure, as we are not 
always aware that they are there. In games, this concept of grammar takes the 
form of game rules, which create a structure for the game, describing how all of 
the elements of the game interact with one another. Structure (in language or 
games) operates much like context, and participates in the meaning-making 
process. By ordering the elements of a system in very particular ways, structure 
works to create meaning. (2003: 61, 63) 
 
Even before we see that “structure works to create meaning,” we are quite obviously on 
the trail of a signifier–signified relationship that can recognize only symbolic meaning. 
This is the very stuff of Saussure’s definition of langue, of linguistic value, and of world-
independent signifieds. Each object, action, or state of affairs in the game is part of a 
system, and it is from modes of relation within this system that meaning arises. Although 
the authors explicitly base their use of signs on the semiotics of Peirce (2003: 65), their 
interpretation falls squarely within Saussure’s structural linguistics. In fact, the 
Interpretant of Peirce is glossed first as “interpretation” and later as the “context” that we 
see figured in the above quote as operating in parallel with the system itself.  
 Salen and Zimmerman’s definition of games as “systems of signs” would work 
just as easily with a board game as with a video game. We can, for example, imagine the 
plastic “hotel” token on a Monopoly board operating as a sign with fixed symbolic value 
within the rules of the game. Regardless of the appearance or substance of the little 
tokens, the “hotels” would mean the same thing in the algorithm of costs; the objects 
function only as placeholders for symbolic value and contain no other meaning in 
themselves. There is evidence enough for this in the dozens of versions of Monopoly that 
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have been published with absolutely no change to the rules, versions “skinned” in unique 
ways to replace the “hotels” with other representational objects of the same value.  
 In other words, the meaning of the signs/types in the game is not affected even 
when their representations change. The way signs participate differently on the two levels 
(as Symbols in the system and representations to the players) is a key distinction in a 
formalist paradigm. Salen and Zimmerman continue: 
 
This concept of a sign representing something other than itself is critical to an 
understanding of games for several reasons. On one hand, games use signs to 
denote actions and outcome, two components of meaningful play. […] On the 
other hand, games use signs to denote the elements of the game world. The 
universe of Mario, for example, is constructed of a system of signs representing 
magic coins, pipes, enemies, hidden platforms, and other elements of the game 
landscape. The signs that make up the game world collectively represent to the 
player—as sounds, interactions, images, and text. Although the signs certainly 
make reference to objects that exist in the real world, they gain their symbolic 
value or meaning from the relationship between signs within the game. (2003: 63, 
64) 
 
We can see in their introduction of game-worlds that the images on the screen function as 
signs to the players only as means to experience the system of “actions and outcomes” of 
meaningful play. Any aesthetic or representative qualities of the objects on the screen 
matter little. Whether the “magic coins” of Super Mario Bros. were coins or candy bars 
would have no affect on their meaning in the game. In fact, even if they were used to 
“buy” items in the game-world, their value would be solely a result of a structure in the 
game arbitrarily paralleling how coins work in the actual world, not by any actual 
relationship or connection between the coins on the screen and actual coins.   
 The system of symbolic values predefines the meaning of each entity and action 
in the game as Saussure’s langue defines the signified of any given word. The meanings 
qua value interact through artificial conflict to produce quantifiable outcomes. Signs let 
players know what is moving and mattering in the course of the game: walls mean 
barriers, pushing “A” means a jumping avatar, rolling a “6” means move six spaces, a 
flashing avatar means you are suffering Symbolic damage, “dying” three times means the 
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game ends, etc. Devoid of narrative and meaningful worlds, how do we define the 
meaning of sheer movement and interactivity? 
Meaningful Play 
 Focusing solely on system-defined value, Salen and Zimmerman define 
“meaningful play” as a kind interactivity or movement that occurs when “the 
relationships between actions and outcomes in a game are both discernible and integrated 
into the larger context of the game. Creating meaningful play is the goal of successful 
game design.” What becomes of key importance to the game’s designer is the player’s 
“emotional and psychological experience of inhabiting a well-designed system of play” 
(2003: 61). As the discussion goes, if the system is designed with meaningful actions, 
outcomes, and contexts, then the play will necessarily be meaningful. This is where it is 
easy to imagine games and websites being analyzed in overlapping terms, and it is no 
wonder that games-as-systems scholars take a great interest in User-Interface design.  
 That any value not operating within the grammar is inconsequential to 
understanding meaningful actions within the game is, of course, entirely valid. As a game 
designer myself, the production of “discernible and integrated” systems of value is what 
keeps me in business. Games should be consistent worlds of intelligible actions and 
reactions. However, this kind of play will never participate in social poetics unless values 
can be pulled legitimately outward at the same time they are participating in the system. 
Affording meaningful social interaction to occur around and through the system of the 
game might just be more crucial in determining the longevity of a title than the fluidity 
and consistency of the structure. As I exhorted earlier, we need a formal approach to play 
that takes social poetics as its foundation if we want to truly understand the many ways 
that play can be significant.  
 This call to take other forms of meaning into account beyond Symbolic value is 
not a breezy way to engage Peirce’s notions of the Icon and Index in a sociological or 
aesthetic study of games. I do not work to analyze the manifold Iconic and Indexical 
meanings of signs in the game, an approach that would be analogous to the “literary 
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criticism” or “reader response” angle. What is the difference between coins and candy 
bars? What does it mean that a mere plumber in saving a princess? Are goombas slaves 
or mercenaries? These are the questions asked by the sociologists and education scholars. 
Importantly, this approach does not challenge a games-as-systems paradigm but, rather, 
seeks to complement it. Such sociological approaches grant the game its systematic 
sovereignty and explore instead what the represented events and characters of the game 
might be said to signify in broader cultural spheres. In this approach, the meaning of the 
game is not produced by the players but inherent to the representations and events in the 
game-world (as reflections or reifications of meanings already existing in the broader 
culture), reducing games to meaning-laden objects in an even more sterile form than the 
games-as-systems scholars do. That games garner this kind of attention should be of no 
surprise; meaningful art draws criticism and conversation, which is a good thing.  
 It might behoove us to sketch a good example of “meaningful play” in Salen and 
Zimmerman’s terms before moving on. Free movement within a structure can elicit more 
than passive learning from the players and work with the representations of the game-
world to engender what might be akin to an ontologizing of player-in-game. While all 
meaning in the game arises as the function of algorithms and symbolic values, actions 
and outcomes within the representational domain of the game-world can work on 
Indexical and Iconic grounds as well as Symbolic to offer a meaningful experience for 
the player. Any game-system must utilize the images of the game-world to communicate 
itself, which affords other grounds of meaning insofar as an environment of virtual 
objects is being represented and explored as such. For instance, several games utilize a 
simple “color swap” to represent a scale of difficulty for enemies, wherein the same 3-D 
model is simply colored differently to represent to the player a different “kind” or “level” 
of enemy. Let us imagine that all blue goblins deal only minimal damage and come with 
only a small number of hit points, while green goblins offer a slightly more substantial 
challenge, and red goblins provide formidable enemies indeed. If this Blue–Green–Red 
“schema” is similar for all monsters in the game-world, it turns the colors themselves—
from the perspective of the learning, exploring player—into Indexical signs. What is 
 89 
Symbolic in the grammar is rendered Indexical in the virtual presentation of the game-
world, and the player responds by intuitively adopting an ontology that figures the game-
world as though it were real. This is meaningful and fulfilling, and the experience of 
worlding is pleasurable in games as it is in everyday life. What I hope to add to this 
notion of meaningful play is a chance not only of worlding but poiesis, where players can 
instrumentalize the game in whole or in part to serve ongoing purposes and generate new 
meanings, new connections, new institutions.  
Narrative Meaning   
 From the narrativist approach, meaning emerges as the experiential confluence of 
contingent performance and narrative progress. They dovetail formal narratology with the 
formal game-as-system, and so the overall meaning of a game arises from two vectors 
converging in the moment of play. These two vectors of meaning pop up all over 
ludology in a variety of forms: performance of mastery vs. performance of belief, 
contingency vs. narrativity, rules vs. representations, etc. It takes both, argue the 
narrativists, to fully understand the meaning of play.  
 Importantly, both of these vectors can be typified by the gaming concept of 
“flow” (for best use see McGonigal 2011: 40–43). On the one side, there is performative 
flow, the cyberspace of system-inhabitance where players are “in the zone” and 
performing mastery. This is the final level of Tetris when the pieces are moving at an 
incredible rate without a mistake from the player, the firefight of Halo wherein Master 
Chief shreds three Covenant Hunters with the appearance of ease, the seventh inning of 
strike-outs as Justin Verlander takes the Tigers on yet another early-season victory. This 
is when the player has true fluency in the world/system of the game. On the other side, 
there is the narrative meaning that arises as events flow together and form in the minds of 
the players a development or progression, where jumbled events fit together to form a 
seamless and meaningful story. This is the player inhaling deeply when she learns at the 
end of Knights of The Old Republic that she was Revan all along, a narrative climax 
heard around the world; the high fives that come when the game-master tips over the Red 
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Dragon miniature on the table to signify that the heroes have slain the beast, recovered 
the hoard, rescued the wayward prince, and restored safety to the countryside.  
 These are emotionally charged experiences of meaning and make for fulfilling 
and rewarding gameplay. However, whether from the grammar or the narrative, meaning 
is fixed within the formal elements of the system and the story. Meaning can be 
experienced, but it cannot be made. In other words, both approaches make presumptions 
about the nature of meaningful play that preclude any true poiesis. There can be masterful 
and artistic performances, but no new meanings; each player will by and large experience 
the same meaning from any given game-as-system, which locates the meaning in the 
game somehow. The player has no input, makes no presentation. In the strictly formalist 
approach, the code holds all meaning; in the narrativist approach the code and player 
together produce meaning, but the player largely acts as passive agent or host. The player 
turns the page of the book, wondering what will occur next but not necessarily in control 
of it.   
 What if there are more than two vectors of meaning? What if there could be as 
many in the game as there are in life (or, at least as many as the game will allow)? What 
if everyday vectors from outside could be seen to pass through the game? Performative 
meaning, personal, narrative, competitive, nostalgic, sexual, cooperative…  
II. GAMES AS LUSORY MEANS 
 
 What we need is a theory of games that does not rest on the representational 
dualism of symbolic value alone. Importing our lesson from the domain of language, I 
hold that we cannot define a game solely by the grammar it obtains and at the same time 
consider it meaningfully connected to the world. Just as Saussure’s linguistics aimed to 
study all of language but only included enough dimensions to study Symbolic meaning, 
so too the formalist vein of ludology aims to study games but only includes enough 
dimensions to study meaning as activation. Neither approach affords poiesis.  
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 This is to say nothing bad of systems, rules, or symbolic meaning. A consistent 
and integrated system of rules can be an invaluable part of social poetics, so long as the 
assembled algorithms and virtual objects of the system can be seen to touch the actual 
world and operate within the ongoing social, cognitive, and bodily meaning-making 
processes of the players. Can the Signs that already participate in the game-system and 
the game-world be made to participate in the actual world as well? Can people use signs 
and systems that the game affords to make their own meanings, to play with meaning, to 
produce new ways of meaning? To answer—to even ask these questions, we would need 
to step away from Saussure and games-as-systems.  
 In this new approach, a game is poetically meaningful insofar as it can be reached 
into and out from, insofar as it can be toyed with. This requires us to move beyond the 
dualist paradigm of Saussure, where rules and objects have predefined meanings, and into 
the trenchant paradigm of Peirce, where each point of articulation within the system of 
the game is a semiotic process. What Peirce brings to the study of semiotics and symbolic 
meaning is not just a third or an additional dimension, but a way to multiply dimensions, 
which allows signs to keep up with and function within the actual world of infinite 
affordances and open-ended meanings. This brings the system of the game into the 
material world and straddles the divide between “formal analysis” and “audience 
response” put forth by Aarseth (1997, 2001). If we do not define meaning as the 
relational values contained in the grammatical/algorithmic structure of the game, where 
does meaning come from? How do we define the game outside grammar, system, 
structure?  
Games As Voluntary Obstacles 
 In a seminal work of both philosophy and ludology, The Grasshopper: Games, 
Life, and Utopia, Bernard Suits famously defies Wittgenstein’s insistence that there is no 
conceptual definition of a game with the equally brilliant and elegant: “A game is a 
voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles” (Suits [1978] 2005: 54). He goes 
on to say that: 
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to play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs (prelusory goal), 
using only means permitted by rules (lusory means), where the rules prohibit use 
of more efficient in favour of less efficient means (constitutive rules), and where 
the rules are accepted just because they make possible such activity (lusory 
attitude). (2005: 54)  
 
In this view, a game functions as “lusory means” that connect a “lusory goal” with a 
“prelusory goal” through a shift in grounds toward a “lusory attitude.” The game itself is 
a means, the pivot of a semiotic process whereby the rule-oriented activity is 
instrumentalized to serve a purpose that only arises when a playful attitude is donned. 
This entails the freedom, tension, and presentation of Huizinga in terms that make room 
for the rules, systems, and quantifiable outcomes of contemporary ludologists. This 
definition of the game, as an outward-facing system of rules, gets outside grammatical 
thinking and situates each and every game, however complex, within social activity. I 
will trace through Suits’ included terms in reverse order. 
 The lusory attitude is precisely play in the sense of Huizinga. It is freely donned 
as an attitude and entails the full force of agency, an activity that takes place through 
contest and presentation. What is important here is that the lusory attitude manifests new 
grounds of meaning; a new context or world must be tentatively donned to reach the 
prelusory goal, drawing a “magic circle” that must be performed to be maintained. The 
constitutive rules entail the entirety of the game-system and will feature for us in John 
Searle’s (1995) terms of “Let X count as Y in Context C.” From Tag to Chess, Pinball to 
Call of Duty, the entire algorithmic structure of any game counts here as “constitutive 
rules” that act to make the overarching social play harder. The lusory means is the game 
as frame, the game as an understood activity apart from its constitutive rules. A lusory 
means may entail regulative rules that situate the game in the world or act as the entirety 
of the game itself. This is the realm of Spin-the-Bottle, where the rules exist as “If X, 
then Y” and become a game prior to Symbolic systems or grammars that would be 
understood as constitutive. In a way, the constitutive rules make the donned lusory game 
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harder, while regulative rules make prelusory play harder by framing the activity as “a 
game” in the first place.  
 We must introduce Suits’ “lusory goals” here as those means entailed by the 
constitutive rules that direct meaningful action within the game-world. For example, 
scoring touchdowns and earning points are lusory goals in football, goals established by 
the constitutive rules of the game that allow the player to meet the prelusory goal of 
exercising muscles, enjoying contest, and winning the game. Following, the prelusory 
goals reflect the initial impulse or desire that inspired the lusory attitude to begin with. 
Scholars will debate how Symbolic a prelusory goal can be (see Kolers 2015). Is the 
prelusory goal of chess, for example, to win the game, or is that a lusory goal? Is it so 
banal? Or, as Kolers suggests, is the prelusory goal to arrange our tokens into a 
checkmate in my favor, to create a “state of affairs” in the actual world that “counts as” 
or is equivalent to the lusory goal of winning the game?  
 I think Kolers takes the game too seriously when he defines checkmate as a 
prelusory goal but winning lusory. I would resolve this by suggesting that the broadest 
prelusory goal of straight chess is to have won the game, which is what drives the playing 
of the game towards the lusory goal of winning the game. I believe this definition of the 
prelusory goal figures properly moving the tokens towards checkmate as escalating 
lusory goals that point towards and literally converge in the moment when the lusory goal 
of winning the game matches the prelusory goal of having won. Of course, moving the 
tokens towards the lusory goal may or may not represent smaller prelusory goals along 
the way (practicing a new strategy, getting through the game without losing so many 
tokens, show off my new gambit, etc.). These multiple prelusory goals can permeate each 
moment of the game, drawing value from the actions and outcomes of the game up into 
the ongoing social world. Both worlds continue on in virtual space charged, or doubled 
by the lusory attitude of play.     
 Outside having won the game, prelusory goals abound. For Walter Benjamin, the 
prelusory goal of a game could be a cover for the childish desire to jump and kick and 
pull: “A child wants to pull something, and so he becomes a horse; he wants to play with 
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sand, and so he turns into a baker; he wants to hide, and so he turns into a robber or a 
policeman” (2005: 115). For example, the prelusory goal of Twister is to touch and climb 
on other people in a socially acceptable way. Behind this alibi, the lusory goal of winning 
is pure pretense. For Johan Huizinga the prelusory goal could be nothing more than the 
pleasure of donning the lusory attitude, but it could also include a drive toward poiesis, 
toward creation. For Erving Goffman, whom we will discuss in more detail below, a 
prelusory goal might the keying of activity towards socially meaningful outcomes. For 
instance, Goffman might figure Spin-the-Bottle as aimed not only towards the pleasure of 
kissing but also towards demonstrating sexual prowess and moving “in line” with a 
performance of self. For John Searle, the prelusory goal could be to collectivize and 
found social institutions. He might see the prelusory goal of “gamifying” a classroom 
project as not only motivating to students but also generative of new ways to understand 
students, public education, and the role of teachers. I would take all of these as equally 
and simultaneously important.  
Games as Social Institutions 
 John Searle offers the most systematic discussion of games that demonstrates the 
spirit of Bernard Suits. Searle defines a game as one kind of social institution among 
many that take the form “Let X count as Y in Context C” (1995: 28). Importantly, his 
“Context” is not the grammar of rules or pre-existing institutions of society, but the 
phenomenological meaning that emerges through collective activity. That this “Context” 
is emergent from the translation of X into Y is absolutely key to understanding Searle’s 
realism within his philosophy of social construction. The system does not constitute the 
rules, but the rules constitute the system. To count X as Y is then to establish a Context 
C, to shift into a frame where objects not only mean different things but mean things 
differently. Searle goes to lengths to maintain that these institutions are not grammars or 
structures that dictate behavior or manifest as force. Institutions at their very root are 
donned frames of meaning with no weight of their own. He says:  
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What we think of as social objects, such as governments, money, and universities, 
are in fact just placeholders for patterns of activities. I hope it is clear that the 
whole operation of agentive functions and collective intentionality is a matter of 
ongoing activities and the creation of the possibility of more ongoing activities. 
(Searle 1995: 57).  
 
 These structures may very well be rigid products of worlding, old meanings that 
resist change after having accrued both weight and mass for centuries, but they remain 
only patterns. Recognizing social structures as patterns of ongoing collective activity 
allows for the existence of certain pivot-points, toe-holds, fulcrums, upon which new 
meaning might yet be made. Each performance, each instantiation of the rule, each 
execution provides a moment where the institution might fail. Any such moment affords 
the intervention of failure, the clash of Peirce or earth of Heidegger, where meaningful 
systems fail to roll on unquestioned and at-hand. This is in essence the argument Judith 
Butler (1993) makes about the subversive power of drag performance. That gender can 
still be toyed with despite the weight of the system shows that institutions do not fix rules 
so much as discipline patterns.   
 This insistence on the tentative ground of social institutions needs to be carried 
over to our discussion of games. A games-as-systems approach can easily figure Searle as 
positing “Contexts” that subsequently demand translations of X to Y. While this reversal 
of course does happen once patterns are set, it is a consequence not a cause. Even within 
a project that situates games within ongoing social play, ludologist Markus Montola 
writes that:  
 
Even though Searle (1969; 1995) does not discuss games as being surrounded by 
a boundary or requiring a particular spatial configuration, Searle’s idea of 
constitutive rules nails down the idea of the magic circle as a transformative 
boundary that produces endogenous meaning. It was mentioned above that 
Searle’s constitutive rules are of the form “X counts as Y in context C”. In the 
context of games, it can be expressed as follows: “X has the endogenous meaning 
Y in the context of the magic circle”. The original X does not vanish in context C, 
and thus everything in the magic circle carries one additional layer of meaning – 
termed endogenous meaning. Of course, players usually adhere to the rules of 
irrelevance and disregard X, focusing on Y instead. (Montola 2012: 53) 
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 Citing Searle’s own pragmatism, we can argue that presuming or correcting for an 
artificial boundary is not necessary. The “Context C” does not require nor necessarily 
entail a fixed structure or system and can instead be an intersubjective frame or horizon 
that is negotiated and enacted at every moment. I would argue that Searle intentionally 
leaves the game open and outward-facing to the greater social environment and ever-
shifting contexts. Remember, Searle is talking about social institutions and using games 
as one example; social institutions have no such clearly marked boundary either. As I 
cited in Chapter 1, Searle theorizes collective intentionality as a “biologically primitive 
phenomenon that cannot be reduced to or eliminated in favor of something else. Every 
attempt at reducing ‘We intentionality’ to ‘I intentionality’ that I have seen is subject to 
counterexamples” (Searle 1995: 24). 
 As an illustrative example, imagine that I come upon a street vendor in München 
while fresh out of Euros. I rummage through my satchel and subsequently offer the man a 
five-dollar bill for the kebab. The “ugly American” faux pas aside, my gesture is a 
flirtation, a toying, a presentation of X as maybe Y. The vendor himself, as my would-be 
partner in poiesis, has the power to confirm a new “Context C”—or not. This may be 
seen as the transformation of a pre-existing frame or the establishment of a new one. 
Either way, I ask him to let X count as Y and await his response. This is play insofar as it 
is presentational and tense; this is worlding insofar as we are rolling intelligible notions 
of currency into new futures; this is flirting… This is everyday life.  
 Figured this way, Searle’s “collective intentionality” stands as one of the most 
basic “lusory means” of available to humans, our ability to establish and mutually inhabit 
meaningful contexts (which seems convincingly close to Goffman’s frame). If the vendor 
accepts my offering, he “confirms” a frame/context/game, he goes along with the world I 
presented, bringing the lusory goal of my presentation in line with the prelusory goal of 
our mutual desire to resolve our incommensurable currencies. Even if the acceptance is 
begrudging, the vendor Interprets X as Y and thus confirms C, if only for a moment. 
There is no appeal to a larger system or structure needed; all that is relied upon is shared 
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intentionality, which emerges quite naturally among individuals without requiring formal 
rules or systems at all.    
 Bernard Suits’ “voluntary obstacles” fitted with the “Let X count as Y in Context 
C” of John Searle provides a definition of games that not only allows poiesis, but also in 
a way requires the slimmest degree of it. Play works to not only redefine signs but also to 
conjure new frames, new contexts, new structures. Each interaction risks failure, which is 
precisely where the precarity of ritual and the contingency of sports arise. In poetic play, 
signs and objects resist fixing on a single meaning and never fully merge with the 
systems that are produced. Figuring how signs and objects do this will draw us into the 
semiotics of C.S. Peirce again.   
III. HOW TO PLAY WITH A TOY 
   
 Paul Kockelman posits an instrument as “a semiotic process whose sign is an 
artificed entity, whose object is a function, and whose key interpretant is an action that 
wields that entity (so far as it serves a function)” (2006: 82). If function is a Second (the 
actual movement/activity of something) and purpose a Third (the value/meaning of that 
action according to some invested perspective), I would argue that affordance fits nicely 
as a First.12 Following Kockelman’s definition of the instrument as an artifact of function 
in a Peircean sense, I will define the toy as an artifact of affordance.  
 Most tools are designed with a particular function in mind, with the best tools 
hitting several purposes by means of this central function. For example, a crowbar has a 
particular affordance (some feature of its shape) that lends itself readily to a particular 
function (redirecting force to wedge apart two surfaces/objects), which agents can use 
toward particular purposes (separating nailed boards of wood, opening a stuck window, 
lifting a metal grate, etc.). Of course, to the agent using the tool, the purpose, function, 
                                                
12 Each of these terms entails the agent’s perspective and thus a full Triad, which is to say purpose comes 
as the Third of a Third, function the Third of a Second, and affordance the Third of a First. A First in itself 
could be better labeled a quality, and Second in itself could be better seen as action or movement devoid of 
meaning. 
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and affordance are often regarded as a single thing, a single tool ready-to-hand. As 
Heidegger reminds us, the tool ready-to-hand acts inconspicuously within the realm of 
purpose and meaning. This issue of use or process reminds us that Kockelman is careful 
to describe the instrument as a “semiotic process” not merely a Sign or artifact.    
 As a special kind of instrumentation, toying is a semiotic process wherein some 
artifact (Sign) elicits an activity (Interpretant) that evinces the establishment of some new 
context (Object). In simpler terms, the toy is an object primarily of affordance insofar as 
it comes alive by means of a feature or quality that is used to reframe or rekey the 
understood or given meaning of the object. This renders a toy as an object kept at all 
times present-at-hand in Heideggerean terms, though I would argue toying embodies a 
mood unlike Heidegger’s scientific or theoretical mood. What acts as the pivot of the 
Interpretant and the chain of following Interpretants is the virtual Object or collectively 
negotiated ground presented in the act of play, the new frame or context being conjured. 
Each Interpretant defers foreclosing on final meaning, leaving the Object tentative and 
teased. The charged space that arises as a result of this toying then becomes the Object, as 
each action and reaction self-consciously form, touch, describe, and conjure the 
intersubjective understanding of the space/moment.  
 
 Once the new context/ground is charged sufficiently, multiple objects can be 
enlisted, each with an affordance that works to continue the presentation of the new 
ground, the new order of things, the new world—or not. Properly, then, there is no toy 
only the toying. In essence, poiesis is then “toying” as a verb, to treat something as a toy, 
to locate affordances in things present-at-hand and play on them to the purpose of shifting 
or destabilizing grounds.  
Not All Toys are Equal 
 Of course, I am defining a particular use of the term toy. Not all store-bought toys 
function so poetically. What I am characterizing here does not just concern playing with 
familiar toys but those moments of broader poiesis, the moments of thing-becoming-toy. 
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That popular store-bought toys do not always elicit this poiesis may go without saying. 
As Roland Barthes offers in his Mythologies: 
 
All of the toys one commonly sees are essentially a microcosm of the adult world; 
they are all reduced copies of human objects, as if in the eyes of the public the 
child was, all told, nothing but a smaller man, a homunculus to whom must be 
supplied objects of his own. […] The fact that French toys literally prefigure the 
world of adult functions obviously cannot but prepare the child to accept them all, 
by constituting for him, even before he can think about it, the alibi of a Nature 
which has at all times created soldiers, postmen, and Vespas. […] These toys die 
in fact very quickly, and once dead, they have no posthumous life for the child. 
(1972: 53-55) 
 
It would be unduly cruel to point his criticism at video games when dolls and board 
games have been doing the same sterile framing for centuries. But in contrast to these 
terminally ill toys, Barthes offers simple building blocks, which we might take as things-
becoming-toys in precisely the way I discussed above: 
 
Invented forms are very rare: a few sets of blocks, which appeal to the spirit of 
do-it-yourself, are the only ones which offer dynamic forms. As for the others, 
French toys always mean something, and this something is always entirely 
socialized, constituted by the myths or the techniques of modern adult life. […] 
The merest set of blocks, provided it is not too refined, implies a very different 
learning of the world: then, the child does not in any way create meaningful 
objects, it matters little to him whether they have an adult name; the actions he 
performs are not those of a user but those of a demiurge. He creates forms which 
walk, which roll, he creates life, not property: objects now act by themselves, they 
are no longer an inert and complicated material in the palm of his hand. But such 
toys are rather rare: French toys are usually based on imitation, they are meant to 
produce children who are users, not creators. (Ibid: 53-54) 
 
These blocks offer such affordances that meaning can remain unfixed, alive, different in 
each moment. It is my argument herein that while some toys can be as dead as Barthes 
laments, most proper “games” are entirely without hope. In fact, playing a heavily 
Symbolic game “straight,” willingly granting authority to such a system-stuck pattern of 
activity, would make lively poiesis largely impossible. This “do-it-yourself” framing is of 
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crucial importance, and any toy engages “do-it-yourself” meaning, “do-it-yourself” 
sociality.  
 As soon as the toy settles on an understood symbolic value (i.e. moves from 
present-at-hand to ready-to-hand), it dies. It becomes an instrument and loses its open 
qualities, its chimaeric force. A toy is always conspicuous insofar as it must maintain its 
prelusory affordances to best navigate the lusory world. The meaning of the artifact itself 
must remain unfixed, continually re-interpreted through use as new affordances are 
found. The ball is many things; the scarf is at once sash, then noose, then mask. The 
presentation can topple as easily as it begins, and the ongoing semiotic play becomes the 
recursive exploration of the actual environment to multiply affordances. This exploration 
of the environment as present-at-hand can lead to new ontologies even inadvertently, like 
an ontological “guess and check” method, or like stochastic splatters of play that might 
yield results unintended.  
 This mode of play is neither the scientific mood of Heidegger, nor an emotional 
or aesthetic mood. I think the idea of Suits’ “lusory attitude” must be retained here as a 
mood in the Heideggerean sense. It is the desire to ontologize, the figure the affordances 
of an object according to new schemas, new ideas; and if toying is very much a verb, we 
need not restrain ourselves to actual toys to toy with.  
Toying & Social Poetics 
 The toy is always only material, ontic; it is pushed and shoved to mark the world 
and imply virtual objects. Recalling our treatment of grounds and ideologies in Chapter 2, 
I figure prolonged toying as something like the role-playing of a shifted/skewed 
ontology, which acts to project the obverse, equivalent world. Successful and sustained 
toying manifests a kind of phantom limb that expands the actual world with a virtual 
presence that is felt as material but absent. Lev Vygotsky describes how play creates “a 
zone of proximal development” around the playing child. He writes, “In play a child 
always behaves beyond his average age, above his daily behavior; in play it is as though 
he were a head taller than himself” (1980). There is this sense that play creates a zone or 
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pocket that new meanings and new worlding will eventually inhabit, once the world 
catches up to the tense performance. 
 The proliferation of these virtual objects can succeed in sustaining a virtual 
world—or not. I will discuss virtual worlds in more detail in the concluding section of 
this chapter, but here I mark how virtual objects are created much like “social facts” to 
have weight-without-presence in the material world. The virtual object created through 
toying becomes a “hard fact [that] forms material for the exercise of my will” (Peirce, CP 
1.358). 
 Toys do not respect games-as-systems insofar as toys bend rules, play with types, 
and conjure new frames. If we view games as systems, play can only be made meaningful 
when executed faithfully, properly. However, there are games that welcome such toying 
and feature systems of constitutive rules that face outward as a way to incorporate and 
invite toying. These are the games that interest me, and the ethnographic case studies of 
this dissertation will focus on three genres that present almost unbridled opportunities for 
toying.  
 In fact, when I look at games-as-systems, I am immediately transfigured into 
Roland Barthes’ child, who, “faced with this world of faithful and complicated objects,” 
can identify himself only as “owner, as user, never as creator; he does not invent the 
world, he uses it: there are, prepared for him, actions without adventure, without wonder, 
without joy” (1972: 55). What toys allow for new worlds? For new frames of meaning 
and new contexts heretofore unheard of? What kinds of new ontologies can be donned to 
project this or that world into being? 
 
 By way of example, the act of producing new grounds on the fly is the core 
mechanic of a very popular game, Cards Against Humanity. The game features two decks 
of cards that both contain cards featuring dirty or adult phrases and/or objects. 
Ostensibly, the black cards offer a kind of “type,” and the white cards “tokens;” however, 
this typology does not always hold during play. Similar to the G-rated title it derives 
from, Cards Against Humanity asks players to pair two otherwise unrelated cards 
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together to produce the most playful result (a Peircean Triad) possible. The idea13 of the 
relationship is entirely up to the players to toy with, though dirty and humorous responses 
seem to dominate. No card has any predefined meaning despite the words printed on its 
surface because each pairing will reframe both cards into a unit of larger meaning. The 
cards offer pure affordances. On player draws a black card, and each remaining player 
uses one of the white cards in her hand to present a Triad in the Peircean sense, two 
objects connected by a means. Whoever drew the black card then anonymously selects 
the “best” pairing on whatever grounds she decides in the moment. One turn she can 
choose the silliest, one turn the dirtiest, one turn the pair that reminds her of childhood; 
and, of course, the idea she sees in the pair might not be the same idea that the player 
intended at all. Hand after hand, each game begins to take its own character as patterns 
emerge among and between players.  
 Cards Against Humanity was designed for new meanings, new ideas, new 
connections. Inevitably, certain cards will develop Symbolic meaning over months of 
continued play within groups (for example, that one white card that wins every time it is 
played no matter what), and this player-driven worlding is the substance of social poetics. 
This Symbolic meaning is now a “social fact” produced by the institution of the game 
that can be played with and against as players vie to win.     
IV. TOYING THROUGH GAMES 
  
 According to a games-as-systems approach, the Signs within a game represent in 
two directions: the Symbolic system that provides predefined value for each Sign, and the 
Symbolic/Iconic representation of an environment that players can move within and 
explore (Salen and Zimmerman 2003: 65). Importantly, neither of these directions allow 
for immediate poetics insofar as the meanings of each and every thing in the game are 
fixed. For instance, you cannot immediately change the Symbolic value of the Fire 
                                                
13 I use “Ground” to denote one of Peirce’s three modalities of Sign–Object relations (Symbol, Index, or 
Icon), and “idea” to denote the ad hoc, specific ground or pivot figured in the moment of any given 
semiotic process, which likely participates in all of these to some extent.   
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Flower in Super Mario Bros. on the one hand, and neither could you alter its appearance 
or representational weight in the game-world on the other.  
 However, we can toy with it: a group of players may adopt a lusory attitude and 
approach the otherwise fixed video game playfully—i.e. poetically, toyingly—and, say, 
develop a drinking game around the Symbolic algorithms at work in the game-system. 
One simple regulative rule: Whenever a Fire Flower shows up on the screen, everyone 
take a shot. This establishes a new institution entirely, a whole new game (broader lusory 
means) that permeates and surrounds the first game. 
 This single rule adds outward-facing value to the Flower. This figures the video 
game as a toy, taking hitherto unregarded affordances within the game to have immediate 
and unintended meanings outside the fixed system of the game. We have made that game 
into something else; or, rather, we have dismantled the game as a world-independent 
system and interpolated an element from it into the actual world as something else. Other 
elements can be toyed with as well. What happens each time a warp pipe is used? Swap 
drinks with the person next to you? Does everyone drink or only the person holding the 
controller? In developing a drinking game around Super Mario Bros. we have now 
keyed/conjured/presented a new frame. To toy with the game is to toy with the meaning 
of the activity as a whole. We are no longer playing SMB; we are chopping up SMB and 
using it piece-meal to play Super Drunk Brothers, or whatever we might later come to 
call this new game/frame/activity. This is a larger frame that plays with the video game 
not within it. We have troubled and agitated the grounds that the system intended with 
your tentative meanings.  
 We have done nothing to change the gameplay of Super Mario Bros., but we must 
recognize that we have, in effect, made drinking harder. We adjusted the prelusory goals 
of the game, broadened the lusory means, and so we cannot rightly say we are still 
playing Super Mario Bros. Any change in the lusory means engenders a new “frame” for 
Goffman, a new collectively intentional activity for Searle.  
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Frame as Lusory Means 
 Erving Goffman introduced his notion of the “frame” as an answer to the 
phenomenological question “What is it that is going on here?” (1974: 9, italics in 
original). The frame is precisely the “it” that is at hand, the shared awareness that a loose 
model exists for the kind of activity that is occurring, the intersubjective awareness of a 
“thing” or “situation” that is afoot. It seems to me that a group of friends who are all 
engaged with a game would necessarily be on the same page; they would all know what 
thing is happening, what situation is afoot. Goffman writes: 
 
My perspective is situational, meaning here a concern for what one individual can 
be alive to at a particular moment, this often involving a few other particular 
individuals and not necessarily restricted to the mutually monitoring arena of 
face-to-face gathering. I assume that when individuals attend to any current 
situation, they face the question: “What is it going on here?” Whether asked 
explicitly, as in times of confusion and doubt, or tacitly, during occasions of usual 
certitude, the question is put and the answer to it is presumed by the way the 
individuals then proceed to get on with affairs at hand. (ibid: 8) 
 
 The “We are playing a game” answer seems to be the central frame—and maybe 
the only frame—that needs referencing. It encompasses the whole of the lusory means 
being adopted and draws in any and all prelusory goals carried by the players. For 
Goffman, who was explicitly following closely to Gregory Bateson’s (1972) use of the 
term, the frame is phenomenological before it is analytical. Frames do not need to be 
multiplied to account for different layers of interaction, different languages, or even 
processes of mediation or representation. Rather, the frame refers to what the consensus 
among the participants holds is going on in the moment. He warns: 
 
I make no claim whatsoever to be talking about the core matters of sociology—
social organization and social structure. Those matters have been and can 
continue to be quite nicely studied without reference to frame at all. I am not 
addressing the structure of social life but the structure of experience individuals 
have at any moment of their social lives. (Goffman 1974: 13)  
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When we change the value of the Fire Flower in Super Mario Bros., we have not changed 
the actual structure of the game at all. Rather, we have expanded the frame to include 
drinking through the video game. While using frame analysis to approach any of the 
gaming genres at the core of this dissertation, I am explicitly talking about the “structure 
of experience” not the game-as-system, the lusory means not the constitutive rules.  
 Frames are the “principles of organization which govern events” and “our 
subjective involvement in them” (ibid: 10). Everyday “frames” can be taken up and 
dropped in quick succession as needed, while “primary frameworks” (race, class, gender, 
occupational prestige, competitive capitalism, election cycles, etc.) might be best 
understood as constitutive of ontologies in the proper sense: an individual’s subjective, 
shared—and in many ways objectively durable—conceptualizations of the nature of 
reality and the purposeful activities of those around her. For the most part, I am 
concerned here with the smaller “frames,” the local situation of “What is it that is going 
on here?” that explains exactly what game is being played, what means  are being 
deployed to reach the prelusory goals.   
 What, then, would a true frame analysis of gaming look like in a more strict 
sense? Perhaps the most illustrative example of how Goffman might tackle gaming 
himself would be his extensive treatment of the theater, which he considers a special case 
for exploring frame analysis: 
 
Because the language of the theater has become deeply embedded in the 
sociology from which this study derives, there is value in attempting from the 
start to address the matter of the stage. There is value, too, because all kinds of 
embarrassments are to be found. All the world is like a stage, we do strut and fret 
our hour on it, and that is all the time we have. But what’s the stage like, and what 
are those figures that people it? (1974: 124) 
 
And has not, by now, the language of the game become likewise deeply embedded in our 
current sociology? One could imagine that, were Goffman writing his book today, 40 
years later, he might use something like video games or reality television as the 
emblematic example. While he delineates at least two “laminations” in place and four 
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“roles” that participants must play within the theatrical frame, it is still a single frame, a 
single activity.  
 The constitutive rules and fabricated objects work together to form an activity 
broader than whatever systems are involved. In this way, every game is bigger than its 
system, it embodies an excess beyond its grammar that incorporates more than “free 
movement” within that structure. Even a formal study of games must take this 
phenomenological frame into consideration.  
Toying Without Toys 
 This idea of a “drinking game” is then a portable kind of frame that can be taken 
to other systems, overlain on other grammars with similar affordances. In this vein, 
Goffman introduces the idea of the key, which he defines as “the set of conventions by 
which a given activity, one already meaningful in terms of some primary framework, is 
transformed into something patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to be 
something quite else. The process of transcription can be called keying” (1974: 44). I see 
this process of keying as similar to toying, though much broader and not necessarily 
pregnant in the same way with the virtual. 
 Any novel, television series, game, play, or radio drama demonstrates the 
“keying” of some actual activities as fiction, as some form of make-believe. Just as film 
producers have a complex industry that helps them key by means of “movie magic” 
certain actual events into the stuff of fantasy and action-adventure, the gamer can bring 
her own familiar key to everyday life. For example, Spin-the-Bottle emerges as the result 
of a very simple keying mechanism: spin something with a recognizable “end” to see 
whom it points out, and then kiss that person. This transforms the primary meaning of the 
bottle from a container of soda pop into a diving rod of sorts, but the same regulative rule 
could be used to key/toy any object into such a device.  
 I imagine we could see a key as pattern of toying pointed toward some typical 
prelusory goal. To key is to present something as something else and in so doing conjure 
a new frame, though this might not always function as poetically as the strict toying we 
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characterized above. In this way, Goffman opens up toying well beyond a reliance on 
physical objects, and his keying incorporates gesture, objects, ideas, and actions to riff on 
the imaginary affordances of all kinds of abstract objects. The semiotic process can 
include any kind of Sign.  
 This allows Goffman to dovetail to Peirce so nicely: there is no essential 
difference between how an object, a word, a color, an idea, or an action operates to 
produce meaningful activity. The difference is purely operational, mechanical. No 
dualism necessary. If the activity or object is not taken as something else, then it is 
precisely not a Sign for Peirce nor a keying for Goffman. In both paradigms, the 
anthropologist must pay close attention to the mechanisms through which this thing 
presents as something else. Any key or the semiotic process could reach the level of 
toying when it retains its charge, its incompleteness, whenever it pivots on a unique idea.   
Sports & Keying 
 As I foreshadowed earlier, the creation of player statistics and league standings 
for any given sports industry creates a “frame” that surrounds the individual games. 
Symbolic values in the game-system are ported outward with new meanings added to or 
eliding their in-game value. So much of professional athletics in the United States is 
decidedly unrelated to the formal system of the game, with the rules of the game 
changing each year sometimes without notice. Even the existence of durable teams of 
regular players toys with the game as a whole and connects it to the actual world in a 
meaningful way, which is to say nothing of stats, records, leagues, MVPs, jersey 
numbers, salary caps, etc.  
 This process of what was once toying has developed a rather conventional feel 
now, more like a key, and the cultural significance of the major sporting leagues in the 
United States could hardly be overstated. While the industry of sports news may be 
likened to the field of literary criticism in its role of evaluation and translation, the sports 
institutions and franchises themselves are formally constituted by larger systems that 
permeate and enlarge the Symbolic values of any given action in any given individual 
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game. Meanings from the league regularly eclipse those of the games themselves, making 
a formalist analysis of the game-as-system itself absolutely uninteresting. Does this mean 
the ludologist must study the league as whole to fully uncover the “meaningful play” this 
wider structure provides? I would argue they might do better to stop searching for closed 
systems and instead focus on the ongoing semiotic processes themselves. For example, 
when fans watch a game knowing that Tom Brady might break a record for yards thrown, 
each play gains weigh more Symbolic value from outside the system than from within.  
 Maybe the most recent example of toying with a game that may even overlap with 
Salen and Zimmerman’s “meaningful play” is the season-long management of the 
Oakland Athletics in 2002 according to sabermetrics that privileged lesser-known 
statistics such as on-base and slugging percentages, a toying portrayed nicely in the film 
Moneyball (Miller 2011). The fact that such statistics emerge from the formal rules of the 
play does not account for their being seen as affordances and quantified by analysts, nor 
for the toying that Billy Beane and Peter Brand undertook in managing the team, which 
entailed interpreting each potential player according to an entirely nontraditional metric 
they were developing as they went.  
  
 Fantasy sports take the idea of toying with sports industries to a new level. If we 
now see the sports leagues as fixed institutions—dead toys, worlds of fully intelligible 
meaning—then fantasy leagues revivify the individual games, “actions and outcomes” 
within the games, and the leagues in whole. In fantasy football, for instance, the 
individual statistics of each athlete are recontextualized game by game in an entirely 
virtual team and league. Friends form virtual leagues and divvy up all of the professional 
athletes into virtual teams, each team then an assemblage of athletes playing various 
positions managed by one player. Each weekend, the virtual teams are paired up and 
pitted against one another, with the Symbolic value of the individual athletes’ 
performance statistics aggregating into the virtual performance of the imagined team. It is 
already a multi-million-dollar industry in itself, and the NFL has capitalized on the 
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growing hobby by forming officially sanctioned and supported virtual leagues on their 
website for the last two years.  
 It takes only an ounce of imagination to envision a world where these virtual 
teams persist year to year as virtual franchises and garner fans of their own, creating 
seasons and histories of their own. One day the virtual teams may be more popular than 
the actual teams. Toying with new meanings, new grounds as much as new institutions, 
is the very stuff of social poiesis. While a game-as-toy might not have the internal 
“quantifiable outcome” of Salen and Zimmerman, it very well can result in quantifiable 
social outcomes. Such a virtual football league just might constitute a virtual world 
according to the definition we will discuss in the final section of this chapter.  
Sports & Poiesis 
 What about the games themselves being toyed with? We do have in the United 
States a very solid example of what a sport-as-toy might look like, though it comes from 
a work of fiction. Let us take a moment getting there. First, imagine something like 
football wherein the officials are taken to be the athletic agents that matter. As the 
conventional players go about playing the game, these officio-athletes call out new types 
and rules on the fly, labeling and re-labeling the activities of the ball-handlers according 
to affordances that arise during play.  
 For example, as a conventional running play is afoot when one of the officials 
calls “traveling” and throws down a yellow flag. As the players shake their heads and 
throw their hands in the air, the game continues with a new rule in place: no running with 
the ball after it is caught. Ten seconds later another flag: players can now only run 
laterally along the white yard-lines after catching the ball. At any given moment the 
officio-athlete is free to encode the immediately preceding activity as some token of a 
newly invented type. The officio-athletes—can we redefine them as the players yet?—
play with and evaluate their own patterns of type-making and token-calling. Their own 
performance of mastery has replaced the athletes’ as the driving force of the game. 
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Another flag: give the ball to the new officio-players, and send the athletes home. And on 
it goes.  
 What we have just developed is a lively game of Calvin-Ball as portrayed by Bill 
Waterson in his iconic comic strip Calvin and Hobbes. As Calvin-Ball demonstrates, the 
nature of the game-sport would become the very toy with which the officio-athletes 
played. Notice that Calvin-Ball fits the definition of games given by Bernard Suits but 
not Salen and Zimmerman.  
The Video Game Industry 
 It is only a matter of time before video games generate the same kinds of 
institutions that other athletic sports have. We already have the birth of statistics, that first 
step. Like the player statistics of sports and fantasy football, different consoles track 
Symbolic actions within individual game titles and aggregate them for the player profiles, 
establishing new social meanings for actions that take place in otherwise closed-system 
games. There are leagues that surround competitive games and professional players who 
travel the world and play for high stakes. Furthermore, several websites, most notably 
Twitch, allow players and leagues to broadcast their play to viewers all over the world, 
expanding the potential spectator culture into the millions.  
Video Games Themselves as Social Institutions 
 While it is easy to imagine an industry growing up around sports, can a single 
video game be seen as a social institution in Searle’s terms? I would argue that video 
games rest on the constitutive rules of programming code, languages constituted by and 
accepted within communities of programmers, rendering the individual game more a 
“social fact” than social institution. The game is constituted by rules and virtual objects 
and offered by its creators to the individual player as a challenge.  
 The figure of the goomba on the screen is so deeply constituted by the game’s 
code and by such far-reaching institutions of programmer communities that it confronts 
us as an object. In the virtual environment, where Grounds have shifted, the goomba is 
physical. It resists the player’s will insofar as it first resists the will of the avatar. Facts 
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are hard to get around. They impose upon themselves. Peirce himself says that “a hard 
fact […] is something which is there, and which I cannot think away, but am forced to 
acknowledge as an object or second beside myself, the subject or number one, and which 
forms material for the exercise of my will” (CP 1.358). These facts almost become 
Seconds—actual objects!—insofar as they confront and frustrate the will. The goombas 
are constituted by such a thoroughgoing and engrossing “Context C” that they are 
virtually there for the actual player.  
 On another level, any individual is free to hack into a game and recode it to do 
whatever she wants, just like she could sneak an extra $50 from the bank in Monopoly or 
re-label a square on the board with her own hometown or school. The only difference is 
that toying with the grammar of a video game requires stopping the game and loading up 
some software. We might say hacking into a video game toys with the virtual objects that 
constitute the game at a level somewhere between rewriting the rules of a board game 
and remodeling your kitchen.  
V. TOYING IN VIRTUAL WORLDS 
 
 The idea of the virtual arises precisely when we are confronted by something 
outside ourselves that we know to be non-physical but cannot reduce to the imaginary, 
when our world is populated by material but abstract charges. The virtual is best 
characterized in the echo, the wave, the asymptote. Virtual objects force individuals to 
question whether they are dealing with objects or features of the objects. Is an asymptote 
a thing in itself or just a feature of a mathematical function?  
 The distinction between “material” and “physical,” though at times revisited, is a 
basic feature of scientific discourse (Hacking 1983, 1999; Massumi 2002; see also 
Chalmers 1999: 41 for the consequences of missing the distinction). Electrical charges, 
vibrations, waves, affect, mind, energy—many fundamental elements of our material 
world are not themselves physical. Despite existing outside the realm of physical stuff, 
these entities have regular and measurable physical causes and physical effects. In other 
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words, though intangible, they cannot be relegated to imaginary or symbolic registers. To 
say a particle “has a charge” is to gloss a complex scientific phenomenon: the particle 
exists and is measurable in the present but at the same time already participates in—and 
in some way contains—an inchoate but indeterminate future state (Massumi 2002).  
 Derek McCormack’s “spectral geographies” are made possible through affective 
registers of the body that allow for the “remote-sensing” of absent environments (2010b). 
McCormack characterizes the wreckage site as a “spectral geography,” an assemblage of 
physical objects that somehow comprise a portal into another, remote world. This remote 
world, the world of the expedition, persists as a material presence that somehow 
interpolates the observer into an affectively “charged” space. Significantly for 
McCormack and myself, the spectral becomes a potential register of all geographical 
experience, a literal echo in the present of something absent.  
 Massumi and McCormack act as anchors for my working understanding of virtual 
worlds as emergent, “charged” atmospheres that respond to material inquiry but resist a 
positivistic logic of the physical. While Massumi describes a fundamental puzzle of 
molecular physics and McCormack theorizes the tragic remains of an illustrious 
adventure, my own research considers the intentionally fabricated virtual worlds of 
tabletop role-playing games (RPGs) and alternate reality gaming (ARG). And the 
evidence of these worlds is in the new ontologies they reflect, the way they impact human 
behavior.  
  I do not mean to explain the virtual mystically. In fact, quite to the contrary, I 
mean to explain it in the most material forms possible. However, that virtual worlds are 
material without being physical, they resist the objectivist’s logic of substances and their 
properties. When talking about virtual worlds, it seems it can be difficult to see the virtual 
forest for the digital trees. In Chapter 2 I developed a theory of “virtual objects” that was 
also touched upon in this chapter. Virtual worlds are populated with virtual objects, but 
not only with virtual objects. The virtual world expands our own world, drawing on all 
the affordances of the actual plus imaginary affordances as well.  
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 I find it both troubling and amusing that we talk about novels as consisting of 
words but we talk of video games as consisting of objects. The images on the screen that 
we encounter when playing a video game are Signs, not Objects. They are virtual 
precisely to the degree that we experience them as Objects/objects. Most objects in video 
games are better seen as social facts, which can themselves be virtual objects, like race or 
gender. 
  The Signs of novels bring to mind imaginary objects, the Signs of video games 
bring into the world virtual objects. The objects on the screen act as Indexical 
Interpretants of every Sign you input into the machine, and it becomes almost impossible 
for the mind not to take the projected and visually constituted shapes as true objects. Like 
“hard facts,” they impinge on the player’s will in a way that words cannot.  
 However, in the worlds of tabletop role-playing, imaginary objects can take on 
such force as well, and imagined dragons become very good at frustrating the will as 
though material objects. And in a certain way they are material, insofar as they exist as 
asymptotes that resist any player of the game and push against your lusory means, 
offering obstacles to the lusory and prelusory goals.  
 The wall in the video game has the same force as any other “reality” or “fact” in 
the words of Hacking (1983, see also 1999: 22-24).  
Discussion of Virtual Worlds 
 Tom Boellstorff (2008, with Nardi et al. 2012) characterizes Second Life quite 
explicitly as a virtual world, not a digital world. However, it would be hard to imagine 
what a non-digital virtual world might look like from scholarship of online worlds. I feel 
that Ken Hillis (2009) rightly defines Second Life a “graphical chat” as it lacks the 
explicit game elements of other massively-multiplayer online worlds, including combat, 
puzzle-solving, teamwork, and narrative challenges. However, what expands Second Life 
from mere chatroom to virtual world is precisely the “graphical” dimension, which 
functions as the lusory means necessary to explore a world of virtual objects according to 
one’s own prelusory goals.  
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 Hillis figures as radically Indexical. The digital bodies of an online world such as 
Second Life are indexical “sign/bodies,” traces that directly connect digital bodies to 
physical players. Drawing from Hillis’ work, I figure the virtual body not as the image on 
the screen but as the permeable, material body created by the digital image and physical 
body together.  
 I would argue that Second Life is a virtual world precisely because the platform 
elicits/demands activities of representation and framing in the same way the actual world 
demands of us representation and framing. It does not represent the actual in digital form, 
nor does it reproduce the actual in a digital world. Instead, it offers a new toy with which 
the user must undertake the representing and reproducing playfully; that is, it offers an 
analog to the actual world. This analog virtual world just happens to exist entirely in 
digital space. So it goes.  
 In contrast, World of Warcraft, while a virtual world in Boellstorff’s and 
Castronova’s terms, is only partially so in mine. Insofar as World of Warcraft functions 
as a single frame more than a domain that elicits framing, it fails to partake in the sense 
of virtuality privileged by Massumi, McCormack, and myself. The social poetics of 
World of Warcraft lack the ontological play that characterizes the user-generated worlds 
of Second Life. Admittedly, these are working definitions. A careful study of how role-
playing or framing takes place within these platforms is welcome. While I have extensive 
experience within Second Life, the closed-frame nature of World of Warcraft turned me 
off immediately.  
 My goal is to study these virtual worlds, the worlds that are not yet our actual, felt 
worlds. These are the worlds that draw us towards them without being real. My argument 
is that they can exist in physical space as much as digital, in either case a “spectral 
geography” that haunts our everyday life. I want to study those spectral worlds, not as 
imaginary or symbolic, but as affective and virtual.   
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Chapter 4: Fantasy Role-Playing & Imaginary Affordances 
 This chapter presents ethnographic data figuring tabletop role-playing games as 
complex, abstract toys that give rise to and instrumentalize imaginary affordances to 
engender new forms of meaningful social play. I argue that the activity of fantasy role-
playing consists of toying with the elaborate and esoteric rule-system of the game, 
cracking the rules open to look outward and participate as virtual objects in the ongoing 
social lives of the players. What everyday mechanisms of poetic play pervade these 
games to weave these ostensibly self-contained systems into ongoing social life? Where 
does larger meaning come from beyond the “quantifiable outcomes” of the game’s 
system? How does studying a game as something analog, something attached, something 
integrated into the world change the way we understand gaming? In answering these 
questions, I argue that tabletop role-playing holds a unique honor as the smallest and 
most ephemeral virtual world, the hydrogen atom, as it were, of virtual worlds.  
 I rely heavily on Bernard Suits’ (1978) definition of games as “voluntary obstacles” 
and Erving Goffman’s several iterations of “frame analysis” (1959, 1961, 1974) to open 
up tabletop role-playing games to the same set of analytical tools that study theater, ritual, 
sports, film, and everyday social institutions (see Chapter 3). This framing allows me to 
engage the semiotics of C.S. Peirce to investigate where meaningful activity arises 
moment by moment within play. Such a study avoids simple media analysis and becomes 
necessarily social analysis. In other words, to answer the question “What is the game?” is 
to answer the questions “What does the game mean?” and “What role does the game play 
in ongoing social activity?” Rather than perform a formal analysis only to complement it 
with a secondary narrative or cultural analysis, let us rather walk slowly through the 
game once, like the ants of Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory (2005). Such an 
approach traces out how the game occurs in ongoing social activity, how signs are read 
and made and mobilized. I suggest that such an undertaking obviates the need for some 
larger theory of integration/interpretation and produces a worthwhile explanation of the 
game itself.  
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 Throughout this chapter, I am decidedly more concerned with the functions of 
make-believe and how generative play handles and grapples with constitutive rules to 
produce through struggle the bricolage images of a fantasy realm. This perspective flips 
on its head the more customary games-as-systems approach, which privileges the content 
of the imaginary realm as emanating from players activating a formal system. 
 After establishing the “frame” of a tabletop role-playing game (Sections I and II), 
this chapter discusses how an initial “keying” of make-believe defines the genre as its 
central lusory means (Section III). I then discuss the important—albeit typically 
overestimated—role that constitutive rules play in tabletop role-playing as a secondary 
keying. I argue that only by toying with the procedures and Symbolic objects of the game 
can virtual objects be conjured and then made to operate within ongoing social activity 
(Section IV). Taking a step back, I interrogate how ongoing processes of narrativity 
function as a third keying to repackage the experience of the entire frame/game (the 
actual world and both earlier keys) into a singular image. The chapter concludes with a 
look at this same narrativity at a temporal remove (Section V).  
Methods 
 My formal research in tabletop role-playing runs from May of 2010 to the present. 
The study included my logging hundreds of hours with four groups of gamers in two very 
different games (Appendix A). Although most studies of tabletop role-playing introduce 
the player-characters within the campaigns and spend much time immersed in the game-
world, because my own approach privileges the outward-facing effects of these games, I 
spend less time describing in-game adventures and environments. While not explicitly 
comparative, the study intentionally features dissimilar groups that highlight different 
affordances of the two game systems studied. 
 While the groups represent a diverse cross-section of the gamer subculture indeed, 
the two games I feature have even less in common. I designed Fantaji14 with the express 
                                                
14 This chapter and the dissertation as a whole conflate my two published titles, Early Dark (2011) and 
Fantaji (2014). While most accounts do indeed refer to Fantaji throughout the two years of its 
development, certain moments with Early Dark will be included without note.  
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purpose of maximizing the affordances of role-playing and providing the fewest 
constitutive rules possible to engender poiesis. Fantaji participates in the “story game” 
movement still building momentum within the hobby, whereas Dungeons & Dragons15 
works as a role-playing game only despite itself. 
I. THE GAME IS AFOOT 
 
 How is the tabletop role-playing game not just a system that is played within but 
also an abstract toy that is played with? I figure the rulebook of any given game—that is 
how role-playing games are published, as books—that a would-be player buys at her 
local gaming shop as an instruction manual for “rekeying” strips of fantasy narrative. 
This rekeying requires a complex kind of activity, and each title presents a unique key. 
The charts, procedures, lists, diagrams, and statistics that constitute the game-system 
comprise an assemblage of Legisigns loosely referred to as “the rules.” However, as I 
will explain, these rules are for much more than constituting a system; they are far from 
complete and have no fixed edges. What the would-be player buys is a toy, not a game; it 
is an imaginary obstacle, a virtual object, a thing. Or, from another perspective, what she 
buys is a how-to manual for making obstacles, for making objects—for making an 
already occurring, everyday kind of sociable performance more rigorous.  
 While other scholars figure role-playing games as a way to make shared fantasies 
possible, or ways to make sharing fantasies easier, I argue instead that the role-playing 
game is better seen as a way to make collective fantasy harder. This is what makes them 
games and what makes them fun. The rules operate on storytelling and collective 
intentionality, and players wield them intentionally to do so.    
                                                
15 Likewise, the accounts that follow conflate various editions of Dungeons & Dragons despite several 
published versions existing. For the sake of clarity, “clones” published through the Open Game License, 
predominantly Pathfinder (Paizo Publishing 2009, 2014), will be referred to as Dungeons & Dragons as 
well, except where noted.  
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Lusory Means Distinct From Constitutive Rules 
 An elucidating analogy for understanding fantasy role-playing as something other 
than a game-as-system is another recreational hobby that happens around dinner tables 
with small, esoteric groups of ironically braggadocios gamers: poker. While few 
hardened poker players might welcome an analogy between poker and fantasy role-
playing, there is a clear formal overlap that helps to frame our conversation.  
 The constitutive rules of poker are fairly simple and consist of procedures for 
arranging and evaluating hands of 5 or 7 playing cards. Once each player forms a hand of 
cards, whether entirely in her own possession or along with shared cards on the table, 
each hand is ranked and compared. At the end of the round, the player who has the best 
hand wins. That is it. Or is it? As anyone evenly vaguely familiar with poker knows, the 
game is not really about arranging and ranking the hands. Poker is about winning money.   
 To define the game frankly, it does not really matter who has the best hand in a 
round or who wins the most rounds in a night. What really matters is who ends up with 
all the money. The constitutive rules of poker cover how the players arrange cards to 
build a hand with the highest value, but these only serve as one part of the lusory 
means—as one part of the game. Poker also entails collective intentionality, rigorous 
socializing, and importantly regulative rules that cover the appropriate ways people who 
are involved in the game can gamble on its outcome. This gambling is a primary social 
framework, an everyday kind of activity that could just as easily occur anywhere and 
revolve around anything. The purpose of poker, what really matters to it as a game, is that 
the game as a whole affords a particular domain for strategic, pleasurable, sportsman-like 
gambling. In other words, the game-system is only part of the game.    
 In this way, poker (as it is played by most people who enjoy it) is not only a 
game, but also a game that functions as a toy. It is a system, yes, but a system that opens 
outward and offers in several places affordances to transform—to rekey—the traditional, 
everyday activity of wagering on life. Euchre, on the other hand, is a game. The goal of 
Euchre is to win the game according to the constitutive rules of the game. There is much 
elaborate and pleasurable sociality that can occur around Euchre—and it may very well 
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be worth anthropological interest insofar as it involves teamwork, strategy, bluffing—but 
(as it is played by most people who enjoy it) it is just a game. In Euchre, the prelusory 
goals of having won the game and having contested with friends are subsumed by the 
immediate lusory goals of winning tricks and scoring points. It is as Markus Montola 
says about games in general, and “players usually adhere to the rules of irrelevance and 
disregard X, focusing on Y instead” (2012: 53). However, the prelusory goals of poker 
remain the motivating force of the game, and so the constitutive rules act as secondary to 
the regulative rules to establish a lusory means for sociable gambling.   
 Likewise, the goal of fantasy role-playing is not simply to slay a dragon according 
to the constitutive rules of the game (a would-be lusory goal), but to struggle with a story 
about slaying a dragon (prelusory goal) through a complicated system (lusory means). 
Players generate affective payoffs by literally—albeit abstractly—struggling with a 
system of virtual objects and imaginary affordances. Each action of the game is charged 
with various goals that come from and pervade through the system itself.  
 As another point of contact between poker and role-playing, the most important 
Signs in the game of poker do not come from the constitutive system of rules but from 
the other players—from the Indices of confidence, apprehension, and all forms of 
subterfuge that make the game challenging and rewarding. Similarly, the operant Signs in 
tabletop role-playing are created by the players.  
Frame Analysis of Tabletop Role-Playing 
 The first monograph of fantasy role-playing came in the field of qualitative 
sociology, Gary Alan Fine’s Shared Fantasies (1983). Fine sought to analyze three 
dimensions of the genre (the formal, the social, and the cultural) at a very early stage in 
the hobby’s history. While gaming culture has done nothing less than explode since 1983, 
Fine’s formal analysis still functions as the point of departure for most subsequent work 
in tabletop role-playing (for example Mackay 2001; Montola 2003; Bowman 2010; 
Cover 2010; Tresca 2011). He offers a worthwhile mobilization of Erving Goffman’s 
“frame analysis” and delineates three frames of meaning that overlap and interact during 
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play: the social frame (the friends around table), the game frame (the rules, artifacts, 
systems), and the diegetic frame (the imagined world and ongoing narrative of the 
fictional heroes). While most scholars agree with Fine that the purpose of a role-playing 
game is to produce and play with symbols that represent a fantasy world (signifiers and 
signifieds), it seems that each researcher cannot help but tinker with the three frames Fine 
offers to produce his or her own unique paradigm (Appendix B).  
 However, I find the multiplying of frames unnecessary. Rather than posit three or 
more distinct domains of meaning and then work to trace points of contact, I would 
instead look at the activities and semiotic processes of play and see what domains 
emerge—or do not emerge. I propose a new frame analysis of the study of tabletop role-
playing games that I believe to be much closer in spirit to Goffman’s original usage.  
 Following, this analysis contains only a single frame, the game. It is the 
phenomenological experience of “We are playing a game” that covers all of the keyings 
and codes that transform the various utterances and images of into intersubjective 
fantasy. Within this frame, there are four layers, or what Goffman calls “laminations.” 
Worth noting, while these laminations at first appear to be roughly equivalent to the 
“frames” within the analyses of other scholars, they operate very differently, as sets of 
material conventions and mechanisms rather than abstract domains.   
 
 Frame: Playing a Game 
  Keying 1: Risky, violent strips of action keyed as role-playing a “part” for 
fun 
  Fabrication 1: The role of the game-master16 
  Keying 2: Role-playing keyed as contest/sport (with performative 
elements)   
  Keying 3: Bricolage of strips, contests, and memory keyed as dramatic 
narrative 
  
                                                
16 This fabrication will not attract too much attention here, only because it can be fully explained in the 
definition of the game-master as the final arbiter of the game and the primary storyteller, who reveals the 
objects and happenings of the fantasy world to the players. I am currently writing an article with a 
colleague, Antero Garcia, about the specific role of the game-master. 
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There is no singular “social frame” that sits atop it all. While “primary frameworks” 
exist, they need not be especially noted here. To say again, of course no play is entirely 
free from larger social frameworks, as scholars rightly acknowledge (see Castronova 
2005: 156; Lastowka 2009; Montola et al. 2009: 200); however, these would be analyzed 
only as needed depending on the situation. The players’ ongoing social worlds can entail 
any number of other frames afoot at any given moment and would only be recognized if 
something in the game triggered an awareness. 
 Each of the following sections discusses in detail one element of the diagram 
above: the singular frame (Section II), the first make-believe keying (Section III), the 
secondary keying that takes up the constitutive rules (Section IV), and a third keying that 
retroactively translates the activity of playing the game as a whole (Section V).  
II. THE GAME IS THE FRAME 
 
 Putting the “game frame” front and center lets the activities of rolling dice and 
narrating actions take place in the ongoing social lives of the players. Just like attending a 
play, watching a movie, or being on a date, the game is understood as “what it is that is 
happening” in an ongoing social life. To be sure, these games are complex, and many 
things are happening at once, but confusion about the frame is rare. While it is true that 
players often become confused over what precisely is happening at any given moment in 
the imagined game-world (and every scholar of tabletop games will have her favorite 
story about such gaffes), players rarely get confused about whether something that occurs 
is happening in the game or in actual life. Game designer Steve Sneiderman observes 
how readily people seem to monitor frames of meaning even when precise markers are 
absent: 
 
Players and fans and officials of any game or sport develop an acute awareness of 
the game’s ‘frame’ or context, but we would be hard pressed to explain in writing, 
even after careful thought, exactly what the signs are. After all, even an umpire’s 
yelling of ‘Play Ball’ is not the exact moment the game starts. […] A human 
being is constantly noticing if conditions for playing the game are still being met, 
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continuously monitoring the ‘frame,’ the circumstances surrounding play, to 
determine that the game is still in progress, always aware (if only unconsciously) 
that the other participants are acting as if the game is ‘on’” (Sneiderman 2004, 
qtd. in Salen and Zimmerman 2003: 75). 
 
Though small corrections are required here and there, it would be misleading to make 
much of these easily re-enframed mistakes.17 In most cases, the people playing the game 
have every interest to work together, and so they maintain the frame as clearly as 
possible.  
Frame Negotiation, Staying in Key 
 Maintaining a frame, what Goffman also describes as sustaining a “storyline of 
activity” (1959), is the very stuff of sociality. While gamers may have a reputation for 
being anti-social or insular in popular media portrayals, I find most sessions proceed with 
deliberately fuzzy edges around the game. Because the lusory means of tabletop gaming 
begin with simple storytelling, games are surprisingly permeable. In simple terms, when 
a newcomer to the room or scenes asks after “what’s going on,” players could either 
break frame to reference “the game” or respond in key; in the majority of cases players 
will respond to such inquiries in key.  
Answering in Key  
 When playing with the Techies in the casita, the group has several opportunities to 
interact with Clark’s landlord, a middle-aged woman who lives in the main house on the 
property and frequently stops by to use the shared laundry machine or grab a tool from 
the shared closet. If she asks “what’s happening?” she will likely receive an answer 
keyed to entertain, devoid of any specific detail that would not make sense to anyone 
unfamiliar with the game: “We are at this very moment attempting to land ultra-light 
gliders on the back of a large military blimp so we can sneak inside the compartments 
underneath and assassinate a few people. You know, the usual. What are you up to?” 
                                                
17 When we talk about alternate reality games in Chapters 5 and 6, we will be much more concerned with 
how the frame is itself constituted and negotiated. As it is, “playing a game” is a familiar enough frame for 
most people to navigate, even if they are new to the specific genre engaged. 
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 This may seem banal enough, but it becomes a captivating thought: a response in 
key presumes that the newcomer is either already familiar enough with the frame to make 
sense of the keying or can be keyed into what is happening readily enough. It is an 
immediately intersubjective move—an intimate sort of thing—to respond from within the 
world of one’s own experience before the world of fact. It is like lobbing a ball at the 
newcomer in the park assuming she will catch it, like a flirtation or affecting an accent to 
“do a bit.” Such an answer pulls at the newcomer in a way.  
 Every so often I see the newcomer take the bait and join in. In Indiana, Jess’s 
wife, Beth, will often come out to the garage for a beer and sit with the Townies for a 
while. She cracks open a bottle and asks, “What’s up?” More often than not Jess will 
respond with keyed speech, unintentionally encompassing her with the make-believe. 
Beth nods and takes in the scene, checking out the illustrations, cards, tokens, dice, etc. 
She sips on her drink and listens in for a while to get into the stream before adding 
suggestions here and there.  
 
Me: Okay, the Giant Grackle puffs its feathers and squawks at you. Hissing and  
 whistling. Before emitting a series of fast chirps. Clicks and chirps. [Half- 
 committed impersonation] You hear other birds in the distance but can’t 
tell if the  
 display is meant to challenge you or summon them. I’ll give you two 
checks each  
 in response before I take any turns.   
Jess: [To me] Two? [To all] I’m going to puff right back at him. I get all— 
Green: —all of us killed! [Laughing] 
Beth: Is there anything else around? Wouldn’t it make more sense to find a giant 
cat or  
 something that can chase the thing away?  
Green: Would make more sense than squawking at it.   
   
And at least partially, this first keying is what “playing the game” is, no matter if she rolls 
any dice or knows any of the rules for the second keying at all. While Beth’s suggestion 
might overstep the usual agency of a player-character in the game, she is participating in 
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the storytelling aspect of play. To speak in engrossed terms is to key is to make-believe is 
to role-play.  
 And once she is “in the game,” she no longer switches in and out of frame 
whatever else she might get up to in the garage. Beth will often add story elements and 
take part in group plotting even if she is working on crafting jewelry across the room. 
The “what it is that is happening” is still the game; we just happen to be playing a game 
at the same time someone is fashioning a necklace. If I tie my shoes or send a quick text 
during play, nobody would consider the frame “broken.” Likewise, Beth’s actions are 
taken right up into the ongoing socializing we do around the table. It is a matter of what 
the activity means to those involved, not what register or domain any given word, 
gesture, or phrase triggers. Conversations about what food we will order, whether the 
beers will last, and how tall Green’s daughters are getting surround and permeate the play 
without disrupting it.  
Added Laminations 
 Some keyed answers arise as small performances for the benefit of the outsider, 
which technically adds another key or “lamination” onto the frame: the players are now 
performing for an audience at the same time as make-believing.  
 Settling in around midnight at a 24-hour diner outside Toledo, OH, the Hicks have 
no qualms about arranging their Dungeons & Dragons game on the corner table. When 
the waitress asks us “what’s going on?” she has to handle quite the gruesome reply:  
  
Trash: Oh, it’s just— 
Russell: We have bodies to get rid of.  
Howard: We’re gonna be chopping up some bodies—  
Amanda: The guards we just killed. Time for chopping.     
  
Howard: [To Amanda] Yeah? [Pauses, to all] The guards I just killed, actually. 
[Back to  
 the waitress] Gotta find a place to bury them before any of the elves show 
up  
 and— 
Amanda: Kill us— 
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Howard: Kill me [Pausing again, feigning frustration], the only one who has done 
the  
 killing so far. [Rolling his eyes at Amanda for the benefit of the waitress] 
It sucks  
 being covered in blood all the time, but someone’s gotta do it.   
 
Halfway through Howard almost loses her, but the humor softens the image of mangled 
corpses. The waitress chuckles at the introduction and seems happy to have us in the 
otherwise empty diner. Her question gives Howard and Amanda a small space to translate 
and negotiate what is occurring within the game-world as though they were debating any 
actual event or encounter. The larger social framework of the restaurant factors little into 
the game, and we play for a few hours waiting for Terry to show up.  
 In each of the cases above, the players are aiming to elicit a playful response from 
the newcomer, whether related to the game or just for fun. Most keyed phrases aimed at 
outsiders do not come from an inability for players to “escape” from the game but from a 
genuine desire to bring the newcomer into it with them.  
Guarding The Frame 
 However, answers keyed at the level of the game-system often function to 
intentionally close the frame off from outsiders. While make-believe and storytelling are 
relatively easily, the esoteric mechanisms of a game’s rules can be mobilized to bar entry. 
Without a shared frame, other bodies in the room are noticeably outside the “what it is 
that is happening” for the players, which often results in a tangible boundary.  
 At Gen Con in 2013, I approach a table of gamers in the open-play area circled 
around an interesting and impressive arrangement of miniatures. As far as I can see, the 
setup does not seem to follow any representational order, but nevertheless it appears very 
precise and meaningfully positioned. It piques my interest, and I ask the least busy player 
what they are up to. The man looks at me and says in a quite pleasant tone, “We just 
finished round three and need to refresh our markers before we phase. He has three jets 
left, but I don’t think he’s going to use them. I wouldn’t.”  
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 Despite his smile and ready answer, it is clear from how he references the frame 
through esoteric details of the constitutive key that he would rather not welcome me into 
the game even as observer. He has successfully blinded me with science, and I move on 
to other tables and other games. A reply in that key that did not use specific terms from 
the game would likely communicate the opposite, as would a reply that demonstrates the 
make-believe keying. I never did figure out what game it was.  
 Interesting to note, responding in untransformed speech has a similar effect on 
outsiders, and gamers can communicate an unwillingness to share the frame by speaking 
from outside it when engaged. This amounts to a kind of “fabrication” in Goffman’s 
terms but in reverse, where the players hide what is “really going on” by talking in literal, 
everyday terms. For example, later on during our night at the diner, a customer who turns 
up in the early hours of the morning approaches the table of Hicks to ask what we are 
doing. Amanda replies, “We are writing things on bits of paper, rolling these fancy dice, 
attempting to get high numbers. It’s really interesting.”  
 Her refusal to speak in frame this time alerts the customer to Amanda’s intention 
to keep him out of the activity. This amounts to a strategic “frame break” from the game, 
which I will discuss more in depth below.  
Other Frames 
 All this is not to say that there is nothing outside the frame. Primary social 
frameworks persist, and other frames can override the game from time to time. During a 
night in Austin with the Dorks, we all take a short break for snacks and overhear Tony on 
the phone with his friend explaining that he is “playing cards” with some coworkers. This 
knowledge then reframes the rest of the night for everyone. It is hard to disregard that 
Tony has built a “fabrication”18 around the game that now sets the rest of us “in on 
something” against his other friends.  
                                                
18 For Goffman, the two ways to transform normal activity is to “key” it as something else or build a 
“fabrication” that masks it. Together, these two transformations can account for any and all frame play (see 
1974: 83). 
 127 
 In fact, other frames are just as likely to be engendered by the game itself as by 
things prior to the game. The game can be utilized to negotiate and produce meaningful 
frames and unique situations.  
 For the Townies most games of Fantaji take place at Jess’s house, but we 
occasionally play over at Green’s house when he is needed to watch the kids. This 
typically finds the group of men half-sitting around a large island separating the kitchen 
from the dining space. On any given weekend Reanna will likely be visiting with Mitch 
from Chicago, and she Reanna and her sister-in-law Sandy teasingly refer to Fantaji as 
“My Little Pony.” They have their own fun chiding their husbands for playing such a 
“childish pastime.”  
 Over the years, the group has developed a fun tradition: whenever Reanna or 
Sandy enters the room and asks “what’s up?” out of playful curiosity, a new lamination is 
added to the frame, and one player or another will attempt to transform the current 
moment of in-game narrative into a twisted and filthy phantasmagoria loosely inspired by 
images of My Little Pony. It is a unique art, and we have all taken our tries over the years; 
it has become the group’s very own Aristocrats! joke, with the most celebrated reply to 
date given by Jess shortly before I joined the group. 
 But some of the participants in the joke see more to the tradition than another 
layer of performance. One late night over the summer Sandy comes into the kitchen with 
the twins in tow and asks her question, “So what’s up in My Little Pony tonight, boys?”  
 We turn to see her wrestling with the twelve-year-olds, and so Green foregoes the 
traditional dirty response for the sake of his daughters, offering instead a straight take on 
the in-game action. Sandy is visibly upset and asks again with a frustrated tone, confusing 
all of us. Misunderstanding what led to her sudden shift in mood, Green answers with 
more detail but still withholding any lamination of performance. Sandy leaves in a huff, 
and the moment goes mostly forgotten until a few months later when I am talking with 
Green on Skype to plan another visit.  
 He explains to me that what the gamers took as an invitation to playfully rekey 
our narrative for the entertainment of Sandy and Reanna had developed into a “check” 
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from the wives to their husbands. The coded My Little Pony reference in the question had 
come to mark, for Sandy at least, the instigation of a new frame, a “check” on her ability 
to control the situation and secure the attention of her husband when desired. In her mind, 
the question put to the group a request to “frame shift” from the world of the game to a 
world that includes her. She was understandably upset when confronted with the 
realization that Green had hitherto entirely missed that level of meaning in the question 
and in each of those earlier moments had not been sharing a semi-private frame with her 
as she had presumed. Now when we hear the question, we gladly pause the game and let 
Green or Mitch check in with their families. The performance is no longer necessary 
because the coded reference to My Little Pony is now understood to exist outside the 
game.     
Frame Breaking 
 While the misunderstanding between Green and Sandy was fixed quite easily, 
sometimes the negotiation of frames turns hostile. Goffman discusses competition over 
the frame in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959), when participants at a 
cocktail party, for example, are competing over control of the situation and defining 
exactly “what it is that is happening” here. I have yet to see a fight begin due to someone 
misunderstanding the nature of the frame; however, I have seen several fights begin due 
to someone entirely correctly understanding what was going on: 
  
Dale: Dammit. I am never going to get a break on this guy.  
Me: Don’t look at me. I haven’t killed any of y’all yet. Can’t blame me for trying.  
Dale. No. Yeah. I just wanna fucking kill him.  
Aytek: Guys. I can use my Burst and deal the final Mortal Wound with the six 
Tokens. It  
 will be faster, and we don’t need the Tokens for healing anyway.  
Me: Easy enough! 
Dale: [To Aytek] You are not gonna fucking do it, man.  
Aytek: Yes, I just did. It’s done.  
Me: You sure? 
Aytek: [Ignoring Dale’s glare] Yes.  
Dale: Fuck you, man. Fuck you.  
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Aytek: You quit crying so much.  
Dale: Fuck you.  
 
This is the equivalent of a player “charging the mound” in baseball. The frame of the 
game is broken, and the primary framework of offense and retribution comes to the fore. 
When Aytek succeeds in slaying the beast that Dale is having trouble with, the effect is 
larger than the game. Dale feels slighted, and Aytek intentionally or not offends the 
former’s pride. Events within the frame of the game are not acceptable at the level of the 
primary framework of the presentation of self, and Dale makes sure his friend knows that 
by stepping “out of key” and refusing to continue. We spend the next few hours keeping 
Dale in check and “contained” in the frame.  
 That games never fully escape primary frameworks has been acknowledged 
before. My point is the frame of a role-playing game is continually negotiated and 
refigured in each act of keying without requiring a hard “in” or “out” at every moment. 
The game is afoot to the degree that anyone maintains the key, but so is everyday life. 
Like having two conversations at once or playing a game of cards at the bar, it is typically 
relatively easy to share a sense of what is going on and negotiate expectations for 
maintaining an immersive and pleasurable experience for everyone.  
 I figure three distinct keyings within this frame: the prelusory make-believe and 
fundamental lusory means of social storytelling (Section III), the constitutive rules of the 
specific game-system (Section IV), and the later production of a singular narrative thread 
(Section V).  
III. PLAYING IN THE KEY OF MAKE-BELIEVE 
  
 Tabletop role-playing games manifest the explicit intention to turn make-believe 
into a game. The genre emerged in its present form at a very specific moment in the 
development of computer technologies, but it echoes much older forms of play in the 
tradition of word games, parlor games, dance, and other time-passing hobbies. Fantasy 
role-playing entails a particular mode of interaction that works as an alibi for changing up 
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social expectations and creating new atmospheres of sociality. Like speaking only in song 
lyrics or spending a lunch break speed-dating, tabletop role-playing games present a fresh 
way for friends and strangers to interact socially. What is so interesting about the medium 
is precisely how complex and convoluted a game can become while its immediate social 
function—that of a rule, an abstract toy—remains relatively simple.  
 The first keying in the frame is the cluster of practices and conventions by which 
strips of fantasy action are keyed into make-believe. What unique activities allow the 
players to all “key” the story the same way? What small gestures, tones, corrections, and 
nudges keep everyone going along in the same direction and keep everyone engrossed? 
Important to note, these practices and conventions lie entirely outside any of the 
constitutive rules of a game-as-system. This is the key of make-believe itself. Goffman 
suggests that “a corpus of transcription practices must be involved for transforming a 
strip of offstage, real activity into a strip of staged being” (1974: 138). I am interested in 
this “corpus” of practices, a indefinite list of micro-moves, intentions, and gestures that I 
abstract around three crucial poles: grounds, agency, and performance.  
Getting In Key 
 For anyone in the United States under 40, video games are easy. The once strange 
directional-pad made famous on the original Nintendo has become second nature. And 
mastering the dual toggles used to control a 3-D avatar’s movement (the left toggle) and 
orientation (the right toggle) with the newer consoles took no time at all by comparison. 
Speaking technically about how the interface through which a player-character inhabits 
the digital space of a video game, there are surprisingly few modes of embodiment 
available. Though buttons will activate different commands in different games, the 
ontology of embodiment has become rather conventional across games and platforms. In 
a third-person platform game, you see the avatar in front of you and control its movement 
as described above with your thumbs. In a first-person game, the monitor represents the 
field of your avatar’s vision, and you control an off-screen body in space just as you 
would in third-person. Several titles allow the perspective to be shifted between the two 
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modes without changing the gameplay at all, perhaps demonstrating fewer modes of play 
than we might think.  
 The player watches Iconic representations of avatars and objects navigating 
environments on the screen. She pushes buttons with her thumbs and fingers in response 
to the movement on screen and through trial and error learns an Indexical relationship 
between the clicking of the fingers and the movements of the avatar. The nature of this 
movement and the nature of the timed, responsive, dexterous button-pushing interact as 
Symbolic values in the game-system, digital inputs pushed through algorithms to reveal 
digital outputs. Most anyone casually observing the performance will likely care more 
about the play of the representations on the screen than the playful moving of the thumbs, 
while waiting players might also study the movements of the thumbs as any student of a 
craft.  
 The manual lusory means, the clicking of buttons and toggling of toggles, is 
second-nature to a younger generation of gamers in the global North. Fantasy role-
playing is a little trickier. 
Grounds: Now That You’ve Found Another Key… 
 I noted earlier how readily experienced players negotiate the edges of the frame, 
but it may take a while to get “in key” initially. Importantly, this negotiation has less to 
do with learning the actual rules of the game-system (we will get to those later) but 
instead demonstrates the mechanisms of keying, make-believing, public fantasizing that 
are learned prior to any formal game. 
 When the Dorks introduce Ismael to role-playing, he has a little trouble catching 
on. This is the first session with everyone together, and it is Ismael’s first time role-
playing ever. The rest of us are on our second session together, and we are doing 
everything we can think of to steal a small drake19 from its cruel owner. The experienced 
players start the night negotiating with the villainous pet-owner and get nowhere, and 
Frederik turns to Ismael:  
                                                
19 A small, quadrupedal dragon with no wings or noteworthy magical abilities. 
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The drake scampers up to you and flicks a forked tongue near your feet. Taking a 
liking to you, it slithers up your leg and under your shirt, crawling up and out of 
your collar, twisting down your arm, and resting flatly in your hand. The reptilian 
critter balls itself up in your palm and stretches like a playful cat. After a few 
moments it seems to catch a scent and sniffs with its flickering tongue around 
your fingers… It begins to nibble on your hand. 
 
 Frederik’s narration is a small keying, an invitation to respond, not necessarily 
with dice or pantomime, but to get Ismael’s “head in the game” as it were. We are 
playing make-believe together, and the performance is a shared responsibility. Frederik 
presents a dangerous condition in the keyed environment, which invites Ismael into the 
game as though he were lobbing a ball at him in the park. Ismael, failing to recognize the 
invitation and step “in key,” waits for something. Frederik could very easily lead with a 
direct “what do you want to do?” question and bring Ismael into the story; however, I 
have come to learn that Frederik’s style of “sink or swim” works very well with a certain 
type of new player. Also, Frederik is not the kind of game-master to act as prompter or 
problem-giver. He describes the world, and you react or die. The following transcript is 
an abridged version edited from more than thirty minutes of prodding: 
 
Frederik: You feel the teeth biting down on your skin. 
Ismael: [Smiles, waits]  
Frederik: The drake breaks the skin, nibbling through blood now. 
Ismael: [Laughs, showing amusement]  
Frederik: [Rolls a die to settle a random event in his head] He swallows a chunk 
of flesh. 
Ismael: Does it hurt? That sucks.  
Frederik: Yes, if you don’t get him off your hand, he will keep eating it.   
Ismael: Damn. [Still waits] 
Frederik: The drake crawls around your forearm and grips into you with his 
claws… 
Frederik: It opens its mouth and chomps down hard on your finger now… 
Frederik: The drake is gnawing your finger to the bone…  
Ismael: Ah! Damn! That sucks! 
Frederik: The drake eats through your finger… 
Frederik: Your finger is gone.  
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Ismael: I want to shake him off! 
[Applause, and everyone cheers before they jump into teasing him] 
Frederik: Thank you. Now roll a Reflex Savings Throw. 
  
 After several long moments, we have Ismael fully embodying his player-
character. The difficult adjustment has little to do with the rules of the game and instead 
revolve around the entirely unfamiliar practice of public make-believe, something he says 
he has never even considered before. Ismael has no siblings and cannot remember ever 
running around the backyard pretending to be a ninja, or a barbarian, or a dinosaur. He 
recalls drawing fantasy pictures and being interested in the Dungeons & Dragons 
cartoon, but he never entertained the thought of sharing his make-believe or performing it 
somehow. Since joining the group, Ismael says “a new world has opened up,” and he 
thinks of gaming as a new way to socialize with people he has known for years. Ismael is 
the most dedicated player in the group after Frederik by far, and he plays with two other 
groups besides us, though less frequently.  
 The Dorks must listen to Ismael recount his “origin story” to every new player 
who stops by our game, and it becomes a bit of a big fish tale over the years. Each time 
the telling gets a little longer, and his dullard immobility is exaggerated another step. 
When the narration is directed at someone who is role-playing for the first time, it will 
end with the same moral. As Ismael put it the last time I heard the bit: “You can’t steer a 
parked care. You can’t help someone if they aren’t pushing the gas.”    
 This entrance into the keying through first-person projection is a fundamental 
mechanism of tabletop role-playing and collects all the rest together. It seems that the 
absolute ease of it is what makes the genre confusing to new players, who expect there to 
be some more complicated procedure dictated by harder-to-learn rules. As simple as can 
be, the first lusory means engaged is first-person storytelling “as if” the game-world were 
actual. In a Peircean sense, the player must shift perspective in a way and take the signs 
of the game-world as Dicent, rather than Rhematic. The Signs that arise are not potentials 
or quotations only, and to be “in the game” is to Interpret each action and each signal as 
actual—albeit keyed—activity. What are Rhematic Symbols (“The drake eats through 
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your finger”) for the players around the table are keyed into Dicent Indices (There is a 
drake eating through your finger, and you need to do something!).  
 I would here argue that this subtle shifting of the ground is not a simple code-
switching or linguistic move, but represents a frame-switching or cognitive adjustment. 
Such an adjustment acts as foundation of toying with the game. Each utterance must be 
read according to the larger frame and situated as “in game” or not.  
Agency: … What Are You Going To Play? 
 Once the first lusory means is taken up, that shift into a new ground or 
perspective, a tabletop role-playing game becomes an exploration of conjured space and 
individual agency. While most games-as-systems ask the user to reach a certain lusory 
goals within the system, the toy lies open and waiting the motives of the player. That 
proper games are defined by their lusory goals and toys by the ever-changing prelusory 
goals they afford is crucial to my analysis.  Worlds do not come ready-made with goals, 
and if a tabletop game is to offer a virtual world, then the genre would need to sustain all 
kinds of socializing, all kinds of prelusory goals. A game demands a certain agency; it 
interpolates the player into its system of values and forces investment. If a user fails to 
invest in the system, then the game stalls or ends. On the other hand, the toy is 
interpolated into the agency of the players who make demands of it.  
 In tabletop role-playing, players individually and as a group must decide on their 
own lusory goals. If the motive is to role-play a brave hero, what would that brave hero 
want to do? There is no “right” thing to do or “objective” in a role-playing game. It is a 
world, a space, a platform. Depending on the particular setting of the game, player-
characters could just as easily protect dragons as slay them, just as easily open a hospital 
as build a castle, just as easily open a business as rob one, etc. However, this freedom can 
be heavy, and the existential crisis will strike every player and every campaign at some 
point. The player-characters in most role-playing games are more often than not 
“condemned forever to be free.” Players familiar with video games or board games alone 
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rarely create their own motives within a game and can find the responsibility 
burdensome.  
 When Amanda joins the Hicks shortly after I do, there is a barrier to entry slightly 
different from Ismael’s. Amanda is eager to share in the make-believe and catches on 
quickly to key, but the completely open-ended freedom of the story paralyzes her. The 
scene is a skirmish between our band of heroes and a scouting party that works for a 
hideous naga20. Amanda decided to accompany Russell at the last minute, and for her 
first night gaming Trash provides a pre-made player-character. She follows along in the 
combat and picks up the system easily enough, but when her player-character is finally 
presented with an open-ended decision, she is stuck.  
 Everyone exhales after the hard fight, and Trash asks Amanda, “Okay, fight’s 
over. What do you want to do now?” She balks for a long moment and describes the 
feeling to me later that night: 
 
What are you supposed to do? I mean, it’s a game. But it’s me, or almost me. And 
you want to do something useful and fun. But you don’t know what’s going to be 
fun or what’s going to be useful to the other players. Everyone else was in gear. 
You have to figure out what you can do and then decide what things you want to 
do. It sounds easy now, but it wasn’t. I just decided [the player-character] should 
be like Sharon Stone from The Quick And The Dead, and from then it was easier. 
I had a picture to go on.   
 
It could also be that Amanda had trouble finding direction or motivation because she was 
not playing “her character,” but the above paralysis occurs with a good portion of new 
players, even those who have spent hours customizing the perfect avatar before their first 
session. There is a sudden awareness that characters can do anything, and the player has 
to provide the impetus for action herself.  
 The same paralysis hits people in the popular online virtual world Second Life. 
The central activities are building worlds and building relationships, and oftentimes new 
                                                
20 A half-human, half-snake creature similar to the Medusa depicted in Clash of The Titans (Davis 1981) 
with Laurence Olivier as Zeus. 
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users are either overwhelmed or underwhelmed by the amount of options. Local social 
poetics sustain the entire platform, and creative meaning-making arises because there is 
literally nothing else to do but float around. Ken Hillis (2009) figures Second Life not as a 
virtual world but a “graphical chat” for this very reason: it has no lusory goals. Goals 
must be invented by the users and shared among the groups and cliques that form in each 
environment. The activity of a virtual world functions much like a detached, open-ended 
worlding, where meaning must struggle to arise out what is otherwise just stuff. On the 
other hand, as a proper game, World of Warcraft has hundreds of lusory goals ready for 
players to chase.    
 The most popular tabletop role-playing game in the world today, Pathfinder, is 
produced by Paizo Publishing and hit the market in 2009. The game began as a licensed 
clone of Dungeons & Dragons 3.5, though it has developed in its own direction since 
then. I would argue that one of the strongest selling points of the game over Dungeons & 
Dragons came tucked in its first few pages, where an off-hand explanation for the title of 
the game intimated that the player-characters are like intrepid “pathfinders,” individuals 
with some vague, unofficial calling to adventure and roam unknown territories. Having 
gamed for over two decades now and encountered dozens of gamers like Ismael and 
Amanda, I cannot help but see brilliance in having a clearly stated (and entirely vague) 
lusory goal printed in black and white to anchor newcomers.  
 It is common practice for game-masters to break the paralyzing spell of this 
existential crisis for a player by quoting the self-professed motive of the iconic 
adventurer Indiana Jones in his second film, The Temple of Doom (Spielberg 1984): 
“Fortune and glory, kid.”  
Performance: A New Skill 
 Beyond the concerns of ground and agency, another issue with keying that comes 
up at some point in every group is simple self-consciousness. Few of the role-players 
eager to participate in an ethnographic study seemed all that shy, but many new role-
players can feel the pinch from two sides. From one side there is self-consciousness 
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surrounding public play and theatrical performance even as tame as the simple keying 
needed to role-play, and from the other side there is the realization that the presence of 
explicit rules makes “failure” an option. It becomes known that the performance itself can 
fail (the first keying), and, should that not happen, the attempted action of the player-
character within the game-system could fail (the second keying). That role-playing is a 
skill often goes entirely unanticipated until the new gamer stairs at a table of her peers 
and feels all eyes on her. There is a recognition that the outcome of your choice is not 
entirely under your control, and it causes hesitation.  
 Much like the problem of paralysis that comes from facing complete freedom, the 
problem of anxiety over public performance fades quickly, most often the very first night. 
Each new player addresses these issues in her own way, usually with open discussion and 
encouragement from the group.  
 However, stress over performing successfully within the system can remain 
permanent, and many gamers familiar with video games take succeeding within the 
game-system as the explicit goal of play.21 For instance, my friend Greg has been gaming 
with me for over 15 years, and he holds the honor of having rolled a “natural 20” as his 
first move in each and every game I have designed (I lost count at ten or so). I must admit 
that this could be entirely mythological, but the record is clearly important for Greg. The 
streak Indexes in both directions: inward, that his heroes always begin strong, undefeated 
for at least a single roll; and outward, that he himself possesses some kind of role-playing 
“mojo” as he calls it.   
 Jane McGonigal (2011) explains how “making failure fun” is one of the most 
important lessons “real life” can learn from games. In the best games, she says, failure is 
fun. How tabletop role-playing games accomplish this or not depends on the rules. I will 
take more time working through performance within the game-system in Section IV 
below.  
                                                
21 They are called “power gamers” in the hobby, and many games will explicitly advertise themselves as 
“not for power games” or “suitable for power gamers.” 
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A Peculiar Key 
 When I first started playing Fantaji with the Techies, one of the would-be players, 
Michael, just could not get into the hobby. I think his stumbling block came somewhere 
between the first and second keyings of my frame analysis chart. As game-master, I set 
the scene as I would in any other game, keying a strip of fantasy actions as though 
present around us: 
 
The five of you wake up as your property is being ransacked by a large group of 
seemingly haggard brigands. Some are digging through your barn. Some are 
hooking up horses to your wagon. A few are running off with your goats. You run 
outside to stop them, all of you now outside in the yard just in front of the house. 
It appears as though they would have gladly come and gone unnoticed, but in 
response to your rousing they draw their blades. There are no less than a dozen of 
the buggers, and while you have time to collect your things and get outside, you 
are immediately surrounded and pressed into combat. What will you do? 
 
I lay cards out on the table to represent each of the things that exist in the scene according 
to the rules of Fantaji. A few players ask qualifying questions to orient themselves:  
 
Hannah: So, we slept late? It’s late morning? 
Me: Sure. 
Clark: No, it’s better if it’s early. 
Hannah: Yeah. 
Me: Okay, sure. It’s early and the ground is damp. The sky is still purple.  
Clark: Are we officially surrounded, unable to move? 
Aytek: We can’t be totally surrounded before taking a turn. 
Me: You are surrounded as in they are in all directions. But, no, you are not stuck 
in the  
 middle of a tight circle or fenced in. You just have them on all sides.  
Michael: Why do I care about the goats? 
Me: You don’t have to care about the goats.  
Dale: Can I tell who the leader is? 
Me: Yeah, you can tell one of the guys near the wagon is barking commands.  
Clark: Do they have a wagon or transport of their own anywhere? 
Me: You can’t tell yet.  
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While the questions seem to be requests for pre-existing information or permission for 
certain actions, the actual operation resembles something more like a “we should make-
believe X unless Calvin offers a reason why not” suggestion. As the game-master, I 
maintain a very basic “fabrication,” which means I must pre-plan or spontaneously 
decide every possible natural and social event that will occur outside the active agency of 
the player-characters. However, as we see in the above examples, the players take as 
much liberty as possible adding to the make-believe outside their own player-
characters.22 They know I am making up most the details in response to their questions, 
playing off existing affordances and offering stochastic details I hope will be fun to toy 
with.  
 I nudge them into the scene one at a time with “What do you want to do?” 
Nobody takes initiative, so I press the danger a little: “The men are running at you with 
swords.” Hannah starts in first, braving the new game. She declares her turn and rolls 
according to the rules, and we settle the outcome of her turn. She lands a solid hit to one 
of the villains’ leg, dealing damage to the enemy. After first blood, the others jump in and 
take turns until only Michael remains.  
 
Michael: I can do anything I want? Anything I want to do? There are no rules?  
Me: Well, there may be the limitations of physics or capacity, but you can choose 
to  
 attempt anything you want. Yeah.  
Michael: I can just do anything? 
Me: [Encouraging nods, smiles] Yeah. 
Michael: [His best “gotcha” smile] I fuck one of those goats.  
[Everyone laughs] 
Michael: Don’t blame me, man. You invented a game that lets people fuck goats, 
man.  
 You said I could do anything.  
Me: Yes, I did say you could do anything. You could have done anything in the 
entire  
 world. You could have attacked one of the guy’s, hopped on a horse, 
bellowed a  
                                                
22 The ways that any given player may add to the story outside the fixed actions of her player-character may 
or may not be determined by the rules of the game. I will discuss this in the following section. 
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 manly challenge and prepared to defend—anything. Instead, of all the 
options  
 available in the world, you chose to hump a goat? 
 
Michael is not put off with my retort. As far as he is concerned it is just “silly to pretend 
to do something,” which is the very point of the keying in the first place. He suffers none 
of the hesitation over “meaning” that the earlier players did because he just cannot get 
himself to care. No discussion of the creative force of play sways his opinion, and 
nobody takes any offense that he opts to leave the night early. While Michael fully 
understands that the game requires direct, creative make-believe and a self-made motive, 
he has little desire to key in this way.  
 If an individual lacks the attitude to make-believe a story, to conjure a fantastical 
situation into being, the hobby falls flat. Where does this desire to key come from? Who 
has it? Who lacks it? I have yet to find a study that answers any of those specific 
questions, and I am no better at predicting who will enjoy role-playing now than I was 
twenty years ago. The idea that there is a “type of person” into it seems only tautological: 
that “type” seems to have nothing else in common other than role-playing, making it a 
rather hollow analytic tool to posit. Writers, artists, performers all do well; but so do just 
as many athletes, lawyers, and programmers. 
 Overcoming the performance hurdles of a video game excites Michael, and he 
seeks out video games with dragons and castles and magic similar to the game the group 
offers. However, the tabletop gaming could not do any less to pique his interest. This 
happens all the time, a demonstration of a clear distinction between “gamer” and “role-
player.” The role-playing did not have enough role-gaming for Michael.  
 Jane McGonigal (2011) presents a strong case that gaming is enjoyable precisely 
because it is challenging. She offers chapters of evidence that—entirely outside any 
playful intent—the most successful forms of gaming will engage the mind to learn, 
master, and perform. Castronova likewise defends gaming as a creative but at the same 
time labor-intensive practice (2005: 177). Henry Jenkins (2004) also makes much of the 
“exploration” challenges that a game can provide.  
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 Maybe make-believe is too easy for some people. Does it offer too little to 
measure learning, demonstrate mastery, evaluate performance? Do we need to make it 
harder?  
IV. KEYING WITH THE GAME-SYSTEM 
  
 At this point we should note that none of the practices covered so far get inside 
the “black box” of a game-system. As I discussed will argue throughout that the 
seemingly self-contained systems of rules function by design to make ongoing role-
playing harder. The best role-playing games design game-constituting rules that double 
as play-regulating rules. These two keys occurring in tandem is what characterizes the 
frame of tabletop role-playing and make the hobby such a unique medium. Any game 
that loses sight of this two-fold keying could only work to key make-believe 
inadvertently, despite itself.   
 Dungeons & Dragons was designed deliberately to reproduce the activities of 
playing a tabletop war-game without requiring miniatures, models, or elaborate pieces of 
terrain. In a very real way, the game acts as an imaginary tabletop war-game, and its rules 
are meant to constitute Symbolic representations of elements that existed in the earlier 
genre. Bear in mind that tabletop war-games were decidedly not about role-playing 
(keying), storytelling (narrativizing), or immersion (engrossables). Though Gygax and 
Arneson were wise to see the potential for an imaginary and abstract version of war-
gaming—an entirely new hobby and multi-million-dollar industry would develop around 
their singular product and make them famous—even today Dungeons & Dragons has not 
outgrown this consequence of its birth: it is a Symbolic transfiguration of a tabletop war-
game, not a Symbolic keying of make-believe or storytelling. 
Making Make-Believe Harder 
 Watch three nine-year-olds enjoy a fight with a dragon. I growl and snarl at my 
nephew and his friends, chasing them around the lawn. When they stab their arms at me, 
I dodge the invisible blades that extend another yard outward in space. When they shake 
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their open hands in my direction, I wince at the impact of their fireballs. When I mime a 
gigantic jaw with my two arms, they spin and reel, gesturing the bloody spray from their 
arteries. The game is fun for the three of them, engaging enough to keep them from 
checking their Nintendo DSs sitting on the picnic table near the patio door. Despite the 
fact that no entertainment device is ever off anymore—despite the fact that every piece of 
gaming technology produced by Microsoft, Sony, or Nintendo today constantly screams 
out for attention—these three inhabit a world of imagination without a single prop or 
device. I admit I can only half-remember slipping so seamlessly from a Michigan lawn 
into an elven wood. But at my prompting, a handful of words, these boys are there. The 
world around them is alive, enchanted. Though I remain—jaded, cynical, ironic—at some 
remove, I too am there with them, the dragon who fears the wood but refuses to relent his 
pursuit. Despite the limitations of my rigid adult mind, our play in every sense of the 
word is easy. Too easy.   
 Fines’ (1983) characterization of fantasy role-playing as “shared fantasy” grants 
too much weight both to the rules of the game and to the diegesis described by the 
players. He sees the tabletop role-playing game as a set of procedures used to mutually 
represent and enjoy a shared imaginary world, a tool that makes sharing an 
intersubjective fantasy space possible. But surely I did just that with my nephew and his 
friends without delving into the rules of Dungeons & Dragons. The rules of D&D are as 
arcane and esoteric as the magic they imagine. The game is hard. And as Bernard Suits’ 
(1978) underscores, play is largely about opting for “less efficient” means of reaching 
one’s goal. 
Tabletop Role-Playing Games as Better Pencils 
 In an insightful text about contemporary digital technologies, Dennis Baron 
(2009) discusses the fate of two important inscription technologies, the pencil and the 
typewriter. Milestones in the field of writing, both instruments led the way to dozens of 
derivatives, including, respectively, zero-gravity pens and roll-away computer keyboards. 
The question Baron asks: Why do we still use pencils but not typewriters? True, 
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typewriters are collected and displayed for nostalgic purposes, much like cassette tapes or 
compact discs, but they have been replaced by the technologies they inspired. On the 
other hand, the pencil is still decidedly useful. Highlighters, crayons, erasable pens, even 
digital recording styli—all derive from the common lead-stick. Yet the pencil abides.    
 I argue here that tabletop role-playing games are like pencils. While the video 
game industry generates billions of dollars each year and massively multiplayer online 
games host millions of players at a time, the low-fi hobby that inspired such 
entertainments still abides. When artists and programmers sought to “upgrade” the 
tabletop technology by porting it to the screen, they instead built something new that did 
not replace—but complemented—what existed before it. If tabletop games are about 
representing and experiencing fantasy worlds, would not the moving-pictures of the video 
game provide better immersion than words and gestures around a table? In a world of 
computer games, why do tabletop games still exist? If virtual worlds are exploding online 
with better immersion and better graphics, how do their pen-and-paper ancestors survive? 
 Any failed mission to manufacture obsolescence is enlightening. The 
perseverance of the tabletop role-playing game in the face of its betters highlights 
dimensions of the genre that went overlooked before, and so figures in relief precisely 
what makes tabletop games unique. That is to say, those elements of tabletop gaming 
improved upon in video games (predominantly detailed representations of fantastical 
environments, artifacts, and bodies) are precisely the elements of role-playing games that 
are not intrinsic to it. If the representation of a fantasy world was the point of tabletop 
gaming, the hobby would have been replaced.  
 And so what was left behind in the digital conversion turns out to be the most 
important or at least quintessential elements of the hobby, the “analog excess” of the 
genre. Like soil left after the floodwaters retreat, the remainder is often more fertile than 
the original.  
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The Odd Case of Dungeons & Dragons 
 Any historical account of the tabletop role-playing game cannot help but focus on 
the advent of Dungeons & Dragons (Gygax and Arneson 1974), and the specifics of its 
origin are immanently relevant to this discussion of games as systems or as something 
more. The immediate predecessors to Dungeons & Dragons were a brood of related war 
simulations that incorporated miniatures and models. A swell of titles had evolved as 
emulations of a particularly popular game designed by none other than the pacifist H.G. 
Wells and published in 1913 as Little Wars.23 These tabletop war-games used toy soldiers 
and large pieces of fabricated terrain first to re-imagine historical battles and later to 
represent fantastic campaigns of war across imaginary worlds.  
 By the 1970s, dozens of games had evolved, many involving fantastical battles 
with magic and monsters. As miniatures became more various and detailed, any number 
of worlds could be simulated. Rules for settling attacks and gambits with dice began to 
carry more of the weight than the arrangement of the models themselves. When a sniper 
or wizard became powerful enough, for example, it did not matter where on the table the 
miniature was in relation to its target. New rules supplemented what could not be 
represented on the table, and soon dragons could “fly” from any place on the table to 
another. Wizards could read minds or disrupt another unit’s turn, and priests could call on 
boons or blessings from the gods.  
 At some point, the generals themselves were inserted onto the table as miniatures 
and allowed to carry their victories from battle to battle, gaining new abilities with each 
new level of success. As avatars of the players that would grow more powerful with 
continued use, these generals came to represent legendary heroes, eventually 
overshadowing any and all of the other units on the table. Soon enough, a single 
miniature representing the experienced player-hero could be waged against an entire 
army controlled by a novice with a relatively less powerful general. This, of course, 
                                                
23 The full title is Little Wars: a game for boys from twelve years of age to one hundred and fifty and for 
that more intelligent sort of girl who likes boys' games and books. 
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meant that masters of the game would then need only one miniature each to face off on 
the battlefield.  
 The developments in both the content (specialized heroes) and materials (growing 
rules supplementing the physicality of the models) eventually led to a final tipping point: 
the elaborate models and crafted miniatures were no longer necessary. All each master 
player needed was a sheet of paper that delineated the particular powers of his or her hero 
and a handful of dice, and any duel could be settled without resorting to physical models 
at all. In other words, the pen-and-paper rules had outgrown the physical models. In 
1974, Gygax and Arneson published a set of rules for players who wanted to skip the 
models all together and get right to being powerful heroes in an imaginary world of 
magic and monsters. Enter Dungeons & Dragons.  
 The central limitation of this origin may not be immediately obvious, but in the 
transformation from miniatures-and-models to pen-and-paper, D&D internalized a rather 
rigid, objectivist24 view of meaning as Symbolic representation and manipulation alone. 
Every miniature and obstacles that constituted the physical war-game was slowly 
replaced with a Symbolic rule, and piece by piece an abstract system reproduced the 
tactile figurines and modeled terrain. Every object (character, monster, weapon, wall) in 
Dungeons & Dragons functions as a Symbol with a fixed value, a simulacrum of the 
once-physical miniature, and every possible action in the game corresponds to some 
movement or manipulation upon those Symbolic objects. This reproduces exactly the two 
vectors of meaning that Salen and Zimmerman described: signs with inherent Symbolic 
value within a grammar of rules, and signs that represent imaginary game-world objects 
and items to the players. What makes tabletop role-playing so abstract is that this second 
vector of representation happens without moving pictures on a screen and is for the most 
part imaginary or verbal. 
 If we call these defined entities objects and these delimited actions commands, 
then you have a reasonable facsimile of a software programming language. Imagine 
                                                
24 I use the term “objectivist” here following George Lakoff’s (1988) critique of “objectivist cognition.” 
Throughout this dissertation we find the hobgoblin of dualism concealing itself within both idealist and 
objectivist constructions.  
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playing Pac-Man in an arcade in the 1970s. There are a fixed number of commands (up, 
down, left, right) and a fixed number of entities (Pac-Man himself, ghosts, walls, pellets, 
fruit, power pellets). The entire game is then the “free movement” within this fixed 
ontology, this fixed semantic system. The game is fun as a challenging practice, a 
performance of mastery not wholly unlike athletic performances; but there is no 
interpretation, no poetics, no role-playing, no particularly noteworthy immersion that 
would evince any similarities with Dungeons & Dragons. Though we can retroactively 
narrativize our experience of playing a game such as Pac-Man by highlighting the 
dramatic moments of emergent contest and organizing them within a narrative structure, 
we could the same with a game of Tetris (see Murray 1998). And who would at first 
consider Tetris and Dungeons & Dragons analogous games either?  
 As it turns out, just like Pac-Man and Tetris, Dungeons & Dragons was built to 
be a world-independent, closed-system game, a Symbolic representation of earlier forms. 
Put properly in formalist terms, Dungeons & Dragons is not a game of storytelling or 
role-playing but an imaginary tabletop war-game. Moreover, one could just as easily 
complicate the issue one step further by figuring D&D as an imaginary video game. That 
players have instrumentalized the basic mechanics of the game to function as a 
storytelling game for almost 50 years is a testament to the power of poetics.  
 
An Imaginary Board Game 
 The hardest part about learning a new tabletop role-playing game is acclimating to 
the specific ontology the game-system demands. In a video game the software dictates 
according to fixed rules where walls are, where the avatar can move and how fast, what 
the player must do to impact and be effectual in the world, etc. In a tabletop role-playing 
game, the players themselves must learn the complex rules and equations that determine 
the “brute facts” of the game-world. This entails not only learning the algorithms but also 
knowing when to apply them. Every single turn the player takes in a tabletop role-playing 
game presents a “story problem” for the group to quantify and resolve. The players must 
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remember where the walls are, what a wall “means” in the system, and what happens if 
their characters bump into one.   
 Consider a game such as chess. Each of the six pieces/types is a semantic entity 
with a specific value within the grammar of chess constituted only by two qualities: its 
starting position on the board and how it can move on any given turn. Each piece/token 
has an estimable value at any given point in the game based on the current “state of 
affairs” in the game and the possible imagined futures projected by the two players. 
Chess has a very simple ontology, but the game supports notoriously broad domains of 
strategy. Before one learns how to arrange the board at the beginning of the game and 
how each piece can move, she cannot be said to know “how to play” chess.  
 Tabletop role-playing games mostly suffer from the opposite notoriety. Each 
entity has dozens of qualities that afford value within a surprisingly complicated system 
of operations. For example, the following is a “stat block” for a Giant from a Pathfinder 
sourcebook (Shel 2013: 61): 
 
GIANT 
XP 1,600 
NE Large humanoid (giant) 
Init –1; Senses low-light vision; Perception +6 
Defense 
AC 16, touch 8, flat-footed 16 (–1 Dex, +8, –1) 
Hp 57 (6d8+30) 
Fort +7, Ref +1, Will +6 
Offense 
Speed 30 ft.  
Melee club +10 (1d8+7) 
Space 10 ft.; Reach 10 ft.  
Special Attacks Gale Breath (See below) 
Statistics 
Str 25, Dex 8, Con 20, Int 7, Wis 12, Cha 9 
Base Atk +4; CMB +12 (+14 bull rush); CMD 22 (24 vs. Bull rush) 
Feats Awesome Blow, Improved Bull Rush, Power Attack 
Skills Intimidate +4, Perception +6, Survival +6 (+10 in snow) 
Racial Modifiers +4 Climb (when climbing rocks), +4 Survival (in snow) 
Languages Giant 
Ecology 
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Environment cold hills and mountains 
Organization solitary, pair, gang (3–5), or clan (6–16) 
Treasure standard 
Special Abilities 
Gale Breath (Su) Every 1d4 rounds as a full-round action, a [giant] can draw in a 
mighty breath an expel it outward in a 30-foot cone. Targets within 10 feet of the 
origin of this cone must succeed at a DC 18 Strength check or be knocked prone. 
Those who succeed at the check or are standing farther away from the [giant] treat 
the effects of the gale breath as a gust of wind spell.  
 
Rather than two qualities (a starting point on the board, and a single allowed command), 
the Giant above has no less than 30 specific qualities that constitute its identity in the 
game. Each of these qualities is an affordance of Symbolic value waiting to be leveraged 
according to “the rules” of the game. 
 And “the rules” are purely constitutive rules just like most board games and all 
video games, although unlike these other games, the tabletop role-playing game is 
markedly imaginary. The “analog excess” that differentiates tabletop role-playing games 
from their video game counterparts is tied up in their imaginary nature, and I argue that it 
is only by taking advantage of that imaginary nature that players can make poetic use of 
the system itself.   
A Broken Video Game That Works 
 The truth is that Dungeons & Dragons can be captivating, enthralling, engrossing. 
Hobbyists have studied its systems and enjoyed its worlds for decades, generations. My 
argument here is not that D&D is a bad game, only that it is not out of the box a role-
playing game. However, as I will point out here, because Dungeons & Dragons contains 
the “analog excess” that video games lack, it can still be made to function as a role-
playing game in the hands of creative players.  
 In other words, players can do more with the constitutive game-system of D&D 
than make a drinking game out of it or gamble on it. Dungeons & Dragons lets us see 
how the entire system can be toyed with. There are three central features of the genre that 
make this grammar-level toying possible: 
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8. Applying “the rules” to resolve player actions is a process fraught with 
interpretation and inconsistency. This might be the biggest “public secret” 
or “disavowal” in tabletop gaming, that the rules are rarely applied 
“objectively” and that they would be terribly tyrannical if they were.  
 
9. No group of players can embody “complete knowledge” of the rules, which 
means any given rule or value will come into play only when someone 
remembers it, and then only how someone remembers it. 
 
10. Even if the rules were applied to the letter, they are buggy and disconnected. 
Certain supplemental books rewrite old rules, others try to patch over 
incomplete rules, and yet others are caught translating between versions of 
the same rule.  
 
Much of the creative work of the game comes from linking an evaluation of the 
suggested make-believe with an appropriate semantic operation contained in one of the 
rules. The translation between open-ended make-believe and the closed system is an 
alchemy that every group executes in their own way. Sometimes the strips of fantasy 
narrative can get caught up in the cogs of the machine in interesting ways. Players toy 
with the game because they have to, but sometimes making the game actually work is the 
part of the fun.  
Multiplying Symbolic Affordances 
 If anyone attempted to play Dungeons & Dragons with machine-like precision 
“right out of the box,” it would crash. The system works as a role-playing game only 
because it is too unwieldy to implement intact, and each group inevitably invents their 
own rules to patch things with their own chewing gum. It only works when it is toyed 
with, but this “broken video game” might not need fixing.  
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 Those who publish Dungeons & Dragons and similar purely Symbolic role-
playing games eventually realize that the rules are incomplete, disjointed, and buggy. 
Unfortunately, their repeated response to this is to add more Symbolic rules. D&D has 
gone the way of LEGO blocks: where the point of the game was once to use the basic 
structures of it to build whatever you imagined, the expectation shifted to include 
increasingly specific and derived structures that now refigure the nature of the structures 
as meaningful in themselves, as having Iconic (LEGO) or Symbolic (D&D) value in 
themselves. Natural and player-driven affordances are replaced with predefined 
purposes. As the theory went, to become more mature, more sophisticated, more 
powerful, the game had to grow more predefined.  
 Bear in mind that for 14 years, Dungeons & Dragons had only one command: 
attack. When the game was first released players could literally do nothing else in the 
game with any meaningful consequences. Advanced Dungeons & Dragons added “non-
weapon proficiencies” in 1988, which amounted to a fixed list of skills that operated 
similarly to attacking. If a player wanted to make-believe an action for her player-
character within the story of the game, it would be absolutely meaningless if it could not 
be made equivalent to one of the listed skills. What results is that playing Dungeons & 
Dragons, even in 5th edition released in 2014, resembles playing an imaginary board or 
video game: the player selects an object to affect and chooses a command from a set list 
with which to target it.  
 The game worked for 14 years without anything else. The wizard and later the elf 
could cast a spell, but that occurred automatically; and rogues could “disarm traps,” but 
this amounted to a single perfunctory role at each new hex on the map. That players 
attempted and accomplished other feats was largely due to ingenuity and innovation, to 
toying.   
 When I play Advanced Dungeons & Dragons with the Dorks, who would never 
admit to toying, I am always getting myself into trouble. While I acclimate to the system 
well enough, it feels constricting when any fudging or smudging of “the rules” is 
outlawed. The initial strips of fantasy narrative I imagine and hope to add to the story are 
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largely outside the bounds of the possible commands. For example, because flipping over 
a table has no real consequence in a game like Advanced Dungeons & Dragons, for 
example, nobody ever does it. In all of the bar fights and ballroom brawls that have ever 
occurred in my twenty years playing the game, I have never seen anyone flip over a table. 
An iconic moment from any Western gunfight is lost on the game.  
 The solution for the publishers was to add more rules about “taking cover” and 
“environmental armor” to later editions of the game, but such additions do not fix the 
essential problem. The player still has to first ascertain what imaginary actions carry 
Symbolic value in the closed system of the game and then weave her make-believe. It 
works backwards and precludes poetics. In fact, the more semantic objects and operations 
that are added to the game, the less space free make-believe has to manifest itself in the 
gaps.   
Make-Believe as Pure Pageantry 
 Not only is there a problem with Symbolic commands overriding open-ended 
make-believe, there often arise situations when make-believe becomes absolutely 
irrelevant once the Symbolic system is invoked.  
 “Shit. Can I roll for Diplomacy?” 
 Russell holds his face still for a minute, eyeing the other players, wondering if he 
will get away with it. He slaps his forehead to confess his shame and pantomimes a 
hellish scream. The rest of the Hicks laugh, having all been in this position before. The 
Diplomacy skill built into the Dungeons and Dragons 3.5 allows a player to calculate a 
probability of success according to “the rules” and then simply roll the die to determine if 
he can talk himself out of a dangerous situation. There is no actual role-playing required; 
it was literally written out of the game.    
  The scene is familiar to any later-edition D&D gamer, when for one reason or 
another you must resort to the “get out of role-playing free” card and use the dice to 
extricate yourself from some tricky encounter.  
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 The sad consequence of this is that all make-believe becomes not only 
unnecessary, but also entirely extraneous to the game. It is no wonder Gary Alan Fine 
found the performative and theatrical parts of the game unimportant (1983).  
What Remains to Toy With? 
 The desire to socialize in a particular way comes first, and the game is picked up 
as a means toward that end. Walter Benjamin reminds us of the body that instigates play: 
“A child wants to pull something, and so he becomes a horse; he wants to play with sand, 
and so he turns into a baker; he wants to hide, and so he turns into a robber or a 
policeman” (2005: 115). And some children like math, like keeping records, like 
tweaking. I suggest that the central part of the constitutive keying that remains formally 
open to toying is the customization of the Symbolic values attached to the player-
characters.  
 Many gamers find the esoteric rules and procedures of tabletop role-playing 
pleasurable in themselves: collecting booty, recording inventory, optimizing weapons, 
calculating bonuses, tracking stats, etc. And it is this corpus of tasks that come from the 
constitutive rules of the game. That this function is entirely outside the activity of the 
game is worth point out.  
 To be sure, many gamers who enjoy Dungeons & Dragons absolutely love this 
element of mechanical optimization, but just as many despise it. The point remains: if we 
imagine that these rules are the role-playing game, then we are left with studying systems 
and activation. Just as the fun in poker happens around the constitutive rules, so too the 
fun of role-playing happens around the systems of representation while at the same time 
being dependent on them. Studying games on one level alone will limit any application of 
games studies in social theory, and it will provide poor metaphors or schemas for 
understanding everyday life.  
V. THE NARRATIVE KEYING 
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 I agree in one sense with Jennifer Grouling Cover’s (2010) argument that a 
specifically narrative keying arises in tabletop role-playing. While I would not attempt to 
extricate the narrativizing that happens during a player’s turn from the other processes of 
translation and presentation, I see narrativizing play a major role in the hobby when 
gamers reflect on earlier gaming sessions. Reliving previous adventures—or even 
pausing during play to rekey around narrativizing—can take up as much time as the other 
keys for players, and this reflective form of keying seems less studied by scholars. The 
importance of players revising and honing a singular narrative—one that inevitably 
grows similarly to any “the one that got away” tale—is an interesting process that has 
many implications outside the world of gaming.  
 However, in contrast to Cover, I argue that the narrative produced will always 
include the entire frame, not simply the imagined worlds, heroes, and events. This third 
keying will necessarily be a translation of the ongoing game, which includes at least two 
other forms of keying. What Cover might see as a negotiation or arbitration between the 
two previous keyings, I see as a third transformation that affords more opportunities for 
toying and another medium of potential poetics. Moreover, I do not see the purpose of 
narrativization rooted in producing a pleasurable or meaningful narrative; rather, I value 
the processes and mechanisms of narrativizing in themselves, as small moments of 
potential poetics, when the story is open and alive, testing out new directions, moving in 
and out—being toyed with. 
 A tabletop role-playing game is not necessarily the only way to produce a 
compelling story, but it is a good way to experience rewards in the micro-moments of 
motive, decision, and arbitration that occur when people tell stories together. It is a 
process that affords more of these meaningful moments than other games and other 
methods of storytelling. That players attach so much value to the resulting narrative is not 
surprising, but it takes only surface scratching to uncover where the deeper value comes 
from. Like Frost’s The Road Not Taken, it is not the actual character of choice that is 
eventually chosen that matters—rendering the “less traveled” evaluation entirely moot—
but that one choice was chosen, and life is forever different. I argue here that it is the 
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social play of choice, risk, chance, competition, creation that makes the storytelling fun, 
not necessarily the resulting narrative.  
Good Story Not The Goal 
 There are at least three solid clusters of evidence against a view of tabletop role-
playing that puts too much value in the resulting narrative of the play. I would argue that 
these clusters incorporate several elements and work just as well as evidence against a 
view that emphasizes the creation of a particularly interesting or beautiful fantasy realm 
as the purpose of play. 
Mismatched Drama 
 It becomes clear after only cursory reflection that the moments in the game most 
fun to play are not necessarily the parts of the narrative that are most dramatic. There is a 
marked disconnect between drama in the frame and drama in the fantasy realm. Of course 
there are times when overlap occurs, and veteran game-masters will likely plan with great 
care for that to happen. In fact, that it takes such careful planning to match them up 
reinforces my point. Drama emerges from all corners and all keys; narrative has no 
monopoly on swelling affect.  
 With the Townies in Indiana, I spend an entire night of dramatic and fulfilling 
role-playing in which our player-characters do nothing but build a hideout. What would 
be covered by a four-minute montage in any self-respecting film took six hours of careful 
rolling, drawing, designing, and fussing. We had major dramatic moments that focused 
on the second keying of “quantifiable outcomes” and calculations.  
 The Hicks can and regularly do spend entire sessions with their player-characters 
undertaking harrowing adventures and epic quests of god-slaying and world-saving, but 
many of these nights feel entirely mundane and dull at the level of the frame.  
Mutually Exclusive Accounts 
 Another thorn in the side of perspectives that privilege the resulting narrative is 
the simple fact of mutually exclusive accounts existing in the same group (and the same 
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individual). The activities of making narrative choices and trying out narrative directions 
are largely more fun than remembering the final decisions made. For example, the 
Techies ceaselessly argue about what occurred in the session before, and these arguments 
end when they agree not on the arc of the narrative but what was happening just before 
the current moment. The course of the story will likely be rewritten throughout the course 
of the current session as well so there is no need to make things official.  
 In a related vein, any “big fish” tale needs to grow and change over time, and it is 
the process of the telling that is fun to perform and fun to observe. Somebody recounting 
the same details later would be pointless. If the narrative were fixed, it would never need 
to be recalled.  
Random Survival 
 Role-players who have been playing for several years, especially those familiar 
with early versions of Dungeons & Dragons, rarely hesitate to jump right in and start 
swinging in whatever direction presents itself. This does not come from cavalier 
personalities, but emerges as a condition of the game itself. In early editions of D&D, a 
player-character took all of five minutes to create, and she could just as easily die in four. 
There was less of an attachment to new player-characters when those games dominated 
the hobby; I have played upwards of four player-characters in a single gaming session 
and still ended the night with death. These characters needed no backstories or 
personalities: those things were meant to evolve over time as memories, auras, 
experiences grow. This echoes my earlier point about the fate of poetics when structures 
become to fully formed.  
 
 In all of the above instances, the narrative account of those sessions is somehow 
dramatic and engaging. Even when the diegesis of the game-world is dull, the 
overlapping lusory keyings of the frame are exciting enough to render the final 
transformation also exciting. What this means is that the narrative key works on the 
frame as a whole, not just as a representation of arc of the diegesis.   
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Poiesis in Detritus  
 The narrative key seems to function another way in tabletop role-playing as well. 
There is a more remote narrativity that enacts precisely the same key, but does so at a 
temporal remove. If the narrative key does engage the entire frame of play, then it is easy 
to imagine the translation on a broader scale. That the process of play exhibits vast poetic 
toying with performance and systems has been argued, but I feel that a similar toying can 
happen later with the detritus gaming produces. This keying still operates on the frame, 
but now the frame is longer. I suggest here that a temporally remote narrative keying may 
illuminate an affordance of tabletop role-playing that might even work as poiesis. 
 The traces of play that role-playing produces are vast: game-master notes, 
drawings, working calculations, diagrams, maps, piles of scratch paper: The record 
amounts to a bricolage of marks and markings that Index long-absent moments, images, 
affects, and vectors. I suggest that, just like a work of art, these records elicit reflection 
and contemplation; they can be regularly gone back to and re-interpreted. It may be 
through embracing the under-defined meaningfulness of actual playfulness that activities 
of play can then be made and remade as needed.  
 When I help Trash prepare for a night with the Hicks, I see him digging through 
his old box of scraps. He flips through the pages of an old notebook, and I can visibly 
detect the change of mode, of mood. When I ask him what some of the notes mean, his 
inability to explain the different scribbles and markings frustrates him, which makes 
sense because I was asking him to translate a complicated text into easy Symbols.  
 “It’s just,” he pauses, “I can remember each and every moment. I can remember 
9th grade Howard asking whether every single elf we met looked like Kathy Ireland.” 
Importantly, he is still trying to rekey both the regulative and constitutive keys. He flips 
the page and almost shouts at me, “This was a huge battle with Kathy Ireland-looking 
elves!” 
Facebook Timeline 
 In the summer of 2012, Facebook made a fundamental change to its user interface 
by releasing the new “Timeline” layout. The changes to the popular social network 
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refigured the user’s page as a deliberate representation of his or her life. Rather than a 
virtual corkboard or calendar, upon which timely bits of news and mundane updates were 
communicated as needed, the page now acted as a kind of manicured scrapbook open to 
public view. Users were encouraged to curate and edit this representation in acts of self-
performance. For instance, you could now enlarge certain pictures over others, feature 
major events more loudly than mundane activities, add notes to particular entries, etc. 
Changes in romantic relationships and employment positions, at one time simply 
displayed along with other static biographical information in a separate page, were now 
pushed front-and-center as meaningful “Milestones” in the story of your life. The site was 
performing interpretation for us.  
 While ostensibly a cosmetic change only, Timeline marked an entirely new 
purpose for the social network. No doubt recent usage data had prompted Facebook to 
follow what it perceived to be the new role of the site in the lives of its users. No longer a 
tool of communication or a record of correspondence alone, the user’s page was now a 
thing in itself. No longer simply a trace, it would become an object open to aesthetic 
interpretation and aesthetic curating. You and a friend are attending a concert tonight? 
The site searches through your pictures, locates your history with that friend, figures how 
important he or she is to you based on how the two of you interact on the site, and 
potentially adds the “event” to your Timeline on your behalf. Facebook was no longer 
content to be your desk calendar; it wanted to be your diary, your scrapbook. 
 That many users resisted this change enough to see Facebook roll back the feature 
piece by piece over the next two years is interesting in its own right, but the struggle is 
relevant here because it demonstrates what happens when the trace of social activity is 
confused with social activity. One could easily psychologize why Facebook appears so 
desperate to insist that using the site constitutes meaningful social activity in itself, but 
we can imagine what convinced Facebook that the change was a good idea. I cannot deny 
digging through old posts on Facebook now and then: opening pictures from five years 
ago, adding comments to long-dead threads, “liking” the mention of a remembered event. 
And of course all that usage was tracked and interpreted.  
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Adventurous Exploration 
 We have all at one time or another pored over an old calendar or datebook only to 
re-imagine the days recorded in jot and tittle on the pages. There is something magical in 
the act of interpretation that makes flipping through a marked-up calendar very different 
from re-reading an old diary. The diary is already an interpretation, a Symbolic gloss on 
how life was, but the calendar acts as so many Indices that await interpretation and re-
interpretation. That date, a scratched deadline, birthdays, appointments with lost friends, 
all those concerts—a messy calendar provides inexhaustible new meanings in a very 
different way than a diary does.    
 I remember crawling through my attic as a child and coming across long swaths 
of one-yard-wide paper that my dad had saved from his years at Michigan State 
University from 1968-1972. Once pinned up on dormitory walls and used as message 
boards for coordinating activities, recording phone messages, and voicing complaints, the 
paper triggered for me the specter of my father’s youth. I imagined which handwriting 
belonged to him and whether he had drawn any of the lewd illustrations that filled much 
of the scroll.  
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Chapter 5: Murder-Mystery Events as Small-Group Alternate Reality 
Games 
 I previously characterized tabletop role-playing as a form of make-believe that 
produces the glimmer of a virtual world as players toy with a game-system and in so 
doing confront virtual objects. The more intense and engrossing the make-believe, the 
more these virtual objects come to frustrate the will of the players and participate as any 
other object would in ongoing sociality. In other words, to the degree that players actively 
shift into the frame of the role-playing game, they step into a new ground, a new 
atmosphere, where mental objects can bear the weight of materiality. This chapter moves 
beyond imagined objects to imagined ontologies.  
 I argue here that the successful murder-mystery event demands a unique form of 
make-believe, one that evokes a similarly unique analog virtual world. Whereas tabletop 
games conjure virtual objects that demand a novel ontology to explore fully, the murder-
mystery event works in reverse: it evokes a novel ontology through performance and 
thereby conjures a corollary virtual world into being. I might say that the performed 
ontology works like a negative pressure, creating a vacuum that draws the actual world 
up, outward, to distend in response. While language is tricky and metaphors necessarily 
abound, such a virtual world is only as magical as a vacuum, only as mystical as using 
the invisible power of the diaphragm to “levitate” water up a straw. The Ski Lodge 
Murder provides us our case study of a small-group alternate reality game that relies 
heavily on performative keying to charge the actual world and evoke the virtual—or not.  
 The current chapter begins with a discussion of the unfamiliar frame of the 
murder-mystery event and how groups of players typically get in key through ice-
breaking lusory means and build their frame outwards (Section I). Following a setting of 
the scene, I take a step back to explain what goes into scattering lusory obstacles 
throughout the environment to aid in the keying (Section II). With the frame in place and 
the lusory goal of the murder made explicit, the event continues as players explore the 
environment, interact according to the lusory means available, and pursue gamed-defined 
as well as player-generated goals competitively (Section III). I then examine a few 
 160 
common hiccups and hurdles that arise in such an unstable and unfamiliar frame, closing 
the chapter with a discussion of social poetics and what kind of virtual world might be 
said to emerge if/when such events succeed (Section IV).  
Methods  
 I participated in 13 murder-mystery events between October of 2010 and  
July of 2014, logging over 100 in-game hours. Of these 13 gaming events, I designed and 
hosted seven myself, five of them iterations the same game in the same location over the 
winter of 2013-2014. The other six consisted of two “dinner theater” events and four 
iterations of the same store-bought MME hosted by three different informants.  
 The central account of this ethnographic chapter draws on the fourth iteration of 
The Ski Lodge Murder, referencing other iterations where noted. References to The 
Speakeasy Murder will not distinguish between specific events, as the closed-system 
game plays out similarly in every event. The “dinner theater” events feature only once, 
but it was during such an event that I first realized the importance of rigorous keying for 
the participants.  
I. EVERYTHING IS REAL BUT THE MURDER 
  
 It is a Texas night in December, two hours west of Austin, and couples stir about 
the two-story cabin waiting on dinner and some ominous “event” that is promised to 
begin soon. Richard and I are cooking this dinner, and the Friday night festivities are 
about to begin. While the open-design ground floor fills with the smells of oregano and 
parmesan, giggles and dirty jokes escape the lofts set in either side of the great room. The 
couples fight over beds and bathrooms upstairs, and it looks like the two guests yet to 
arrive will be competing for space on the downstairs couches. The cabin could exist in a 
furniture catalog: exposed logs polished to shine, brushed aluminum appliances, several 
cow-skin rugs, themed rooms, and carefully staged magazine racks and bowls of plastic 
fruit. Our setting is already surreal, already a little fake. It belongs to Kelly’s parents, and 
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though they visit only once or twice a year, they maintain the cabin, grounds included, in 
photo-ready condition.   
 I choose this moment of chaotic unpacking just before dinner to strike, and all ten 
of the players, including the two I have yet to meet, receive their character biographies 
via email at the same time. The cabin is now officially a game. The boundaries are 
unknown. The facts are unknown. The future is unknown. But everyone knows that 
something is happening. Or already did happen. Or was about to happen. From this point 
on, the cabin is quickly enchanted as a gaming space as folks check their phones and 
open the attachments I just sent. Each player in turn pauses for a moment and wonders 
over the alternate reality that the group will slowly come to realize and perform has been 
presented, offered as a world—or not. Their every action is now potentially part of the 
game, and everyone begins to take measured steps. Nobody knows exactly what counts, 
what matters, what is the game and what is merely real life. Something has shifted.  
 Or so that is the goal.  
The Novel Frame 
 The email conjures our frame for the weekend, alerting everyone staying at the 
cabin that we are doing a thing, playing at somehow transforming or “rekeying” to one 
extent or another every activity to follow. From a game-as-system perspective, this is the 
moment when the system descends and replaces the actual world, marking off the 
environment and all ensuing activities as beholden to the Symbolic meaning of the 
system. However, a good murder-mystery event relies on blurry edges, on never 
officially constituting the boundaries of a system or the details of an overarching logic. 
Rather, the actual world retains its own norms, objects, and affordances while being 
forced to take on even more. Whatever changes to behavior or situations that might occur 
do so by means of an expansion of elements, not a reduction. Before the parlor game 
introduces the lusory goal of the mysterious murder, there is the addition of an 
ambiguous keying, of “a something afoot” that charges the space and confuses 
conventional expectations. It embodies a “more is less” dynamic. 
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Something Missing 
 At the cabin, Mara hangs her torso over the rough-cut railing of the “Seaside 
Loft,” one of the two rooms in the south wing of the cabin; the other has been coined the 
“Horse-track Room” by Kelly’s family. Mara looks down into the great room from above 
and lowers herself dangerously over the edge to get a look into the kitchen.  
 “Hey. Hey,” she calls.  
 I look up, but my poker face is already in place. She scrunches her nose at my 
lack of acknowledgement. “I think it happened,” she says, now more to the house than to 
me, and swings her body up over the railing to the loft. When her boyfriend, Keith, 
comes down the stairs a moment later, he is wearing an outfit inspired by a Duran Duran 
music video. Richard almost drops his drink, and we both shake our heads and laugh 
encouragingly at the commitment Keith has for the game. The 1980s are upon us.  
 That Mara and Keith are so keen to move things along is a great sign for things to 
come, as I am a little thrown off after the previous, lackluster weekend. This is my fourth 
time running the Ski Lodge Murder at Kelly’s cabin, and it is off to a suspiciously good 
start. Every event starts a little differently, and all of the usual social hiccups typically 
occur: someone wears the wrong clothes and feels uncomfortable the whole time, people 
show up late and disrupt the activities, folks take it too seriously or not seriously enough, 
“plus-ones” can feel neglected and derail the proceedings, technical difficulties force 
restarts and work-arounds, etc. So far, this run has been smooth.  
Public Make-Believe 
 Beyond the common interruptions and entanglements, there is a specific 
vulnerability in public play in the United States. Activities as undefined as weekend-long 
excursions into role-playing invoke a vague and unfamiliar frame that most players have 
trouble settling into: awkwardness, the death knell of the social. The murder-mystery 
weekend is a testament to the absolute awkwardness of rigorously unscripted social 
interaction. 
 Of the 70 or so players I run or attend murder-mystery events with, only nine have 
participated in one before. Touching base with as many players as I can in the following 
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years, not one has participated in another MME since. Tabletop role-playing games 
attract dedicated players, many of whom take up the game for hours at a time, several 
days a month, over the course of many years. Larger alternate reality games regularly 
bewitch players so completely that “chasing the dragon” is considered a “natural phase” 
at the close of any individual’s first game (Szulborski 2005b). In contrast, murder-
mystery events work more like skydiving and other “bucket list” activities. Individuals 
try them once, and they rarely look back.  
 One Halloween per year is enough for most people, it seems.  
 Despite their close kinship to two engrossing and successful forms of gaming, 
murder-mystery events systematically and regularly fail. Why? As a halfway point 
between two superlatively captivating and engrossing forms of gaming, discovering the 
miscalculation in the common design of the murder-mystery event might elucidate its 
own character as well as those of its relatives. I explore more of the framing difficulties 
that regularly arise in such games later in the chapter (Section IV), but what needs 
making clear early in the analysis is that there is something tricky with murder-mystery 
events, something unique.  
 After participating in so many failed murder-mystery events as well as the rare 
success, I feel that the foundation of this precarious mode of social activity comes down 
to negotiating the frame. Before any social poetics or shifting ontologies can occur, 
everyone needs to be on the same page, a necessary condition of which is that the page 
exists in the first place.   
A Touchy Frame 
 Everyday life often goes on smoothly without local frames. We can do things 
within what Goffman calls “primary frameworks,” which require no negotiated script or 
pattern at all. These become such taken-for-granted structures that they function as 
“second nature” outside the individual’s perception. Proper ontologies, doxa, the models 
of natural science—we may acknowledge that certain orientations and understandings 
must be internalized to some extent for the individual to continue functioning in the 
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absence of other people. Moreover, social interactions can occur without frames as well. 
For example, I can wait in line at the post office to mail my brother a parcel, and I feel no 
responsibility to behave a certain way despite the fact that I have obviously been 
conditioned and socialized to the norms of culture. Again, when I stroll through the 
grocery store, I do not feel any particular expectations on my performance of self. These 
are of course in part a consequences of the privilege my unmarked body affords, but as 
simple examples they suffice.  
 By sending my email during a chaotic moment just before dinner, I am playing 
with everyone in the cabin on that December night. There is nothing afoot yet. Nothing 
has happened yet. The only change is that the group has now acknowledged that 
something is going to happen soon or that the something that is happening now will be 
happening differently. This is one of the strengths of Goffman’s “key” to better represent 
Searle’s “Context C:” even when players do not know what is happening, they can know 
that they do not know; this lack of being “in frame” can be felt. How does this tentative 
frame work? 
 If there is an arbitrary keying afoot, one that cannot be situated toward a goal or 
social purpose, towards a particular “line” or to advance a “footing,” individuals will not 
maintain it for long (Goffman 1961). A continued expectation to key or perform can 
become boring as well as burdensome. Likewise, if there is a seemingly arbitrary 
fabrication afoot and no evident means to break out of it, then the frame becomes 
frustrating and burdensome. I want to suggest here that most murder-mystery events fail 
because they expect players to don and maintain a keying for its own sake without 
providing lusory goals to explore and/or expect players to take interest in a fabrication 
without providing any engaging lusory means to address it.  
 I say all this not to rush into the chapter’s conclusions, but to lay a foundation for 
the experiment to come and to defend the medium for any readers who may have had dull 
or empty experiences in the past. Yes, the vast majority of murder-mystery events are 
either hollow pageantry with no real game, or boring games that amount to the social 
equivalent of filling out a worksheet to get to the end.  
 165 
 Taking this diagnosis to heart, my ethnography will look at the keying of the 
make-believe and the pursuit of cracking the fabrication together. The frame as a whole is 
at stake; the overall party or weekend must be entertaining and lively if we are to find a 
virtual world. Both tabletop role-playing and online virtual worlds have no official lusory 
goal, but they buzz with activity. Murder-mystery events can only sustain such a world 
when everything goes just right. To have any chance of success, the host or hostess must 
sustain the key and the fabrication with adequate lusory means right from the beginning. 
There need to be toys.   
 
 According to Bernard Suits (1978), a game governs activity whereby players 
attain a prelusory goal (some “state of affairs” in the actual world) by donning a lusory 
attitude (the poetic, playful “contest and display” of Johan Huizinga) that 
promises/contracts to—through some available lusory means (props, rules, activity, dice, 
etc.)—regard the attainment of lusory goals (the “quantifiable outcomes” of a game) as 
equivalent to the original, prelusory goals. Every game is an alchemy, a sleight of hand 
that swaps lead for gold. 
 The magic, then, occurs within the lusory means. We might describe the lusory 
means of a typical murder-mystery event as a complicated interactivity characterized by 
individuals role-playing fictional characters in a thematic environment according to a set 
of rules that govern how players are to treat specific objects of that environment as 
meaningful signs within the world of the game. The best murder-mystery events will 
feature outward-facing rules that allow player-generated meanings to operate within and 
through the game, while a poor event will rely on a game-as-system approach that figures 
play as “free movement” within this system.  
The Lusory Means 
The emails I send at 7:00PM contain a brief re-introduction to the event, setting 
up the nature of the key and offering backstory for the fictional “Class Trip” event, and 
also each player’s fictional character biography. The biographies include a 200-word 
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backstory for each character to explain his or her personality and quirks, details that 
might be typical of a character sketch for any other murder-mystery event. 
At Mara’s summons, Kelly and Kyra come running down the stairs, scrambling to 
find their phones to open up the email. The cabin is from now on keyed as a ski lodge in 
1985, the site of Bedford High School’s “Class of 1985 Senior Ski Trip.” After each 
player reads his or her character biography, there are twenty or thirty minutes of open 
keying. The players don these personas and poke about in the new social environment, 
learning names, making connections, performing cursory investigations into who knows 
what about whom, testing the edges of play, etc.  
For example, Richard is Hans Kier, a German foreign exchange student; Kyra and 
Aleya are Sam and Alex, two athletic sisters on the school volleyball team; Hanson is 
Terd Kool, the “big man on campus” and stereotypical stud; Kelly is Rhoda, the shy 
book-nerd who has promised herself to break out of her shell on the trip; etc.  
Importantly, all of the roles are open to interpretation, intentionally “generic” and 
stereotypical, which encourages the players to perform around shared iconic images 
rather than work towards faithful or accurate portrayals. This lack of realism in the 
character biographies is precisely what makes the personas toys. Such personas, as the 
very stuff of the game’s keying, can then afford and encourage poetic interpretation and 
social negotiation from the very beginning. The personas work like Barthes’ (1972) 
“building blocks” or the early, five-minute player-characters of Dungeons & Dragons. 
The player will come to embody his or her character by toying with a persona. In other 
words, the character does not exist yet, and the player has a role in defining who he or she 
is: genuine poetics.    
Conveniently, I am the Class President who planned the ski trip and works as 
liaison with the facility. My social role as host in the actual world keys easily into my 
persona in the game, which makes my giving instructions and guidance an ideal lusory 
double.   
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Individual Lusory Goals 
 However, we are not playing at open-ended make-believe alone. We are playing a 
game, and games have rules—sorta. The introduction of implied lusory goals into the 
character biographies acts to structure the event and offer direction for players, which 
renders the ensuing keyful behavior purposeful and deliberate. The other designers and I 
offer meaningful dynamics between and among characters with the inclusion in each 
character bio of three Hints, three Missions, and three Reactions.  
 The Hints on the character bios point players towards particular locations or 
objects of the environment that contain Clues, our Symbolic objects. Players will likely 
check these out and explore a bit, but without the system in place yet few of the Clues 
take on much meaning.   
 The Missions are specific lusory goals for players to pursue throughout the night. 
These all present a possible “Pass or Fail” outcome and debut as more or less meaningful 
depending on the character. For example, Rhoda has a Mission to “Get a neck and 
shoulder rub from Terd and offer him a kiss.” If, at the end of the weekend, any other 
players remember this event happening, whoever played Rhoda gains a point. Relying on 
the “quantifiable outcomes” of Salen and Zimmerman (2003) can work within a games-
as-toys approach when such values are built into the otherwise actual and ongoing social 
interactions. Though each Mission will take on one of two Symbolic values (“point” or 
“no point”) at a later moment in the game, this evaluation comes about only after the 
Mission animated the player to scheme, seduce, trick, lie, hide, perform, etc. earlier in the 
weekend. In other words, meeting the lusory goals requires open-ended activity outside 
any Symbolic systems or demands.    
The Reactions are tied to the Missions of other characters. In a web of cause-and-
effect, players will be acting and reacting over the course of the entire weekend. This web 
is non-linear, with many beginning points. For example, Paola’s character Tory has a 
Reaction to “Throw a fit when Big Mike openly flirts with Alex and chuck food on the 
floor in rage.” This responds to a Mission on Big Mike’s character bio and subsequently 
triggers another Reaction from Rhoda.  
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Such a chain will encourage multiple and overlapping concentric keyings as the 
players go about their purposeful performances. To recognize behavior as part of a 
character’s Mission is important because one never knows if such performances might 
trigger a Reaction; the melodrama and heightened “donning” that occurs must then Index 
that a Mission or Reaction is afoot. The smaller performances become small keyings of 
their own and operate to reinforce or reinvigorate the overall keying of the 1985 Class 
Trip.  
  
 Keep in mind, we still have yet to introduce any constitutive rules at all. The 
Mission–Reaction chain is a series of “If X, Then Y” rules that only become regarded as 
a system in the mind of the interpreter. They exist outside the grammar or matrix of the 
game that serves to provide the Symbolic value of the Clues. So far, all of the character 
descriptions and suggested relationships are part of a playful keying with only hints of the 
system of Symbolic value to come. That players are interacting towards purposes they do 
not yet fully understand only works to heighten the play and keep everyone’s ears open. 
They do not yet know what potential Symbols exist so the activity is purposive without 
being parsed 
 In the hour between my sending the email and dinner being served, every 
participant stays in key and goes about purposive lusory activity that provides actual 
moments of humor, flirtation, trickery, and learning. The frame has instigated new modes 
of interaction, a new medium. 
 Paola and her boyfriend Forrest arrive before dinner as well and get into 
character. Paola plays Tory, the tough girl who rides a motorcycle to school, and Forrest 
plays Big Mike, the bully of Bedford High.  
The Other Murder 
 On the other hand, the keyed social activity of The Speakeasy Murder is either 
hollow pageantry or direct inquiry. The only clues are “pieces of information,” which 
means all evidence comes in the form of symbols, words, representations of an imagined 
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and untouchable world. Players are generally given character bios before the game begins 
so they may dress the part, and the core version of the game features a cast of almost 20 
characters. Of course, only six or seven of those have anything unique about them, 
including full names; unsurprisingly, these are the same six or seven characters who 
contribute to the plot. A similar phenomenon existed in professional wrestling in the 
1980s: the wrestler with the longest name and the most unique costume always won.  
In every case, the players spend less than thirty minutes sharing information and 
swapping details contained in their bios to help make sense of the situation. Because the 
frame offers no other lusory goals, the players seem to take “sharing information” as the 
default activity. We try to repeat as much information as we can remember from our bios. 
It is all very rote, and soon the playful air grows stale. Players become guests once more, 
and they move back to their original cliques and actual friends. Everyone stays vaguely in 
key, speaking in 1920s slang and performing towards iconic types as much as they know 
how, but mostly everyone waits for the host or hostess to offer the next prompt.  
Constitutive Rules: How To Solve A Murder 
 At the cabin, dinner is served promptly at 8:00PM. We eat and chat until everyone 
is just about finished, and then I trigger the second major event of the night: “Reach 
under your seats and pull out the blindfolds. Put them on and imagine with me…” 
 With the players blindfolded, I describe their first evening out on the slopes after 
dinner, rekeying the dinner we just had as though it had taken place several hours earlier 
in the night. While offering the exposition, I am also running around the lower floor of 
the cabin hiding last-minute props and making intentional noises in various places both to 
entertain and dissemble. Like Tim Curry from Clue (Lynn 1985), I scurry about setting 
the trap and filling in the performers. After two or three minutes of exposition, I ask them 
to remove the blindfolds. Just when most of the eyes are on me, I continue, “And then 
you all meet up in the lobby just as I…” And then I drop dead.   
 The Terd player-character has a Reaction listed on his bio telling him, “When the 
murder occurs, take the lead and investigate. Without your leadership, where would these 
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kids be?” My toppled body has a small pink note on it, the first Clue of the game. My 
role is mostly finished, and, stepping out of character, I get up and find a seat to observe.  
The Grammar 
 To solve the crime, the players must uncover whichever character had all three of 
Motive, Means, and Opportunity to have killed the Class President. The game is 
structured so some characters have Motives right from the beginning (listed as Hints on 
other character’s bios), while others do not. Likewise with Means and Opportunity. 
Different murder weapons are introduced as props as the night progresses, and facts come 
to light that attach them to certain characters—or not. If you have an alibi that lasts, you 
are kept off the list of suspects for now. These will be augmented, interrogated, and 
revised as the events of the party go on; Clues can function to “switch on” or “switch off” 
any of the categories. These categories make piecing the murder together a process of 
innocence elimination: whichever character ends up with Motive, Means, and 
Opportunity is guaranteed to be the guilty party. There can be no “false positives” in The 
Ski Lodge Murder, and—as in any 1980s crime comedy—circumstantial evidence is all 
we need for the most part.  
 Solving the murder becomes the central lusory goal, and we add more as we 
develop the game. By the fifth iteration, there is: one prize for whoever solves the murder 
first, another for whoever turns out to be the murderer (which encourages an entirely 
opposite strategy), another for the first person to complete all three Missions on his or her 
bio, another for whoever first completes all three Reactions, and so on. On the second 
weekend, the players created two of their own rewards as well determined by ballot: 
“Best Backstab” and “Worst Backstab.”   
 The personalities and prelusory goals of the players can work through this system 
however they might. Some players prefer certain prizes to others, and so toy with the 
game in one direction. Other players maintain actual alliances and rivalries and toy with 
the game to attain those. In any case, there is bound to be conflicting and engaging 
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agendas throughout the weekend. The game is not a different world to enter but a 
different way to participate in our world.  
Clues as Toys 
 Other than the very first Clue, the note pinned on my body after I key my death, 
none of the other Clues are as conspicuous. Players will discover them inadvertently as 
the weekend goes on, be pushed towards them by the Hints and Missions on their 
character bios, and even hide them when needed to eliminate their Symbolic weight.  
 In fact, there are no more rules needed at all. The second Clue the players will 
find—based on the first Reaction written onto Rachel’s character of Diana—explains the 
rules to them and procedures of the game, all this from within the game itself. The 
Reaction leads Rachel to a Clue I hid in her luggage. As captain of the debate team, 
Diana fancies herself a lawyer and shares with the group her How To Catch a Killer 
Notebook, which appears as a manila envelope containing all the materials and 
procedures the players need to keep track of details for themselves. Also, should any 
other player at some point look at the manila envelope, they will see a pink note on the 
back (Clue 3!) that reads:  
 
 DIANA HAS MEANS: Diana is trained in the ways of the law. If she wanted to 
kill the Class President, you bet she’d know just how to do it, and without anyone 
being the wiser. Well, you won’t let her make a fool out of you!  
 
(If you are not Diana, take this note and share it with whomever you like in public 
or secret. If you are Diana, you must leave this note on the envelope and the 
envelope in plain view, but you’ll probably want to keep it facedown. Just 
saying.) 
 
 Every discovered Clue comes written on a deep pink notecard and does one of the 
following: switch “on” or “off” one specific category of one particular character, switch 
“on” or “off” a specific category on a character chosen by the person to find the Clue, or 
act as a “switch on” or “switch off” veto power that can be used publicly according to set 
parameters.  
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 All Clues come as notes with exposition that clearly mark the operation, 
translating the object into a Symbol. For example, two early Clues are: 
 
 The Muddy Boots: Hidden in the environment for anyone to find, but also alluded 
to in a Reaction demanded by Keith’s character Nigel. 
 
NIGEL HAS OPPORTUNITY: These are Nigel’s muddy boots, and it looks like 
they match a set of footprints leading up the lodge that were made around the time 
of the murder. Somebody has some explaining to do! 
 
(If you are not Nigel, you must publicly declare the facts of this Clue. If you are 
Nigel, you must share with two other people the facts of this Clue in secret.) 
 
 The Tissues: Three character bios contain Hints that point the character to a box 
of tissues in one of the bathrooms. 
 
OFFER AN ALIBI: Somebody was down in the casita bathroom crying all 
evening during the murder. Who was it? You know! And you would testify to that 
effect in court.  
 
(Take this box of tissues and the note. Whenever another character is publicly 
granted Opportunity for the murder of the Class President, you can cover for him 
or her. Just this once!) 
 
 Not all the Clues are in place on the first night, which ensures the murder is not 
solved too quickly. Likewise, more than half of the Missions and Reactions cannot be 
triggered until an official event happens the next morning. The first, second, and third 
iterations of The Ski Lodge Murder all have errors and mistakes that need the meddling 
fingers of the designer, but by the fourth iteration we have a smooth game. The fifth 
iteration is made up a few repeat players who realize that there is no “one true” murderer, 
and they keep so many Clues secret, we have a “stand-off” on Sunday morning. I will 
discuss how these Clues operate on and within the ongoing activity in Section IV.  
Central Fabrications 
 Finding out who the murderer is comprises the central fabrication within the 
realm of the game, and each player is attempting to get outside this central fabrication to 
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get “in on” the truth of the matter. Of course, this does not mean they will get out of the 
frame, which is the greater keying of the weekend as a 1985 Senior Class Trip. In fact, 
the fabrication only exists within the frame itself. If one gets out of key (stops make-
believing we are in a 1980s ski lodge where a murder has taken place), the fabrication 
ceases to exist (you are no longer “in the dark” about anything).  
 While most of the lusory goals point in this direction, the tangled mess of 
interactivity allows for any number of smaller and player-driven fabrications to arise.  
Other Fabrications 
 If there can be no smaller fabrications among the individual players, the game is 
less interesting. Most murder-mystery events will include what might be called 
“subplots” to the murder narrative, things that guide or instigate certain actions 
throughout the course of the night, giving the players more goals to reach. Of course it is 
best when the players invent their own machinations, plans, and rivalries. This is where 
role-playing gives way to toying, and meanings that the game affords but does not assign 
can be pursued and shared. To constitute a virtual world, the conjured totality must act as 
a platform capable of sustaining the players’ ongoing and exogenous frames and agendas.   
 The Ski Lodge Murder includes Missions and Reactions that serve to encourage 
smaller fabrications but mostly according to the designs of the players. For example, 
Forrest’s character Big Mike has a Mission to: “You are the drug dealer of Bedford High 
and you made the mistake of selling on someone else’s turf. You must switch clothes—
swapping an ENTIRE outfit—with another character to hide from the local dealers who 
are after you.” 
 When Forrest sees this, he has to start working on softening people up right away. 
Just a strange request obviously marks itself as a Mission or Reaction of some kind, and 
players do not know right away if helping out Big Mike may have repercussions later. 
Forrest spends most of Friday night prodding Richard to swap clothes with him without 
getting anywhere. Richard (as Hans) has his own agenda, and resists. Later in the day on 
Saturday, Big Mike finally gets Hans to swap clothes, but only because Forrest has 
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offered to cat-sit for Rachel next month, persuading Rachel (now in her role as Diana) to 
help him convince Hans (portrayed by Richard, her real-life boyfriend) into swapping 
clothes. However, now Diana knows that Big Mike is the drug dealer even though Hans 
does not, a truth that Forrest has to monitor if he wants to reach other goals. Forrest and 
Rachel are now “in the know” where other player-characters are not, and later events will 
put strain on this fabrication.  
 The lusory and prelusory goals swirl seamlessly, and the operations of the game 
are so many overlain-but-actual operations. There need not be any true distinction 
between lusory and prelusory goals in a virtual world, precisely because the world 
functions to sustain all kinds of social activity (not just games). Constructing an 
environment with such a pervasive and integrated lusory attitude is a good step toward 
both conjuring a virtual world and hosting an event that does not bomb.  
Major Fabrication 
 By the second iteration of The Ski Lodge Murder, we already feel that something 
is missing, and we add what I call the major fabrication, which is unrelated to the central 
fabrication of finding the murderer. The major fabrication, a truth I hide from the players 
at the beginning of the game, is that there are enough clues with enough valences of 
Symbolic interpretability that any one of the 10 characters can end up being the murderer. 
Clues are fun to write, and once we work out a system for keeping them integrated and 
smooth, we develop a system that includes Clues with player-driven interpretations and 
Indexical value.  
 We consider this more a “rule” of the game than a “fabrication,” and most players 
end up figuring this out at some point throughout the weekend. However, after the fifth 
iteration of the weekend, in which players who already know this “rule” participate with 
that knowledge from the very beginning, the knowledge has a dramatic affect on play. In 
fact, the “rule” of the game operates more like a “fact of the matter of the situation” that 
certain participants may or may not be privy to. It is a textbook fabrication in Goffman’s 
terms.  
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Activity Outside The Frame 
 Starting with the second iteration of the game, from the moment Terd pulls the 
note off my chest, I stand up and take on the role of “The Class President’s Ghost,” 
offering answers here and there but mostly staying out of the way taking field notes. 
Anyone talking to me is then “keyed” as talking to a ghost, which leads to an entirely 
entertaining dynamic wherein anyone talking to me gets teased and jeered by everyone 
else. By the second morning, asking me a question or directly engaging with me at all 
more often than not triggers a mass response of one kind or another. It works similarly to 
yelling “O–H” in Columbus, OH, which invariably earns an “I–O” in reply.  
 The game provides sufficient lusory means and lusory goals to sustain a great deal 
of in-game activity, but there is no pressure or expectation to stay in key at all times. The 
weekend is long. After three hours of role-playing and performing, many of the first 
night’s Clues are found and Reactions made. People chill out, watch a movie, make 
snacks. However, the game is still afoot, dormant, like a bear trap. It keeps things lively 
without getting in the way.  
 During our third Ski Lodge weekend, Kelly and I are writing music for a friend, 
entirely unrelated to the Ski Lodge key. We pore hours into it as her co-workers likewise 
spend a great deal of time doing legitimate work. None of this gets in the way of the 
game, just as nothing in the game gets in the way of work. We still key, and we still live 
in the virtual “double” that does not require “code-“ or “frame-switching” so much as 
afford it. The virtual is alive so long as we adopt a particular attitude; it arises if we cross 
our eyes or hold our breaths.  
Lusory Means in The Other Murder 
 The fabrications of The Speakeasy Murder are multiple, but each is tied to a 
particular character or faction of characters. The players themselves have no role in 
deciding how the fictional characters are arranged. In other words, the game presumes a 
“social structure” that the players can act against but not “officially” change.  
 When I participate in my third iteration of The Speakeasy Murder, I am in Toledo, 
OH, I am on a date, but otherwise among strangers. I have played this particular MME 
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twice before with the same host as “practice” for studying the genre. Meeting this 
particular woman and getting invited to a MME is a nice coincidence six or seven months 
later, and I am eager to take notes for the first time and not have to half-host the event. I 
hear ahead of time that it is a 1920s theme, but I consider that one of the stock MME eras 
and think little of it.  
 As soon as I walk into the hostess’s house, I see the posters and decorations, all of 
which she has printed from her home computer after buying and downloading the same 
90-page PDF my friend had the year before. I am “in the know” in a serious way, and I 
happen to be assigned a rather important character. I know from playing the game twice 
before that my character, the Sheriff, is a big decoy throughout most of the night before 
the real murderer is found.  
 Because I am portraying the Sheriff, I have to share agendas with the person 
portraying the crooked Mayor. I have nothing against the guy playing the Major, but my 
date and I promised “to be a team and work together to win this thing” in the car on the 
way there. When I tell her I know every single meaningful thing that will transpire and 
when, she becomes giddy and eager to impress her friends. However, there is no way for 
me to do anything with my character that is not scripted. Even if I do not disclose 
information I gather throughout the night with the Mayor, the “script” calls on me to do 
certain things at certain times, and the game only works if he has access to most of the 
information on my character bio. The game as “social structure” has assigned me an 
agenda I am supposed to role-play (or activate); my value is fixed.  
 This has two serious implications on the night. First, I cannot continue my 
prelusory goals of teaming up with my date. The game as a system demands that I adopt 
the agency and the goals determined by the system; the game demands that I “play 
straight” and follow the path laid out for me. In fact, the game would come to halt if any 
player strayed because the balance of the carefully constructed narrative would stop 
making sense. Second, even though I know the end, I can do nothing differently. As 
though reading a book or watching a film, the fact that I know who the killer is, when he 
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strikes, why, how—None of my prescience matters. In the land of the blind, the sighted 
man is no king at all; his vision is useless.  
 Whether I am a good player or a bad player does not matter. Even investigation or 
gathering information is a hit-or-miss endeavor in futility. The game has planned events 
and planned connections, and all of us go through the motions enacting the script. I can 
be creative with my performance and offer a heartfelt pageantry to the other players, but I 
cannot be poetic and have actual affect on the meaningfulness of what I do.  
Constitutive Rules in The Other Murder  
 The rules of The Speakeasy Murder are simple. There is an indefinite amount of 
information on the central character bios, but only three facts matter. Lies abound, most 
players do not read their bios that closely, and everyone is presented with what seems like 
a random and cacophonous boom of rote facts upon entering conversation with anyone 
else. The game goes on for an hour or so before the host or hostess triggers the next 
event, which will occur according to script and purport to offer some new critical piece of 
information. This happens three or four times over the course of the night, and at the final 
event, the “clues” are laid out. There are four or five printed images from the PDF that 
represent “the clues that we should have uncovered.”  
 Each player is then given the chance to walk past the table and examine the 
artifacts as though taking a personal moment at a coffin. After every player has a chance, 
the host or hostess calls for the final event and passes out ballots on which every 
participants votes on categories such as “Best Costume,” “Best Actress,” etc. The final 
question asks for the name of the murderer. Following, the host or hostess tallies up the 
votes while everyone continues hanging out. Finally, a small award ceremony is held 
whereupon all is revealed.  
 The variety of awards are nice, but the “solution” to the murder hinges on one 
piece of information from one of the four printed clues: a small pair of initials that are 
listed in a bookie’s ledger. This one clue, combined with three pieces of information 
scattered about all of the character bios—the Deputy’s middle name, the fact that the 
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Deputy has a gun unlike that of the Sheriff, and some detail about the Deputy once dating 
another of the key characters—“proves” that the Deputy killed the husband of the woman 
who runs the speakeasy. Voila. That any number of other just as logical connections 
could have been just as loosely tied together from the accounts does not factor in: there is 
a “right” solution provided by the game that by chance entirely two or three people might 
latch onto by the end of the night.  
 In the four iterations of The Speakeasy Murder that I participate in, the number of 
winners is slim: two the first night, one the second, two the third, and three the fourth.  
II. MURDER, WE WROTE 
 
 In Texas, although the players are confronted with a fantastical murder only an 
hour after entering the game, I and my three collaborators have been living in this 
fictional game-world for weeks, planning and debugging things in preparation for each 
weekend. While the responsive system takes a few tries to get moving, eventually the 
event can almost run itself.  
Building The Time Machine 
 A MME is much easier to inhabit than a tabletop role-playing game. There are 
fewer codes and complicated instructions, and players inhabit the space of the game as 
they would most other cocktail parties. The layering of signs and signals begins with 
simple redecorating: by the fifth time I run the game, the cabin of central Texas is 
decorated to resemble a ski lodge from the 1980s, reminiscent of the recent film Hot Tub 
Time Machine (Pink 2010). The cabin itself provides the most compelling effect (all that 
gorgeous wood), but we bring ski equipment to litter the main living area, music from the 
era plays, and the staged magazines have been replaced with equally staged 1980s 
counterparts. Even the Texas weather cooperates in January, and two of the weekends see 
a dusting of snow as the players drive up on their respective Friday afternoons. We ask 
players to arrive dressed in fashion from the 1980s, but the character biographies are 
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always sent later. Most players find clothes either tugged from long-forgotten storage 
units or picked up the day before at local thrift stores.  
Designing The Matrix of Clues 
 The Ski Lodge Murder is easy to design for two reasons. First, we eventually 
decide to allow an open-ended resolution, which means Clues can be multiplied and 
made more fluid; there is not one set ending—and the concomitant story arc—that we 
have to plan, obfuscate, and implement. Second, we agree that each Clue will hold 
Symbolic value. Though these Clues might operate as unpredictable Symbols, that they 
ultimately function as Symbols means we can start at the end and work backwards much 
more easily.  
 Taken together, we fill the matrix with “On” Symbols and simply work 
backwards making sure to add one Clue for each, 30 in total. Exactly what these Clues 
will look like is inconsequential, only the value matters. For example, whether the 
“Universal Opportunity Alibi” Clue is a box of tissues in the bathroom, a used condom in 
the bedroom, a time-stamped bus ticket, or a medical bill does not matter. All that matters 
as this point is the Symbolic value of each Clue.  
 After determining the entire matrix, we decide that the idea of Clues working to 
switch categories “Off” is fun as well, and so we work back through the Clues to see 
which can be variable, making sure to balance the characters. Each character now has one 
Clue that switches something “Off” on their matrix as well, so we are at 40 total. Again, 
these are Symbolic, and while we will assuredly tie them thematically into the event and 
the lives of the characters, the gloss or flavor will not have any formal meaningful effect.  
 Further refining, we want to make more specific Clues that target individual 
characters in specific ways and tie these into Missions and Reactions, smaller subplots 
that can cut against the straight game entirely. These include a drinking game, spin-the-
bottle fun, practical jokes, and even a human pyramid. That is 10 more, for a total of 50. 
We then run through all of the variables to make sure that no matter what choices are 
made at least one of the characters can be identified, and we are set.  
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 We then decide that each character bio will have one Clue stated outright within 
their Hints, Reactions, and Missions, which reduces the number of physical props we 
need to 40.  
Too Much System? 
 Although we have designed a purely Symbolic system of meanings for each Clue, 
the system demands that each Clue be toyed with and operated upon by the players. Some 
Clues can be applied to any character, building connections and layering meanings of the 
players’ designs. Some Clues are kept secret, others made public, others shared with one 
or two specific people. From another angle, the fact that a player wins a prize for being 
the murderer means that Clues can be used to gather blame for oneself and resist 
exonerating evidence. The Symbols will be exchanged, shared, manipulated, and 
repurposed according to the agencies of the players.  
 Despite their Symbolic value, the Clues are toys. They do not each have one 
single value, and none of them are simply “used” or activated by the system. There is no 
“host” in the game, and players will make choices that impact the outcome of the event. 
The successful murder-mystery event, like poker and the tabletop role-playing game, 
offers a system designed specifically to be toyed with and situated within ongoing social 
activity.  
 For example, when Mara (as Eva, the editor of the Bedford High School 
newspaper) uses the Box of Tissues Clue to exonerate her friend Kelly, Kelly is upset 
because she is aiming to become the murderer this weekend. Kelly then takes Mara’s 
action as an Index of their out of sync agendas and acts accordingly. Rather than an 
aesthetic or subjective judgment around the Symbolic Clue, such an interpretation has 
actual weight over the course of the event: the next day, Kelly finds the Owl Lamp Clue, 
which grants her the power to switch “On” either Eva’s or Tory’s Means intersection 
when she finds a small, feminine fingerprint in the soft wax of the candle in the lamp. 
The Symbolic value of this Clue is now based on the Indexical value Kelly freely added 
to the Symbolic move that Mara made the day before. 
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 Of course, the same thing happens when two people play a video game. Hey, you 
knocked me off the cliff! I’m going to get you back for that! However, the difference is 
that the murder-mystery event is operating within the actual world at all points, not just 
the Symbolic. The video game presents a contest between lusory goals, while the MME 
affords and encourages that it be pulled up into the prelusory contests of the players. In 
other words, the world of the game does not meet the actual world in only small points of 
contact or competition. Precisely the opposite, the world of the game entirely overlaps 
our own but for these places of Symbolic paraphrasing. The virtual elements of the game 
produce a distance, a gap, that constitutes the virtual mirage. It is in the production of 
distance that the virtual emerges. The points of overlap are exploited by the designers as 
much as they can be, and the fewer virtual elements necessary the better.  
 The system accepts toys, which makes it part of our world. More accurately, it 
becomes part of the players’ world. We write no narrative, no twists, no arcs, no drama… 
The story is their own. We provide the toys, and they make a game out of it.  
III. ON THE TRAIL OF THE KILLER 
 
 The three categories of Motive, Means, and Opportunity limit the otherwise 
infinite scope of meanings any object might have to three registers of Symbolic value. 
Players have only to determine “on” or “off” for each intersection of character and 
category: if one character gets all three boxes filled, then we know the killer! The chart 
fixes what values can be attached to particular Clues, each Clue capable of switching one 
or more of these values, more likely to “On” than “Off,” though we have Clues that go 
both ways. What results is a simple checklist of Symbols representing very simple 
constitutive rules. However, these Symbols come as the results of complex chains of 
semiosis.  
 The social and cognitive labors of the game begin with determining whether any 
given action, prop, tone, etc. will count as a Sign at all. The “Context C” of the charged 
atmosphere makes “X” and “Y” co-present. We can pass Brian Massumi’s (2002) vision 
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of the virtual through John Searle’s (1995) social institution theory of games and imagine 
that when “X counts as Y” what is really happening is that “X” participates in a wave or 
takes up a charge that we recognize as “Y” emerging. No Sign is complete or finished; no 
toy is dead.  
Scanning For Clues 
 We have already talked about being nudged towards Clues from the Hints, 
Reactions, and Missions on the character biographies, but there is also good, old-
fashioned detective work. Whereas true detectives would hunt for Indices of the crime 
based on their own ontologies and experience of cause and effect in the world, the game 
works differently because players know that each and every Clue has been established 
already and designed by the human mind.  
 Recognizing an object in the environment as a potential Clue becomes a unique 
semiotic act; the environment is being “read” for Indices of human tampering, human 
design. We might say that the Object of this semiotic process is the human mind itself. 
Players scanning the environment are looking for that conspicuous Index that says, “This 
arrangement of things was put here by a human.” After all, the Clues are created to be 
semi-conspicuous Signs. I recall the experience of watching older cartoons from the 
1980s and before: the viewer can always perceive what objects are going to move 
because they—as overlain animation cells—stand out from the more organically painted 
background. The mark of the human mind rests on those objects even before they move.  
 The best MMEs, and even localized alternate reality games as we will discuss in 
Chapter 6, will enchant the environment enough to keep players guessing, on their toes, 
vigilant. Clues can turn up in any conversation, any exaggerated gestures or attitudes in 
other players, or behind any suspicious object or artifact.  
Human, All Too Human 
 During our second run of the event at Kelly’s cabin in December, one of the 
players finds six Clues right away just by exploring the environment. Impressed to say 
the least, I ask him how he managed to do that. None of Clues were from his character 
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biography either; he just scans the cabin and walks right up to them. In response he puts 
me quite readily in my place: 
  
They were too much. You had one issue of Highlights magazine on the table. 
One. You didn’t think anyone would pick up on that? There was a snowsuit 
hanging on the coat rack. That lamp wasn’t plugged in. Nobody wore boots. And 
that curtain was untied, but that one wasn’t. I don’t think Kelly’s mom would 
have left it like that.   
 
 Everything he says is obvious as soon as he points it out. The lack of solid 1980s 
décor in the first few runs both made the Clues more conspicuous and ruined the 
engrossment. “What about the frozen gloves?” I ask.  
 “Oh. There’s always something in the freezer. Even I hide shit in my freezer.” 
Fair enough. 
Clues in The Other Murder 
 In contrast, The Speakeasy Murder attempts to take a major step forward by 
building a resolution mechanism that consists of Indices alone. Or, more accurately, the 
clues in the game are all Symbolic representations of real pieces of evidence, and these 
representations and descriptions are all spread out across the various character 
biographies. The major problem is that nobody knows which elements of his or her 
character are important elements. Because nobody knows what happened in the game-
world, they cannot extrapolate from the biographies what facts are Indices of something 
important, which means the only meaningful conversation that occurs is direct, verbatim 
information-swapping.  
 Readers of a Symbolic description of an event can draw no new information out 
of the Signs than what the author put into it. At first that seems a facile observation, but 
consider Icons and Indices. The Index is inexhaustible; it embodies infinite affordances. 
As an actual trace of activity, it can represent any number of Objects. It points in all 
directions. This is the very reason why anthropological field notes must be both 
meticulous and excessive: the researcher must write things down that do not yet have a 
 184 
meaning. She must write traces, Indices, Icons. The words are likely Symbols, yes, but 
the pages are not. The paragraphs are larger than Symbols. The Symbols have not been 
figured yet. Notes must work as tomes that can be interpreted again and again like the 
detritus of tabletop gaming or a work of art.  
 In an actual murder investigation, worthwhile clues function as Indices that point 
incontrovertibly towards one and only one definite fact: the presence and murderous 
activity of a specific person (and even the psychical intentionality if the prosecutor is 
going for murder in the first degree). All clues are Indices because they participated in 
this actual fact. They are traces.  
 Natural Indices converge. For example, if I detect a particularly shaped hole in 
my apartment wall and suspect that someone has shot a gun in my room, I can look 
around for a bullet casing, which would if it existed corroborate my interpretation of the 
hole. If I find no such casing, my suspicions are not corroborated; however, neither are 
they controverted.  
 The fundamental flaw of most murder-mystery events as facsimiles of actual 
murders is that very rarely do they offer converging Indices. Most evidence is 
circumstantial and interpretable in any number of ways. The “right” interpretation is 
whatever Symbolic value is assigned to the clue by the game’s designers.  
IV. FINDING A POETIC KEY 
 
 A good sign the game is going to be a success is players adopting the frame and 
rekeying of their own initiative, even better when pursuing their own goals. In middling 
cases, when a full-on adoption does not occur, there can still be players “trying on” the 
new key in small bits or exchanges. The problems arise when new players hesitate to join 
in the keying because they do not have a grasp on exactly “what it is that is going on.” 
Without knowing the frame, players do not have expectations, scripts, or patterns to rely 
on. It is almost as though making a meaningless action, an action not already laden with 
cultural definitions, would be worse than no action. I saw as much in tabletop gaming as 
 185 
well (see Chapter 4). Without being able to predict the other participants’ “footings” or 
know what “lines” to expect (Goffman 1959), players can become paralyzed.  
 Before any particular lusory means are deployed, the participant needs to freely 
choose to don the lusory attitude, the first step toward bringing into alignment lusory and 
prelusory goals. This is easier said than done, and there are people who lack any 
semblance of playfulness. On the other hand, there are those of us who have maintained a 
lusory attitude for years at a time. Speaking of myself, for instance, I cannot remember a 
recent time I was not keying in a markedly playful way. However, to study frames that 
arise from gaming, we will take the lusory attitude for granted.  
 The purpose of this section is to explore where murder-mystery events go wrong. 
What makes the genre such a one-off experience? As I argued in the introductory section, 
the troubles of murder-mystery events revolve around the awkward task that it is getting 
to learn a frame. We take our frames for granted so often. Various media are constantly 
flooding us with scripts, models, patterns, examples, stereotypes—We live in a world 
where we see almost as many people on screen as we do in person. Frames should be so 
easy. However, the murder-mystery event is an odd animal that presents hurdles with 
interesting implications.  
Games-as-Systems Frame 
 At this point, it may behoove us to consider a frame that works without much 
effort at all. Video games, board games, sports—We have excellent examples of games 
that offer familiar and understandable frames. However, without being too entirely 
dismissive, we might question whether any of these activities require local frames at all. 
Goffman himself muses over what it is to play in a hockey game or tennis match, 
considering for a moment whether such contests were not entirely sensible within 
Primary Social Frameworks of competition, dominance, showmanship (1974: 57). Just 
because rules are in place does not mean we are being pulled into a social frame. While 
professional boxing might require the management of a frame for the sake of safety. Is 
this guy really trying to kill me here, or are we still just boxing? Does playing 
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professional basketball or football in the United States similarly require such a protective 
frame? After consideration, we might take such sports as entirely sensible without any 
intersubjective frame. The players are doing precisely what they seem to be doing, and 
there are no keys nor meanings nor fabrications. Players on a team are likely working 
together according to some pattern or model; is that the same thing as a frame?  
 It is worth wondering about. We might say that a “systems mentality” is part of 
our Primary Social and Physical Frameworks in the West. Logistics, scalability, models, 
diagrams, flow, grids—We live in systems. However, I have gone to great lengths to 
distance myself from understandings of language, mind, society, or nature as bounded 
systems that organize endogenous value.  
The Authority of Constitutive Rules 
 The base dynamic of the game Werewolf is pure social performance and 
influence. It requires a relatively large number of players, typically eight or more, though 
even larger groups can be better. The game requires one leader or “warden” who does not 
take part in the action. After randomly and secretly assigning one of the other players the 
role of “werewolf,” all the players sit in a ring; everyone closes their eyes and puts their 
heads down. When the warden sees that everyone has turned away, she tells the werewolf 
to lift her head and point to one person who will be killed. Whoever is the werewolf 
opens her eyes, points to a victim, and puts her head back down. The warden announces 
that the deed has been done and tells everyone else to lift up his or her head. All of the 
players find out who died, and they must now decide who the werewolf is. The group 
votes to kill one person, and then everyone else puts their heads down. If the werewolf is 
still alive, the warden asks her to “wake up” and point out who will be killed tonight. And 
on it goes until the group figures out who the werewolf is and executes the right person. 
Who is it? Who gained from killing that person?  
 More sophisticated versions of the game add other roles for participants to play. I 
was playing a game once that included the “child” as a role. The child has the authority to 
“wake up” during the “nighttime” phase as well, after the werewolf has killed her victim. 
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The child can point to anyone else in the group to ask the warden, “Is this the werewolf?” 
The warden nods or shakes her head and tells the child to put her head down. Then 
everyone wakes up with another victim missing.  
 There is no benefit to saying, “I am the werewolf,” of course, because you will be 
killed. However, neither is their any benefit to saying, “I am the child! I saw the 
werewolf! Trust me!” and expose yourself because you will very well be the next victim 
when nighttime comes. There are no rules against exposing what role you might have, but 
it is just generally not a good idea. Whatever roles are afoot, the performance is pure 
dissembling and influence. To be a good child or a good werewolf, you must do so 
without letting anyone else know.  
 I explain this game to offer an elucidating anecdote. I recall playing a game of 
Werewolf with friends here in Austin a few years ago that started with over 20 
participants. When only seven of us were left in the game, I spoke up to say, “Hey, I’m 
the child. That dude is the werewolf. Let’s end this.”  
 I had good influence within the group up to this point, but it was getting too close 
to the end. I wanted to take the cocky werewolf out before she killed me, and I thought it 
was in the bag. Unfortunately, everyone in the group (still participating or long “dead”) 
became furious that I exposed the truth about my role. They assumed I had broken some 
rule. Despite my best efforts, I could not explain to them the difference between a 
common strategy and a constitutive rule. The secrecy of the rules was pure lusory means, 
just a strategy of play.  
 “It is a suggested norm that expert players will share with new players, but it is a 
norm that can be superseded at this point in the game!” I offered, but there was no 
budging.  
 A perfectly suitable, if rarely utilized, strategy of the game had been taken as a 
constitutive rule in a game that is slim even on prelusory regulative rules. This happens in 
MME all the time. In The Speakeasy Murder, each host and hostess I had would demand 
strict adherence to constitutive rules that I knew to be more suggestions or guidelines 
than rules necessary to constitute the system of the game. In one case, this 
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overdependence on the authority of constitutive rules was intimately tied up with the 
host’s own reaching after authority.  
Playing vs. Role-Playing 
 A major issue in murder-mystery events that comes up in The Speakeasy Murder 
is whether or not the killer is to know at the beginning of the game that she is the killer. 
This amounts to a small fabrication that has a large impact on the dynamics of the game. 
In The Speakeasy Murder, the killer finds out at the event that occurs just after the killing, 
second phase of the night. Unfortunately, as I learned during my third time through the 
game, the killer’s own character biography holds one of the central pieces of evidence 
against her. This leads to a conflict of interest between “playing the game” and “role-
playing the game.”  
 We ran the first iteration of The Ski Lodge Murder with a naïve murderer, and 
things did not work well. Other popular MMEs for sale online advertise their titles by 
celebrating that “everyone is in on the game.” The board game Clue works this way, and 
if your character turns out to be the killer, you just announce the fact as you would if it 
were anyone else. 
 What the game gains in inclusivity, it loses in complexity not to mention 
verisimilitude. Would you not act differently from the very beginning if you were the 
killer? By giving the killer something to do or having players compete to be the killer just 
as they compete to find her, it seems to me, the game could include more vectors and 
interactivity. We went with that option in The Ski Lodge Murder for the second iteration 
and never looked back.  
Frame-Breaking & Griefing  
 Any frame has the vulnerability of attracting griefers, people who take pleasure in 
intentionally breaking frames and transgressing the “we intentionality” of a group 
engaged in activity. The MME is more vulnerable than most. Because The Ski Lodge 
Murder takes place over an entire weekend, the frame of the game would wax and wane 
as Clues came into play. However, a game that is as focused and narrow as The 
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Speakeasy Murder risks complete shutdown if too many players begin to break the frame 
or become hostile.  
 The drive behind griefing is not necessarily a bad one: the griefers are toying with 
a frame, which in most cases I would celebrate. The problem is that they toy with frames 
being enjoyed by others. In the case of The Speakeasy griefers, I could sympathize with 
their wanting to invigorate the night by donning new prelusory goals and playing through 
the game. I did the same when I turned Super Mario Bros. into Super Drunk Bros. in 
Chapter 3.  
Lusory Means Outside Constitutive Rules 
 When I ask players what “worked” for them in the Ski Lodge game, the most 
common positive element is the feeling of environmental enchantment. Their words are 
invariably spatial, rather than social or mental:  
 “The whole house is enchanted, different.” 
 “It feels like anything can pop out at you. Like you could step on something!” 
 “It’s like the place is playing back with you.” 
 “You have to go everywhere. It’s like hunting for Easter eggs when you’re taking 
a pee.” 
 “I had no idea where to go. Everything was everywhere.” 
While we had a great resource in Kelly’s cabin, I do not think they were merely referring 
to the locale. Something about the game made the space charged from early on, even 
before there were Clues strewn about. Four of the above quotes come from talking to 
people at dinner, before the murder took place! 
 When asked about The Speakeasy Murder, the responses are more mixed, and the 
most prevalent positive experience of the event is the excuse to dress up and play. When 
asked about the game itself, players typically respond with a shrug.  
 “It was like Halloween. That’s fun.” 
 “I got to buy a really cool dress.” 
 “It was fun wearing these little glasses all night.” 
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 “I wish people still wore these [suspenders]. They’re pretty cool.” 
 Note that these players are talking about a prelusory goal that has little to do with 
the game. The only lusory means that connected with them, the only technique that 
worked to align the lusory goals of the game with the prelusory goals was the fashion. 
Then again, the costumes are entirely optional, which means they are not technically part 
of the lusory goals of the game. This means the game was not experienced as a game at 
all but simply a keying, a performance, a pageant.  
 I think one of the players from my second time going through the game put it best 
when he said, “I put on different clothes than I normally do.” 
 The lusory means of the MME can work to enchant the world and afford new 
kinds of behaviors, or they do the exact opposite and demand a keying that serves only to 
constrain behavior. I suggest that it is not a fine line at all, rather one that underscores the 
difference between a game-as-system and a game-as-toy.   
Making Systems Work 
  Dramatically simpler than the complex rule systems of tabletop role-playing 
games, the typical MME features only a small set of constitutive rules for translating the 
actions and objects that occur into meaningful Symbols in the game-system. However, 
sparse constitutive rules do not necessarily lead to open-ended, player-generated social 
activity and toying. While the role-playing demands of any MME will be more or less 
pressing depending on its design, the system itself needs to open outward beyond 
pageantry or playfulness and respond to the players’ ideas and emergent goals. To see 
player-generated meaning and unique poetics, the system must afford and encourage 
toying, and a game cannot encourage toying unless it responds to it.  
Possibility of Social Poetics 
 I am reminded of all those hours as a child spent pretending the floor was lava. 
The floor is lava! You have to jump from furniture to furniture! Throw down pillows as 
stepping-stones! To be sure, what is pleasurable and fun in such a simple game is not the 
idea of having lava on the floor. The content of the fantasy is not always the point. What 
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is fun is jumping and performing acrobatics, on the one hand, and developing a frame 
with friends in which the floor is charged as something different, on the other. The lava 
only needs to last for a moment; soon the floor is water, and you can touch it but only for 
an instant; the next moment you can only touch the floor, and the trail of pillows behind 
you are landmines.  
 My point is that toying maintains the “X” as an open-ended Sign and takes 
pleasure in developing and teasing whatever “Y” emerges from moment to moment. The 
shared space and poetic activity works to maintain the dual substance of the floor; as 
soon as the two worlds collapse again, the play ends. The tension and exhibition of 
playing create the double, the gap, the vacuum.    
 I believe The Ski Lodge Murder provides a rigor that makes a certain mode of 
playfulness harder. This playfulness permeates the game through an open-system, 
allowing players to inhabit the frame and build out their own fabrications and goals. It 
happens in each moment: the game disappears, and the lusory means expand the actual 
world to bring the lusory and prelusory goals together like two magnets: close but not 
touching.  
Virtual World or Alternate Reality 
 Whether online or analog, the virtual world presents inhabitants with a different 
way to be social, a different platform to do all the things that we do when we socialize. 
The world under-defines just enough objects and actions to invite playful toying, to offer 
affordances for meaning-making before it offers ready-made meaning.  
 The resulting assemblage is a world within which we can tease, bond, boast, 
compete, share, and teach. The success of a virtual world depends on how well it invites 
and sustains activities that enable all of those familiar modes of associating, and then 
offers new ways. I believe the events collected and represented here provide a compelling 
case for small-group alternate reality game offering new ways to reach desired rewards 
and pleasures, maybe even suggesting new rewards and pleasures in the process.    
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Chapter 6: Fighting The Fabrications in Local Alternate Reality Games 
 Unlike the tabletop role-playing games of Chapter 4 and the murder-mystery 
events of Chapter 5, the genuine alternate reality game has no constitutive rules, no 
system. What defines the tabletop role-playing game is the frame, an easily conjured but 
tensely maintained engrossment in a world of “hard facts” and performance. What 
defines the murder-mystery event is the key, a corpus of practices and performances that 
govern how players must inhabit the space of the game, without which the event would 
grind to a halt. What defines the alternate reality game is the fabrication, a simple wall of 
secrecy that exclaims, “I know something you don’t know!” However, like the voice of 
one crying in the wilderness or the sound of a tree falling in the forest, the game cannot 
exist unless there is an ear to hear it. The more ears, the better.  
 This ethnographic chapter focuses centrally on two iterations of a local alternate 
reality game, or ARG, hosted by several fellow designers and me. The argument 
sustained alongside the ethnography holds that a successful alternate reality game 
incorporates players into an analog virtual world, an unfalsifiable world of virtual objects 
similar in many ways to the online virtual worlds of Edward Castronova (2005, 2007) 
and Tom Boellstorff (2008). Essential to this argument is understanding how the social 
interactions and meaningful activity that emerge during play are at once actual and other. 
I suggest that much of the game’s excitement arises from the players’ conscious 
negotiation between the actual and the almost at each moment, a doubling that I have 
previously argued characterizes the virtual. Of course, to be considered a proper 
worlding, the virtual environment must afford players to explore whatever prelusory or 
lusory goals emerge from the player-driven public. Following, and contrary to most 
scholarship on alternate reality gaming, my ethnography focuses more on the experience 
of worlding and the machinations of the player-public than on the specific narrative 
planned by the designers.  
 First developed in 2001 as a technique of viral marketing, ARG has since become 
an autonomous form of interactive media (McGonigal 2006, Szulborski 2005b). A 
decade after the first large-scale alternate reality game—designed to promote Steven 
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Spielberg’s film A.I. (2001) and attracting over three million participants worldwide—
scholarship on this new form of gaming remains largely within the disciplines of 
performance studies (McGonigal 2006, 2007) and media or narrative studies (Szulborski 
2005a, Jenkins 2006), with only a later showing among game studies proper (Montola et 
al. 2009). While paying attention to the market motivations that spawned—and to a large 
extent sustain—the genre, my own investigations aim to privilege the perspective of the 
players and take account of the affective, cognitive, and semiotic labor undertaken in 
playing/performing an alternate reality game. 
 This chapter first introduces the “fabrication” at the heart of the game and 
describes at length how unsuspecting participants typically stumble upon a new game 
(Section I). I then cover the labor required to produce the virtual objects that populate the 
alternate reality conjured by the game and discuss the role of material infrastructures that 
make possible such virtual worlds (Section II). Stepping inside the frame, I then work 
through later stages of the game from the perspective of a handful of players (Sections III 
and IV). The chapter concludes with a word about poiesis and the roles of player-driven 
creativity and player-generated meaning, contrasting alternate reality games that take a 
closed-system approach with those that leave the narrative open for the actions of the 
players to decide (Sections V).  
Methods 
 Though the first local alternate reality game I ran with a handful of fellow 
designers in March of 2012 at the SXSW Interactive and SXSW Music Festivals, Fancy 
Bang, generated only twelve or so players at a cost of over $2000, it provided most of the 
hard-knock lessons needed to fashion us into the successful designers of two later games 
(with a third taking place in the near future).  
 We created the second iteration of Fancy Bang shortly thereafter, designing the 
game to intersect with the Gen Con gaming convention to be held in August in 
Indianapolis, IN. Gen Con, or “the best four days in gaming,” is actually a five-day event 
that takes place in early August each year and attracts around 50,000 attendees to the 
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downtown convention center. Gen Con focuses centrally on tabletop role-playing games 
and miniature war games, though any such gathering of geeks in recent years will feature 
all popular forms of games and performative play. This version of Fancy Bang, which 
hacked into regularly scheduled events of the larger convention and permeated several 
levels of the administration, drew 80 players together to investigate and resolve the 
“champion’s curse” of Mark “Crocodile Fingers” Harshman, a fictional veteran gamer 
caught up in no small amount of intrigue. Through my connections with industry 
professionals and convention organizers, I was able to sneak props and clues for the 
Fancy Bang players into some surprising places. According to player feedback, the game 
acted as an animating part of their convention as a whole, a charge that lasted all week 
even outside proper events.  
 The following year, while attending the A-Kon convention in Dallas, TX, the 
same group of designers and I hosted another iteration of Fancy Bang for attendees of the 
longest-running and fifth-largest anime convention in the United States. With less 
responsive program administrators, less frequented pre-convention Web forums, and only 
three days of full attendance on site, we had to cut out or condense several of the phases 
from Gen Con. Despite the drawbacks, this iteration of Fancy Bang attracted 200 of the 
26,000 con-goers. It exploded into six area hotels and became a huge success, largely due 
to a fortuitous night of drinking and a serendipitous slip of the tongue.  
 The August 2012 iteration of Fancy Bang at Gen Con in Indianapolis will act as 
the cornerstone of this account, while I use references to the SXSW and A-Kon iterations 
when appropriate to highlight other details and insights for the genre.  
I. THE SLIMMEST ALTERNATE REALITY GAME 
  
 Every public alternate reality game begins as a hoax, a conspiracy theory, a rabbit 
hole. The manifold virtual elements created by the game’s designers populate the 
environment in something akin to Derek McCormack’s “spectral geographies” (2010b, 
see also Chapter 2), hoping to circulate enough to develop a charge. As a whole, the 
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virtual world exists as a puzzle box awaiting an audience; it only works to the degree it 
can generate interest, pique curiosity, elicit investment. Once the participant wanders 
down into the rabbit hole, she, like Alice, is confronted with so many equivalents of a 
“Drink Me” sign, and it is through the willingness to drink—through an early act of Why 
the hell not?—that the participant enters the game to become a player.  
Localized Alternate Reality Games 
 Jane McGonigal (2006, 2007) theorizes alternate reality gaming at the intersection 
of “ubiquitous computing and experimental game design,” analyzing formal elements of 
the diverse genre as well as new technologies that make such games possible. Likewise, 
in his book Convergence Culture, Henry Jenkins (2006) theorizes how the “hive minds” 
of similar movements develop across multiple platforms as people and attention converge 
in cyberspace. Fancy Bang, with 80 and 200 players in each substantial iteration, is 
admittedly logarithmically smaller than the million-player games McGonigal and designs 
and studies; however, I feel focusing too closely on the dazzling technologies that make 
larger games possible can reaffirm the “digital fallacy” warned against by Stenros and 
Waern (2011).  
 We must bear in mind that both McGonigal and Jenkins look to wildly successful 
alternate reality games produced as guerilla marketing campaigns by the likes of Sony 
Pictures and Microsoft to theorize the formal elements of the genre. That a fabricated 
“grassroots” advertising campaign designed to engage millions of potential customers 
would employ all kinds of mass-media and Internet technologies to mobilize activity and 
attention seems obvious; digital infrastructures provide unparalleled access to consumers, 
and marketing firms have long been drivers of innovation into technologies of access and 
attention. However, in a move to reorient the study of alternate reality games away from 
technological innovation, I suggest that such mass-market mobilization is not essential to 
the genre.  
 In contrast, I argue that the essential elements of the alternate reality game are 
shared with those needed to sustain any analog virtual world: the presence of sufficient 
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virtual objects to expand and thereby charge the actual world with a spectre that becomes 
materially present despite its physical absence. What the alternate reality game adds is 
only that the virtual objects serve as lusory means that typically entail an ultimate lusory 
goal. In any case, such a world must afford individuals to bring their own prelusory and 
lusory goals to the platform and host any ensuing player-directed sociality. While 
“ubiquitous computing” offers solid means to produce virtual objects, we have already 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 how other media—after human cognition itself—afford 
such constructs as well. Rather than defining the genre with the games of McGonigal and 
Szulborski and stepping inward to smaller scales, my own study begins with the virtual 
worlds of tabletop games and murder-mystery events and steps outward to what I call 
“localized” alternate reality games. 
Framing The Game 
 In August of 2012, Fancy Bang started slowly on the Internet with unassuming 
call-outs on the official Gen Con forums for attendees to pre-register for scheduled events 
at the upcoming con. Every year the convention hosts thousands of individual gaming 
sessions arranged into four genres, with the tabletop role-playing games where we will 
stage many of our events coming in four-hour slots. Official gaming sessions run from 
Wednesday evening thru Sunday afternoon, and forums are lively from the day they open 
six months before the con until well beyond the event itself. Unofficial gaming happens 
everywhere as well, and threads open on the forums to arrange private games and longer 
campaigns that will run outside the set schedule of the con.  
  Attendees negotiating for room-sharing arrangements will be the most popular 
online forum overall, generating dozens of threads, and a third-party market exists of 
attendees reserving several rooms and “scalping” beds to the late-comers. However, the 
most active gaming-related threads come from game-masters advertising the adventures 
they have planned. Each gaming slot has only a unique ID-number and a brief description 
listed on the convention website, and so game-masters plug their four-hour events by 
posting longer synopses, images of the miniatures and terrain pieces to be featured, 
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unofficial prizes offered, parameters for the player-characters permitted, intended mood 
or atmosphere, etc. Any game-master who runs 16 hours of gaming gets free admission to 
the con (a reimbursement worth more than $80 in 2012), and the competition for 
mustering pre-registered players begins as early as February.  
 As I already have several slots reserved to feature my company’s new role-
playing game, the designers of Fancy Bang and I take advantage of the forums to begin 
laying out the narrative. Instrumentalizing the existing infrastructure of the con, we begin 
the slow build of the legend of Mark “Crocodile Fingers” Harshman. For Fancy Bang to 
work, we must “contain” potential players in a frame that will figure multiple events 
hosted over the duration of the con as the tumultuous rock-bottom plunge of Crocodile 
Fingers. Goffman (1974) theorizes what he calls the fabrication in contrast to the key as 
one of two possible ways to transform actual activity into something else. While the 
common mechanisms of Goffman’s fabrications are tricks, schemes, confidence games, 
and ruses, fabrications are not essentially about a lie, but a secret. The multiplying 
falsifications and untruths constructed by the fabricators serve a greater purpose: protect 
the secret.25 Fabrications arise when some participants in the frame are aware of one or 
another specific “fact of the matter” that other participants are intentionally kept in the 
dark about.  
 I will here characterize the alternate reality game an as overarching key that 
contains two crucial fabrications, both of which can likely contain an indefinite number 
of smaller keys and fabrications. I consider this major keying the lusory make-believe of 
the entire story and world of the game that encompasses designers and players alike. 
Following, the major fabrication is then the unsuspecting participants’ experience of the 
fantasy make-believe as actually happening. Only those who break out of being 
“contained” in this fabrication become players. Finally, there is what I will call the 
central fabrication, which contains the secrets of the game-world only known to the 
                                                
25 Goffman’s idea of the fabrication fits easily into Bernard Suits’ longer definition of a game (1978: 48), 
an observation that reframes the childlike pleasure of telling lies from being about generating falsity or 
untruths to being about hiding. The lie is reframed as a lusory means toward the prelusory goal of hiding, of 
concealing, of playing. 
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creators. This is the mystery that participants and players alike engage and resolve. 
Importantly, these fabrications are not concentric; for example, a participant may work 
within the game to uncover facts about the fictional characters and conflicts without 
knowing them to be fictional.  
Opening Fabrications 
 The Fancy Bang design team spends the late spring and early summer of 2012 
building the legend and arming our fabrications. Using the Internet to create false trails 
and false accounts of the talent of Mark Harshman is easy, and we soon have each of our 
slots filled with five gamers hoping to unseat Crocodile Fingers as the undisputed 
“world’s best” Fantaji player. This ensures us at the very least 65 participants, though 
whether or not they will be interested in what occurs enough to slip down the rabbit hole 
remains to be seen.  
 In the 2013 game at A-Kon, which focuses more on anime art and culture than 
gaming, there is no such activity prior to the con itself. We reach out to potential 
participants through the convention’s website only through small blog posts and contest 
announcements that the convention administrators request from attending exhibitors and 
programmers. While we gain promising feedback on post performance from the con’s 
website administrators, none of the 200+ players who pushed the game forward in Dallas, 
TX, mention any of our Web articles in follow-up interviews. 
The Ethics of Fabrication 
 Although the overall goal is to keep some people in the dark about “what is it that 
is going on” in the current situation, fabrications can be malicious or benign in spirit 
(Goffman 1974: 85). The planning of a surprise birthday party entails a fabrication, as do 
the magic show, the intervention, and the guerilla concert. By all accounts, alternate 
reality games fit squarely in the benign category, as the important fabrications are all 
eventually revealed as they are. The only negative feeling I have seen attached to a game 
is simple disappointment, when a game fizzles before its intended conclusion or ends up 
not as fun as some previous game. That this is true even when the most popular alternate 
 199 
reality games are advertising campaigns is interesting, and it seems that even the 
unveiling of the self-interested motives of the creators generates more excitement than 
criticism. We might all remember semi-fictional Ralphie’s disappointment in A 
Christmas Story (Clark 1983) to discover that the vitally important secret message he 
saved up for and worked so hard to decode advised him only to “Drink more Ovaltine;” 
however, the similar experiences I have had myself at the conclusion of a game have 
never detracted from the remembered intensity and excitement of such large-scale 
gaming and problem-solving. 
The Performance of Belief as Keying 
 Borrowing from Bernard Suits that a game is “a voluntary attempt to overcome 
unnecessary obstacles,” McGonigal (2007) offers that one of the pleasures of ARG is the 
“performance of mastery” that allows players to overcome these obstacles: multimedia 
literacy, problem-solving prowess, teamwork, and strategies of collective intelligence. 
While large-scale alternate reality games rely heavily on puzzles hard enough to sustain 
the efforts of thousands of minds together, my own interests in frames and virtual worlds 
see this performance of mastery embodied in the sleuthing of players to break out of 
either important fabrication. Smaller puzzles, scavenger hunts, decodings, and 
competitions all provide pleasurable conflicts and—more importantly—opportunities to 
demonstrate value to peers and self-organize. What can go overlooked in studies that 
focus too closely on the technological side of ARGs is the presence of an ongoing 
prelusory goal of social organization that overlays the goal of deduction and 
computational mastery.     
 McGonigal coins another pleasure in alternate reality gaming the “performance of 
belief,” in obvious contrast to the theater’s familiar “suspension of disbelief,” her 
implication being that the player takes an active role in generating the lusory attitude 
needed to play. The game becomes a justification or excuse for the kind of play desired 
by the player. This performance of belief occurs when participants break out of the major 
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fabrication and join with the creators of the game in keying their ways through the central 
fabrication.  
From Participants to Players 
 While the murder-mystery event involves players who know from the very 
beginning that they are playing a game, the genuine alternate reality game floats out in 
the actual world as pure possibility, a net of Indices and virtual objects trawling for 
players who eventually realize—or not—that they have been interpolated into a virtual 
world. Like Chris Kelty’s (2008) “recursive public,” the participants in the virtual world 
begin to realize themselves as players of a game and the sole constituents of its body. At 
this point, in this step towards investment and responsibility over the progress of the 
game, the participants become players. The motto of the genre, “This Is Not A Game” or 
“TINAG” (Szulborski 2005a), ensures that the players must be both self-starting and self-
directed. There will be little prompting by the creators, and the narrative works best when 
it unfolds organically as unfalsifiable. To expose the game as a game ruins the fun, and 
virtual world can only persist as long as the players remain partially caught in a charged 
doubling that makes their world something else, something bigger.   
Staying in Key 
 From the perspective of the designers, participants are those individuals fully 
“contained” within the major fabrication, who follow the events and activities of the 
game at face value and have no idea something else is afoot. In contrast, players see 
through the major fabrication in part and work from this position to construct knowledge 
in two directions. Both directions work to amplify the virtual world through the labor and 
performance of players.  
 In one direction, initiated players must decide whether and to what extent they 
should organize and communicate with each other outside the major fabrication. Such 
planning is risky in a localized alternate reality game because the more participants any 
player “lets in,” the greater the risk of her being left out or left behind when later events 
occur. In other words, the more people who know “what’s going on,” the farther from the 
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center of the action any given player is likely to feel. Of course, players cannot be sure 
how many other players there are in any case, never knowing how central they might be 
to the narrative or what greater narrative may remain entirely unknown to them. This 
competition over being “in on” and “in control of” the fabrication works exactly like 
“frame-working” in Goffman’s (1959, 1961) sense, where individuals vie for position 
within the intersubjectively negotiated frame. In this vein, players struggle to have 
control of the situation and gain or retain leadership and decision-making roles in the 
game. I feel that this social conflict and “negotiation” is the neglected heart of 
McGonigal’s performance of mastery and deserves at least as much attention as problem-
solving and technical performance.  
 In the other direction, the very same players must still decide what to do about the 
unfolding narrative within the central fabrication, playing along—keying—with the 
events and challenges. However, this keying takes on a charged valence because there is 
no way to tell precisely what is actually happening and what is almost happening. To the 
extent that the fabrication is unfalsifiable and distended across hundreds of individuals 
and thousands of square-feet, even the players who realize that something is afoot cannot 
be sure what is what, and so they can never be certain just how much they are pretending.  
 The former direction towards struggling with the major fabrication will be the 
subject of Section III, while the latter issue of cracking the central fabrication fills 
Section IV. The upcoming section (II) covers the work that goes into constructing the 
material infrastructure that aims at conjuring the virtual world.   
II. THE MATERIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
 There are 11 designers altogether and over 30 volunteers, but only four designers 
and I participate in two or more iterations of Fancy Bang. I will refer only to these four 
by name in the following accounts, though no game would get off the ground with a crew 
of only five: Greg, a long-time friend and gamer who has an exceptional mind for 
logistics; Mitch, a new Fantaji gamer who designs most of the in-game conflicts that 
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further the narrative and portrays “Crocodile Fingers” in 2012 at Gen Con; Andrea, who 
writes most of the copy in our fictional and fabricated materials and comes through with 
clutch graphic design whenever I drop the ball; and Jake, a self-professed workhorse with 
the mind of a Carl Sagan and too many natural science degrees.   
 From here on out, the designers and I must key the narrative of Mark Harshman 
and maintain a fabrication on at least two levels. The question now is whether and to 
what degree our three laminations—along with the circulation of physical props, actors, a 
virtual “curse,” player-driven organizing, real and imagined conflicts, and affective 
labor—can conjure and sustain an analog virtual world for the players. 
 Being in such close quarters and lasting only a few days, Fancy Bang has little 
chance of containing players in the major fabrication for too long. It is a small game with 
modest aims, but the iterations prove popular enough to feature the essential elements of 
larger ARGs.  
Unfalsifiable Worlds 
 One of the heaviest burdens on the designers of an alternate reality game of any 
size is their commitment to unfalsifiability. Not all alternate reality games attempt to 
maintain unfalsifiable narratives and so abandon what I call the major fabrication 
entirely, though several very successful games have held fast to the “TINAG” motto as a 
way of amping engrossment.  
 Regardless of the practice in alternate reality gaming, every proper virtual world 
at least has the potential for unfalsifiability, if only because it is impossible to prove a 
negative. When I spent 30 continuous hours glued to the /b/ board of 4chan.org one 
summer years ago, I could not be absolutely sure that the person posting all those time-
stamped photographs was actually Danny DeVito messing around on the Internet with 
fans. However, his posts came with such reasonable timing and accurate deixis that 
“performing belief” came easily.  
 If we consider a more substantial virtual world, the phenomenon is the same. No 
Second Life user would mistake the digital images of high-rise condominiums and trim, 
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tawny bodies displayed on his monitor for physical buildings or bodies, but that is not 
what is at stake: there is no way he can definitively prove that the person controlling that 
other avatar isn’t a 24-year-old graduate student at Cambridge University—though 
maybe we could wonder why she only logs on at what would be 4:30AM Greenwich 
Mean Time…  
 Beyond providing social activity and Indexing the mere existence of other 
individuals, a virtual world generates a presence; the power of the virtual world is not in 
its physicality but its materiality. Ken Hillis (2009) describes the avatars of Second Life 
as “sign–bodies” that generate empathy and attachment precisely because they are 
Indices of actual individuals with actual bodies, however distant. It is not simply there 
existence that matters, but their virtual proximity via the avatars. Each jitter, each gesture, 
each rotation of the avatar is an actual signal from that distant person, a signal that still 
means something even if the body performing the gesture is not physical.    
 What I have added to Hillis’ account is that the colorful and engrossing Indices on 
the monitor can also function as virtual objects that participate in the same doubled 
environment that includes not only the user’s digital avatar but his actual body as well. 
Each image on the monitor is apprehended as almost an object, a “hard fact” that plays 
with and against the user’s own will, resisting activity and intention as any physical 
object would, entering a user’s cyborg mind as any object might (Clark 2003). If our 
minds permeate actual space, what is to stop them from taking up virtual objects as well? 
Second Life acts as the cliff face or cave wall that carries and reflects the very material—
albeit non-physical—echo of other actual bodies. When the other user claims that the 
appearance and gestures of her avatar Index an identical appearance and similarly 
intended gestures, such claims are—at the most mechanical level—entirely unfalsifiable. 
In such a way, navigating Second Life can be akin to playing a never-ending Turing Test, 
which many users find part of the excitement.   
 After the initial SXSW run, a strict level of unfalsifiability becomes the goal for 
Fancy Bang; we want to contain players within a lively Turing Test that will keep them 
on their toes.  
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Singular Virtual Object 
 Many of the most successful alternate reality games include supernatural elements 
that attempt to truly transport the players to another world. In a research project designed 
around alternate realities, such an inclusion would seem to make sense. However, 
although the Fancy Bang designers spent several weeks developing a supernatural plot 
and even ran the first game featuring an alternate timeline for the city of Austin, TX, I 
was able to persuade Mitch and Andrea to develop the “champion’s curse” as the only 
paranormal element for the next iterations.  
 In the interest of creating the thinnest analog virtual world possible, I felt that a 
plot without wild supernatural elements would stick truer to my research goals. Tabletop 
role-playing games cover the imaginary elements of analog virtual worlds well, and every 
murder-mystery event revolves around a “fictional” murder; for the final case study (and 
after the utter failure of Fancy Bang 1.0 at SXSW), I decided the project could increase 
potential engrossment and at the same time generate more transportable data by leaving 
out the properly supernatural and deploying only a single, slim virtual object. Enter the 
champion’s curse!  
Constructing the Champion’s Curse 
 After deciding on the virtual object that will work as our game’s focus, we have to 
generate all of the objects that will help Index its existence and turn the “curse” into a 
“hard fact” that can resist the will of the players and become a part of their ongoing 
ontology. We know it will take something like stage magic to create a believable and 
engrossing “curse” to haunt Crocodile Fingers, and I consult with two professional 
magicians to work on tricks that the actors portraying Mark Harshman and I can perform 
at the gaming table. The whole team has dreams of being street magicians and blowing 
the minds of our players with theatrics at grand scales. I confess that YouTube research 
into “street magic” sucked up about a week of collective time. 
 The first contact with a magician comes by complete coincidence the next month. 
I am attending an art show with fellow-designer Andrea at a speakeasy in East Austin. 
The event is hosted by local cartoon-creating celebrity Mike Judge, and part of the 
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entertainment—definitely the tamest—is a professional magician who performs card 
tricks and simple illusions while circulating through the party. Though I prove entirely 
incompetent at performing the magic tricks, Andrea is able to pick them up quickly; I am 
even more amazed when, over a year later, she passes a remembered trick along to the 
actor who plays Mark Harshman in Dallas, which scores a great effect in the game.  
 I give magic another shot by contacting a local card magician from Craigslist. He 
works in the kitchen of a bar in downtown Austin, and I spend two hours very late at 
night in an alley of the Warehouse District dropping cards in puddles of crud. With Gen 
Con a few months away, we need a more secure way to conjure this virtual curse, and the 
team brainstorms new ideas.  
 The strongest asset we settle on is my list of industry contacts who will be 
attending the con in August. I go about making calls and filling in those professionals 
who will be making public appearances during the convention. I line up four solid 
commitments that will be temporally spread out over the course of the convention, and I 
later give each of these industry names a small phrase offering condolences to Mark 
Harshman that they can work into whatever appearances they make and spread gossip 
about. To my surprise, one of the guys makes an immediate post online about it, which 
marks the first outsider participation in the game and gets the design team excited about 
the prospects of building a fictional gamer hero with larger-than-life status.  
 Additionally, we come up with some great scenes to enact that require the 
following items: 
 
Loaded dice to botch rolls 
Lost stuff in fabricated “stashes” 
Crutches 
2 Fake T-shirts 
Small fake diary 
 
We also pay $200 to a prominent gaming blog that promises to be broadcasting live from 
Gen Con for some screen time during one of their segments, which will lead to mixed 
results.  
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Planning The Props 
 What physical props are needed to run a successful alternate reality game will 
vary with the game, but attempting to develop a “spectral geography” takes carefully 
designed objects and environments. While virtual objects make up a large part of tabletop 
games and online virtual worlds, murder-mystery events and alternate reality games 
thrive on the “infinite affordances” of the actual world. The actual world is fully 
interpolated into the virtual construction and becomes its own best map.   
 In the terms of John Searle (1995), each prop is designed in such a way to 
function as “X” for the participants or uninitiated and at the same time “Y” for players 
who have shifted into “Context C.” The best props, like the best clues, can seem to mean 
one thing at one time, only to mean something else after more knowledge is uncovered. 
In other words, they exist robustly enough to afford multiple interpretations, a necessary 
condition for player toying. Such props constitute a material infrastructure—or, a “patch” 
that hacks into various actual infrastructures—with the aim of expanding or distending 
the actual world enough to create a pocket big enough for the game to slip in.  
 The lusory means of the game come from these fabricated Indices peppered 
throughout the environs of the convention, which work not only to Index the curse but 
also simultaneously lead players through the events of the game, which manifest as the 
unfolding (pre)lusory goals. The second and third iterations of Fancy Bang are much 
cheaper than the first, as it is much easier to generate a single virtual object rather than an 
entirely virtual downtown environment, although the A-Kon game will take a surprising 
turn in that direction thanks to a minor celebrity. Most of the other lusory goals and 
contests embody conflicts generated within the Fantaji games and throughout the 
tournament, which is easy enough to manipulate.   
 For the 2012 Gen Con iteration of Fancy Bang, we purchase or fabricate the at 
least the following items:  
 
20 11” X 17” fake gaming schedules 
20 11” X 17” fake posters from last year used as false histories 
5 copies of a 24” X 36” foam board signs for fake “open-gaming” room 
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2 vinyl banners 
2000 artifact cards in 50 different styles 
1000 coupon cards 
400 poker chip tokens 
50 poker chip tokens with “decoder” design 
3 T-shirts from real conventions with Mark’s name on them (2 bad, 1 good) 
3 fake convention programs with Mark in them 
Old printed diary from previous champion 
200 fake business cards for 2 fictional characters 
1000 printed schedules of table events (2 versions) 
1 pair of crutches 
10 loaded dice 
2 full backpacks of used goods to be Mark Harshman’s “stash” 
50 tiles of 5 custom Fantaji enemies to suit narrative 
80 stapled packets of the 60+ page quickstart packets (see below) 
300 blank character sheets 
80 copies of 8 sample characters 
4 previous character sheets of Mark’s characters 
 
These props are all designed to charge the halls of the Indiana Convention Center (ICC) 
and the Hilton Anatole hotel in Dallas with our fictional world and singular virtual object. 
Together, a world slightly bigger than our own can emerge. Surprisingly, the props cost 
us just under $1800 per convention (beyond the $1000 or so my company already spends 
to attend, which covers lodging). The amount we spend on each of Gen Con and A-Kon 
is only slightly less than the price of the doomed SXSW iteration, which resulted in only 
12 unique players over 11 days.   
Take-Home Quickstarts 
 What become the most important props by far are not properly part of the virtual 
world. We publish 80 small packets for each convention that contain free “quickstart” 
copies of Fantaji, preview versions that contain just enough of the game for a tutorial and 
some fun. These each include the stories of our successful 2010 Kickstarter campaign and 
the rise of Mark “Crocodile Fingers” Harshman, which we fictionally attach to the 
previous year’s con. The packets also contain a few character sheets, sample artifacts, 
and plenty of information to bring people into the Fancy Bang fabrication. Our hope is 
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that these portable “rabbit holes” can be used to lure promising tabletop gamers already 
interested in Fantaji seamlessly into Fancy Bang’s alternate reality. Mitch and his own 
team take great care designing an encounter for the quickstart that resonates with the 
plight of Harshman, and Andrea puts everything together impeccably.  
Murphy’s Law of Infrastructure Hacking 
 For the smaller con in 2013, we print only 20 posters altogether to hang around 
the Hilton Anatole in Dallas, TX, that appear to be official schedules and reminders from 
the A-Kon administrators. The posters feature the Fantaji play-offs “featuring Mark 
‘Crocodile Fingers’ Harshman” alongside the official sponsored events of the con. In our 
post-event interviews, nobody recalls seeing the posters, and before the 2014 con I find it 
is cheaper to simply pay for advertising space at the convention than to go guerilla. So it 
goes.    
The Central Fabrication & Schedule 
 The narrative flow-chart we plot out serves to feature the curse as centrally as 
possible and to give players opportunities to interact with our actors and each other to 
animate their environments and get caught up in the doubling world. From Wednesday 
through Friday at Gen Con and all day Friday at A-Kon, we will have up to four projects 
running at any given moment: scheduled four-hour Fantaji sessions in the gaming halls 
to offer “rabbit holes” and spread gossip, two-hour Fantaji sessions that constitute a loose 
“play-off” tournament at our own dedicated booth, Crocodile Fingers himself 
schmoozing the con to enlist “allies” and “impostors” whom he coaches to win the 
tournament and take his place as champion, and any one of our pre-designed live-action 
challenges or latent puzzle-games.  
 Andrea and I design two twists, the first scheduled for Saturday morning at both 
cons, wherein Harshman’s Fantaji player-character will die in a third-round play-off 
session at our dedicated booth, before the presumed finale. By this point Harshman will 
have been amassing allies and coaching them how to win the tournament with puzzles, 
challenges, and impromptu gaming sessions. His early loss should confuse the players a 
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bit, and Harshman will continue to offer puzzles and challenges with the promise of still 
having some trick up his sleeve that yet gives him power to determine his successor.  
 The second twist will happen later in the day on Saturday after Harshman publicly 
confesses to losing on purpose to shed the “champion’s curse.” Most of the players will 
have already known and taken advantage of his intention to lose throughout the 
tournament; however, the twist comes after the new champion is crowned. For the Gen 
Con iteration, another actor will play the new Fantaji champion, Aurora, who suffers 
from the curse and then swears to spread it through force of will to any and all who 
played in the Fantaji tournament over the last three days. Saturday night will see more 
curse-Indexing hijinks, and there will be a final event early on Sunday morning to 
“cleanse” any player of the curse, though attendance is mandatory for the spell to work. 
By this point the major fabrication will have been set aside, and players will likely be 
invested in Fancy Bang only to see what happens next and how far we can take the curse 
before resolving the central fabrication.  
 The second twist occurs differently at A-Kon. When the next year comes around, 
we cannot fill out a full ensemble of actors and decide to leave the role of the “new 
champion” up to chance. The con has fewer days anyway, and we figure it will be easier 
having Crocodile Fingers himself seek to spread the curse to every player in the 
tournament out of spite after losing, potentially arguing that because he did not lose in the 
championship game his curse lingers. We plan to test the mettle of whoever wins the 
tournament to see what we might do with the curse for the rest of the day Saturday. Does 
it stay with Harshman or move to the new reigning champion? Either way, the narrative 
will lead up to the denouement event early Sunday morning.  
 Climactic forks in the road will occur on Thursday and Friday nights, swaying the 
direction of the tournament and revealing new information—or not—about the nature of 
the curse. The Saturday night event will function as a headline climax that has a preset 
result, though Sunday morning can go in a few directions based on our sense of the night 
before.  
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Wednesday Morning: Press & Educators Day 
 Although the Fancy Bang designers spend months prepping players online, 
generating buzz and planting evidence around the Web, the participants have few 
opportunities to investigate the frame until they arrive at the con. In Indianapolis, this 
means the localized portion of the game will begin at noon on Wednesday the 15th. 
 Wednesday at Gen Con is reserved exclusively for the press and educators. It is 
the “soft launch” of the con, and researchers are permitted to roam any of the open-
gaming areas and demo rooms; only the hangar-sized Exhibition Hall is closed as 
retailers hang their signs and build their booths. The convention has several panels 
throughout the day, but only one or two thousand such researchers are in attendance. 
There is talk of letting small-studio designers attend on Wednesday as well and 
expanding the programming to include how-to and Shark Tank-style events, where 
amateur designers pitch ideas to larger publishers; however, I cannot foresee this 
happening anytime soon. Gen Con is becoming increasingly industry-driven as private 
companies direct more and more of the programming and reshape the con as a business 
retreat and “state of the union” expo, rather than as place to interact with and support 
their fans and gamers. The change has been rapid, interestingly coeval with similar shifts 
in the many national Comic Con events and even Austin’s own SXSW Festivals. I have 
“yellow badge” access to Gen Con each year as an educator, though 2012 would be the 
first year I would use such clearance for Wednesday activities.  
Early Framing & Scouting 
 After the team of creators arrives on Wednesday, only four of us for now, we 
immediately scope out the new layout of the convention center. The Indiana Convention 
Center (ICC) has a modular floor-plan, and each year the con is a little different. In 2011, 
the ICC completed a $275-million expansion and renovation project in preparation for 
hosting Super Bowl XLVI along with the nearby Lucas Oil Stadium in February of 2012, 
and the Fancy Bang team, most of us veteran Gen Con attendees, prepares for an 
unfamiliar environment. 
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 I check in with my contacts and my company’s retail partners via SMS and have 
them slip me into the Exhibition Hall to drop off some printed materials at various 
booths. Things are still being fixed together in the enormous space; small forklifts and 
hydraulic cranes move the metal armatures of larger displays and hanging three-
dimensional signs and models resembling float-balloons from the 30’ ceilings. Andrea 
and Greg have created a coupon for a free Fantaji PDF download that requires a kind of 
“booth crawl” to activate: con-goers must learn code words from different booths to fill 
out blanks on the postcard-sized coupon and bring it to us in our dedicated booth in a 
smaller program hall. Several of the third-party booths are happy to be involved in the 
“crawl,” and we get a small chance to start some Crocodile Fingers gossip with smaller 
companies eager to be a part of the action.    
Wednesday Afternoon: The Playtest Hall 
 My company has taken out a booth in the new “Playtest Hall,” an unofficial test-
run of a program that would go on to become officially sanctioned in 2013 and 2014, 
doubling in size each year. The Playtest Hall allows large and small studios to debut 
games in progress and elicit feedback from specifically targeted gamers. Want to test 
your new game or module with a gaming group of three middle-aged couples? Easy. Fill 
out the worksheet, and the company running the Hall will find the six volunteers from 
among the con and schedule them at your table.  
 On Wednesday, we open up our booth at noon and request groups of six gamers 
each who will be attending the con for the full duration (we would not want to waste the 
time advertising to researchers only here for the day). I am soon in rhythm running short-
form games of Fantaji, taking e-mail addresses, names, and the occasional cell-phone 
number to “keep the gamers updated on special events” that are bound to turn up 
throughout the convention. Every chance I get, I plug the saddening fate of Mark 
“Crocodile Fingers” Harshman, who has been the undisputed “world champion” of 
Fantaji since the game launched in 2011. Overall, I catch a few fish, and I end up passing 
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out six of the quickstart packets to promising gamers who seem eager to continue the 
game in their rooms after hours.   
 Most of the Wednesday programming ends at 5:00PM, and the ICC gets eerily 
quiet after the scheduled events end. The team calls it a night pretty early on and heads up 
to our rooms for drinks and stapling more quickstart packets. Checking online the night 
before each convention launches, we have 65 pre-registered participants for Gen Con and 
40 for A-Kon. I will be up early running games and working the booths in either case. 
The game is on! 
III. BREAKING THE MAJOR FABRICATION 
 
 This section traces the transformation from participant to player of key attendees 
from both conventions. Two Gen Con gamers who take up leadership roles in 
Indianapolis, Sid and Nico, become playful rivals to replace Crocodile Fingers. Alex 
takes an early lead in solving puzzles and quickly picks up on the “quest-giver” function 
Mitch plays. Juno suffers from the “champion’s curse” and enlists the aid of her entire 
European tour group to further the tournament. Three unacquainted A-Kon attendees find 
themselves at the center of the action at different times in Dallas, and each changes the 
direction of the game: Melinda, Thomas, and Wamae. Finally, one random encounter 
almost entirely ruins our A-Kon Fancy Bang, but ends up being just the thing to double 
our base.   
Thursday: Gathering Gamers 
  By 9:00AM in Indianapolis there is a line of almost one thousand people winding 
its way around the largest foyer of the ICC, the vast plurality of the bodies white, male, 
and over 30 years old. The costume parade is not until Saturday, and Gen Con is not 
particularly known for its cosplay. There are attendees in various stages of half-
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costume—the odd piece of mail armor, a foam sword, some Orc or Drow26 face-paint, 
some quality superhero outfits—but most individuals look like stereotypical “gamers” 
from film and television. While the personalities and mannerisms of fictionalized tabletop 
gamers in the media are rarely accurate, it seems most directors can capture the outward 
appearances well enough. In 2012, “geek culture” was just at the edge of mainstream, and 
it would take only one or two more superhero movies to push things over.        
 My first game runs 10:00AM-2:00PM, and for the rest of the day I work the booth 
in the Playtest Hall spreading rumors or wandering the convention meeting friends and 
contacts. One of my best game-masters, Davis, meets Sid, 36, and Ash, 34, in a game 
scheduled at the 2:00-6:00PM slot. The two drove in from Milwaukee the night before 
and stayed with old college friends in a nearby suburb before driving downtown early in 
the morning. With their bags tagged behind the front desk awaiting check-in, they started 
into their scheduled events at 9:00AM with a panel on the television series Firefly, hosted 
by the company that purchased the license to publish the Firefly Role-Playing Game.   
 Davis starts up the planned adventure and shares some of our printed materials 
with Sid and Ash, staying in key and dropping bits of Crocodile Fingers lore when the 
opportunities arise. Davis recalls that a few of the other gamers in the session became 
very interested in the curse and asked direct questions that caught him off guard. He 
cannot say whether Sid or Ash ever chimed in, though he remembers that both did fairly 
well playing through the Fantaji adventure. The three-part module we are running at the 
convention progresses from day to day in  gamers who enjoy their officially scheduled 
sessions can visit our Playtest booth to continue the same campaign.  
 Sid remembers being captivated by Fantaji. He reads through the entire quickstart 
booklet at the table during play and suggests the gambit that eventually pushes the party 
to victory against a Clutch of Ember Goblins and an Painted Ogre. Ash role-plays as a 
Wood Elementalist but gets killed halfway through the session. He spends the rest of the 
time looking over the tiles, cards, and coupons Davis has on display. At 5:30PM or so the 
                                                
26 Orcs are the default antagonists of certain fantasy realms, inspired by the writings of J.R.R. Tolkien, and 
Drow are evil, charcoal-skinned quasi-elves with silver hair first appearing in Dungeons & Dragons tie-in 
fiction. 
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game is over, and Sid wants to know what slot Mark Harshman is scheduled to play in for 
the Fantaji tournament that starts Friday. From that moment on, he has a new personal 
goal for the con: take down the giant.  
 He and Ash take one of the quickstart packets and flip through it a few times over 
the course of the day while waiting in line, working out their own characters to use the 
next day if they join the tournament. Like most Gen Con attendees, Sid and Ash have full 
schedules and come to the conference with a long to-do list that leaves little time for 
spontaneous events or detours. If they want to play Fantaji at some point on Friday, they 
will have to do it over lunch or miss out on a panel during the afternoon.  
Nico Catches On at The Booth 
 Later in the day, after I have been running non-stop Fantaji games for over 10 
hours, three middle-aged, heavy-laden con-goers notice an empty table near my Playtest 
booth and stroll up to take a load off as they wait for their own scheduled session to begin 
with another company. As I lead six Fantaji newcomers through a small skirmish, the 
resting guys eavesdrop a bit and take interest. A half hour later, when the encounter at my 
table ends, I give a little Crocodile Fingers pitch and flash some of the knock-off 
materials that Andrea and Mitch designed featuring fictional conventions and 
tournaments. I pass out a quickstart or two and start cleaning up the table for the next 
scheduled group of testers. One of the waiting guys steps over with a grin on his face.  
 “I want in, man,” he offers. I assure him that I have no idea what he means, but it 
is my first time deflecting such direct inquiries and this man knows his stuff. He calls out 
the fake tournaments, drops some knowledge about the various conventions that actually 
take place in the cities mentioned on the fake T-shirts, and tells me again that he “wants 
in on” whatever is happening.  
 Feeling caught but unwilling to give up on the fabrication on the first full day of 
the convention, I explain that Mark Harshman himself had brought those T-shirts by 
earlier in the day to intimidate new gamers with his legacy, and I had just assumed they 
were real. Faked? How could he? The middle-aged veteran, Nico, buys it reluctantly and 
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moves into sharing some of his war stories from attending the real conventions in 
Columbus, OH, and Ann Arbor, MI. He seems a great guy, and I invite him to join in on 
the play-offs that will be starting the next day where he can confront the counterfeiter 
himself. I hand him a quickstart packet, and we shake hands before both of us start up our 
next shifts of scheduled games.   
“Crocodile Fingers” Making Allies 
 While most of the Fancy Bang designers and my team of game-masters endure 
long shifts either at the Playtest booth or in the overlapping series of four-hour registered 
events, Mitch is working the crowd as Crocodile Fingers on crutches and having a ball. 
He passes out printed artifact tiles that players can use in Fantaji sessions to boost their 
player-characters and get ahead in the tournament, and he sends interested gamers on 
challenges and quests we have hidden across the con. He regales all who will listen on 
the series of tragic accidents that almost made him miss the con and landed him in 
crutches; he claims that the curse follows him everywhere and prevents him from 
attending the con to the fullest and taking advantage of his role as Fantaji champion. If 
the mark seems keen to step into the fabrication, Mitch then invites them to impersonate 
him and attend one of two smaller events as the guest of honor in his place—so long as 
they do something for him first or prove themselves somehow.  
 Mitch distributes forty artifacts cards throughout the day and invites a dozen or so 
participants—who may or may not be onto his shtick—to attend either a late-night dinner 
in his honor at a nearby hotel or an early morning gaming session with his pre-made 
player-character. Though we have a competitive event planned for Thursday night to take 
place during an otherwise unrelated private party, none of the invited guests will arrive. 
However, three of his new “allies” will show up early Friday morning to compete for two 
powerful artifacts that can help them in the tournament, one of those being Alex.   
A-Kon Crocodile Fingers 
 The actor who plays Mark “Crocodile Fingers” Harshman at A-Kon is a 
professional. He comes recommended from a friend I have in Dallas, and while he lacks a 
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certain imagination, he will do anything we ask. There is no self-consciousness about 
causing scenes in public, no embarrassment at wailing in front of strangers or stumbling 
over furniture. He is a riot, and his obvious melodrama weakens the major fabrication 
only a little. What if the real Crocodile Fingers is a histrionic diva with a penchant for 
self-abuse? 
 Though he plays a major role at A-Kon, he and I have less of a personal 
relationship than Mitch and I; subsequently I see him less during the con and trust that he 
is keeping up with his duties, which he does.  
The Curse Strikes—Without Us 
 Juno, 31, lives in Germany and attends Gen Con every year with her husband. She 
backed the Fantaji project on Kickstarter and held off on having the materials shipped to 
them at home to save money. She has been waiting almost a year to pick up the book, 
custom dice, deck of cards, and other materials at Gen Con. When Juno and her husband 
come to the Playtest Hall to meet with me on Thursday afternoon and pick up their items, 
I am busy in the gaming hall. However, Mitch is taking a break with the crew and, not 
knowing Juno is an acquaintance of sorts, he sidles up on his crutches and gives the 
couple his pitch about the curse. They speak for a while, but after Juno explains herself 
and what she is looking for, Jake steps in and hands her the package I had marked and set 
aside for her earlier.  
 Later that night, Juno and her husband come back to the booth, again when I am 
away. Apparently a few elements of Mitch’s pitch as Crocodile Fingers were lost in 
translation, and Juno has come to playfully share that she sprained her wrist during a 
game in which she was using the “cursed dice” from her Fantaji materials. It takes a few 
moments for Jake and Davis to put together what she means, since neither listened too 
closely when she spoke with Mitch several hours earlier. Apparently she took Mitch to 
mean that all the custom Fantaji dice were cursed, not his dice. Juno stopped by to tease 
him about jinxing her and spraining her wrist. She sits down with a small group of 
strangers and plays through the round-one encounter with the Golem and Wizard. 
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 Fortunately, no other players are harmed during the game. The crew does a good 
job keying Juno into the game, and she proves a sharp contender.  
Thursday Night in Dallas 
 If Gen Con is that weird uncle you see once a year, A-Kon might be that charmed 
cousin ten years your junior who somehow knows more about the world than you do. A-
Kon has an average age closer to 20, and the convention unofficially begins Thursday 
night when guests begin arriving at the Hilton Anatole hotel. My carpool arrives from 
Austin around 7:00PM, and the elegance of the hotel astounds me. They are going to let 
teenage, con-going otaku27 run amok in this place? The ivory-colored floors shine 
something like opal, and the vertical ebony frames that act as walls lead the eye upwards 
to art installations hanging from the ceilings. We drag our roller-boards onward, and I 
recognize what looks like historical art from south and east Asia: sculptures, paintings, 
silks, tapestries.  
 My Fancy Bang team is not coming in until tomorrow, and my carpool friends—
including the guy who told me about the con a few months ago and suggested that we 
stage another game here—offer to help me get the company table put together for the 
morning. We pass two large chambers, as many cafes, a trendy bar with LED displays for 
tables, and another art gallery. It takes us three hours to unpack and put out the materials.  
 Meanwhile, Melinda, 19, and five of her friends arrive at the hotel closer to 
9:00PM and drag their multiple suitcases and makeup kits up to the 9th floor of the 
“Tower,” one of three wings of the hotel, a vast chamber outfitted with exposed hallways 
pointed inward, a 25-floor panopticon wrapped around hanging art. She and her friends 
each have four costumes for the convention: one for the Thursday night rounds, one for 
Friday, one for most of Saturday, and one for the masquerade ball on Saturday night. The 
six of them coordinated each set of costumes to highlight the full cast of a different anime 
series or video game title; it takes them over an hour to get ready, the co-ed crew now 
decked out as six popular enemies of the Marvel Comics anti-hero Deadpool. They 
                                                
27 The word means “fan” or “fanatic” in Japanese and applies to various fandoms in that country, but in the 
United States it typically applies to anime fans and cosplayers. 
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distribute a handle of vodka among six water bottles, mix in a little Redbull, each pop a 
tab of ecstasy, and strut out to the lobby.       
 Thomas, 22, gets to the hotel a little later than Melinda. He comes alone but plans 
to meet with his friends tomorrow. For one night he has a room to himself, and Thomas 
intends to make the most of it. When he wakes up Friday morning to a buzzing phone and 
knocks on the door, he has no recollection of what happened the night before. In fact, the 
blackout will extend back into Thursday evening, and come Sunday afternoon Thomas 
will be unable to find his car. He has to ask hotel security for help and does not leave 
Dallas for Forth Worth until late Sunday night.  
 Wamae, 20, arrives closer to midnight with three friends. They have three 
costumes each and do not bring any drugs or alcohol to the convention. Wamae scored 
free passes to the con for him and his friends by signing up to volunteer as ushers and 
runners for various programming events. Each of the men had to commit to be on-call for 
four hours on Friday and Saturday each and to stay after the convention closed on Sunday 
for cleanup. As things would go, Wamae will spend his full four hours on Friday morning 
running for us in the gaming room.   
Loose Lips Sink Ships 
 After setting up, two of my new acquaintances head up to their room to change 
into costumes, but Joel, 22, and I both set out to find a drink. When Joel and I turn the 
corner from the southwest corridor and step off the burgundy carpet towards the central 
foyer and the bar, we step right up against hundreds of young otaku buzzing, strolling, 
and dancing from floor to ceiling. The atmosphere is progressively queer, and most of the 
attendees are decked out in costumes specifically designed for the rave-like feel of this 
one night. Half of the bodies are half bare, and both metallic and animal print body-paint 
seem popular. Gender is fluid, judgment is absent, and red plastic cups pass from stranger 
to stranger to keep the hotel security from catching any single person with the contraband 
alcohol. The environment could not be more different from Gen Con, and I worry for a 
moment if any of these Millennial ravers are going to be into tabletop gaming.  
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 I figure the bar will be packed at 10:00PM, but as Joel and I stroll up we see only 
a handful of out-of-place patrons inside. Of course! Everyone else is underage. He and I 
are both haggard and bearded, and a few middle-aged hotel guests—obviously in town 
for a reason unrelated to the con—flash us commiserating glances as we walk in. I am 
enamored of the atmosphere in the lobby, and we pay the curmudgeons no reply and no 
mind. I snag a stool at the bar and turn to face the spectacle just on the other side of a 
small, open patio that juts out into the atrium. It seems a virtual world of some sort is 
already afoot, and watching the assemblage of bodies move, flow, quake is inspiring.  
 We meet Hibiko and his friends, well-dressed actors who have been hired by the 
convention administrators to portray popular anime ensembles and perform small scenes 
throughout the weekend in character. Tonight they wear expensive suits and a touch of 
metallic makeup around their eyes. They seem good people, and the hours pass as we talk 
about working the con and being at such a remove from the culture of the young 
attendees. Hibiko is a tabletop gamer, and I let him in on Fancy Bang, asking if he can 
help spread gossip about the “champion’s curse.” He leaps at the idea, and we stay up 
talking until 2:30AM about ways he and his troupe can help the cause.  
Friday Morning Players 
 Friday morning comes easily in Indianapolis, and we begin to hear from newly 
constituted players who have cracked through the major fabrication after working with 
Mitch the previous day and reading through materials at night. They want to ask us about 
“the game” that is seemingly afoot.  
 “The story just seems like one of those indie gamer movies,” Alex says after 
stopping by the booth to play an exclusive session he was invited to the night before. “If 
it is a movie and you guys are making it, I mean, I want to be in it too,” he adds. We get a 
full table of six players together and let them fight it out for some powerful artifacts. Alex 
wins handedly and hangs around for a bit, seemingly taking in the dynamic of the group 
and plotting.  
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 As other gamers from the last couple days trickle back in to check up on the story, 
they pick up on the team’s performances. I am busy enough running the booth to hide my 
poor capacity for dissembling under very real stress when I respond to their questions. 
Other designers are much better actors and work to deflect (but encourage) these new 
players throughout the morning. They give the newcomers tips on how to find Crocodile 
Fingers wandering around the con, offering that they have “heard he has been up to 
something.” 
 Nico, the middle-aged man I met in the same place the evening before, returns 
late in the morning with new friends and wants to join the tournament. He says that he 
and his group breezed through the quickstart last night and played Fantaji for a few 
hours, and the three of them have filled out the blank character sheets with custom 
player-characters. Nico shows his friends the fake T-shirts and speaks in key about the 
“champion’s curse,” obviously eager to play along. He proclaims to other visitors at our 
booth that he fears no curse and prophesies that he will win the tournament Saturday 
night after a final showdown with Mark “Crocodile Fingers” Harshman. His friends are 
keen as well, and they play through the first official module with three other gamers who 
volunteered through the Playtest Hall, easily tearing through the Golem and the Wizard. 
 The first good sign of the virtual world is Nico performing to us as much as to the 
others crowd. He knows something is “up” with the fake T-shirts and the purple 
quickstart narrative, but we have so far played dumb enough that he figures the hoax may 
be of Mark Harshman’s creation. Following, his performance is noticeably guarded, and 
he constantly reads the faces of the crew as he makes claims and fishes for information. 
He takes liberties adding more to the fictional legacy of Crocodile Fingers and, hearing 
no resistance, positions himself as the top contender to any who will listen. He is making 
the ruse his own and seems to be intentionally trying to con us. Nico works his unique 
style of positive and gregarious energy to motivate other players at key events throughout 
the convention.   
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First A-Kon Player 
 Wamae is on-call in the Tabletop Gaming Room when it opens at 10:00AM, and 
he is called in immediately to set up tables for the free miniature-painting workshops to 
take place. He makes several trips to the small office supply store in the hotel for event 
organizers, and we rely on him three or four times ourselves before 11:00AM.  
 The room is only 60’ square, and there are six or seven contingents of gaming 
organizers each working a cluster of tables. My company has two tables right near the 
door, and Fantaji is the only anime-themed game at the con. Wizards of The Coast are 
running official Dungeons & Dragons modules on two tables in the back corner, no 
anime or otaku vibe at all; a crew of twenty-somethings in full costume run a steampunk 
game on seven tables in the middle of the room, again devoid of themes related to the 
convention; a polyamorous collective of middle-aged  and older volunteers run Palladium 
Publishing games on four tables nearest us, a company that has not published a new game 
in more than a decade but has a large cult following; and volunteer crews of two or three 
other companies play miniature war-games along the far wall, all themed for science-
fiction.  
 I run three or four short sessions of Fantaji in the four hours that Wamae runs 
errands for the gaming programmers, and whenever he gets a spare minute he hangs 
around our table picking up on the game. After hearing my canned “curse” pitch two or 
three times and reading through some of the materials, he figures out what is happening. 
He asks about the tournament, clearly already outside the major fabrication, but I stay in 
key and invite him and his friends to sign up for a session later in the day.  
Friday Afternoon Events 
 While I run two long sessions with new participants in the gaming hall, Davis and 
Jake work the Playtest Hall booth most of the day Friday. Sid and Ash play the first 
module of the tournament, bringing their lunches to the table. Two of the six player-
characters must die in the first round, and Ash gets killed again after role-playing the 
same relatively powerless player-character he took to the four-hour session. The have a 
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laugh, and Sid advances to the next round, which means he can stop by whenever he 
wants and see if enough second-round gamers are waiting for a table to start.  
 Arguably the most important thing to happen on Friday at Gen Con—even more 
so than the first tournament appearance of Harshman later in the night—is the meeting of 
Sid and Nico. Before Sid and Ash leave for their afternoon event, Nico comes into the 
Hall and asks to start up a second-round game. He keys himself as the “big contender” 
against Crocodile Fingers, and Sid has no choice but to stay. As he tells me later, it is 
through Nico’s bombastic performance that Sid breaks himself out of major fabrication 
and figures out what is going on: a fake champion whom real gamers have to compete 
against in a semi-staged tournament.  
 Sometime just after lunch, Sid and Nico play a second-round session with four 
other gamers. They are both veteran gamers confident in their abilities, and Fantaji 
encourages over-the-top theatrics with rules that are easily toyed with. They turn the 
entire session into a competition between the two of them. From what I gather, after both 
survive the session by dumb luck they strike up a gentlemen’s agreement to key the rest 
of the con as hated rivals.  
 Davis explains to them that after the third-round encounter, which will kill off 
half of the player-characters who begin the session, there is only the championship table 
left. Sid and Nico hang around the booth for a while inventing backstories for their 
rivalry before agreeing to meet the next day as enemies.  
Live-Action Challenges Create An Economy 
 At both conventions, the side quests Harshman offers to help players build up 
more powerful characters to take into the tournament spawn a small economy of artifacts 
and tokens. Some players repeatedly find the same rewards and want to trade, others do 
not care to play Fantaji at all and offer their rewards for cash or tickets28, and a few 
bands of players work together pooling resources and taking turns checking in with 
Crocodile Fingers.  
                                                
28 Gen Con sells “generic tickets” that are required to play any officially scheduled gaming event. Each 
ticket is worth $1. 
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The Curse Steals Harshman’s Backpack 
 It is scripted that sometime during the day Harshman has to unleash the curse on 
himself. We have prepared two backpacks of clues and artifacts, hoping we can pull the 
same stunt twice at each con with different players to increase circulation of the rumors 
and backstory. Harshman will hide the bag somewhere and then enlist new participants or 
keyed players to help him retrieve the “stolen” or “lost” bag of gear, however he feels 
like selling it.  
 By now, Mitch has a stable of allies who check in with him now and then for 
ways to earn tokens and artifacts. Any initiated players who hear the quest about a lost 
backpack assume correctly that the contents of the bag will constitute quite the haul. Jake 
and I spent forever planning the crossover for this challenge, and the entire team is 
excited to see how it goes. The players have to enter an entirely unrelated tournament to 
get the bag, which has been “accidentally” tagged as part of the booty. The tournament is 
being run by one of my industry friends, and I asked him for a simple favor: if my players 
win, give them the backpack with the other prizes; if someone else wins, cause a little 
scene fussing over why “some filthy backpack got mixed up with the prizes” and toss it 
in a corner for my players to retrieve.  
 The group that wins the first backpack are part of the growing “puzzles only” 
culture, the design team loses track of the bag. We later reckon that it hit some kind of 
“chop shop” that took the artifacts and tokens before ditching the rest. Unfortunately, 
there was a painstakingly made fake diary in the backpack that we only had the one copy 
of. So it goes.  
Friday Evening Event: Enter Crocodile Fingers 
 When Mitch arrives for his first scheduled session as Crocodile Fingers, our booth 
is surrounded by 20 or so players who have been vying for spots to join in the game with 
the champion. Nico is there, but he already played the second module earlier in the day 
with Sid and knows how powerful the enemies are. The people running the Playtest Hall 
are a little frustrated with our taking over much of the space in the room, but they 
dutifully help us set up more tables to accommodate all the gamers. While I run 
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Harshman, Alex, and four other players through the second Fantaji module, Davis and 
Jake do the same for the other players.   
 Everyone there is already keying along with the narrative so we play up the 
“curse” hard, even a little campy: the loaded dice, spilled drinks, a text from Harshman’s 
mother alerting him his dog died, etc. Just when campy curse jokes die down and the 
battles get more intense, Juno and her European Gamers Tour Group arrive, and she 
shares her own experiences with the “curse.” They schedule their own sessions for the 
next day and cheer on the gamers before heading back out.  
 Harshman scrapes by the session, and players start speculating about what might 
happen the next day when the third-round sessions start. Unfortunately, Alex’s player-
character gets killed off, but we see him quickly walk over to Nico with a deck of 
artifacts he has been saving up. All of our important players are keyed in and waiting to 
see how the next round goes.  
Hibiko Hijacks The Game in Dallas 
 The final Friday sessions in Dallas start at 9:00PM because the Tabletop Gaming 
Room closes just before midnight. One table features a second-round encounter, and the 
other hosts the final first-round session. Melinda won an artifact earlier in the day and 
strolled over to the room just to see what was happening. She sits down to get a better 
look at the printed materials, and we assume she is claiming a spot. Before she knows it, 
the encounter is starting around her; she just goes with it.  
 Somehow the professional actor Hibiko has been collecting artifacts and tokens 
throughout the day on Friday by manipulating a large group of impressionable attendees 
with relatively “insider” information about the game that I had spilled to him Thursday 
night. He arrives at our cluster of tables in the Tabletop Gaming Room around 10:00PM 
with a trail of followers in the form of a long parade. Hibiko announces that he will win 
the tournament on Saturday to be the next undisputed Fantaji champion, and Jake has to 
inform him that there are no spots left tonight nor will there be any more first-round 
tables starting up for the tournament tomorrow. Were I not busy with a table, I would 
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have seen the number of gamers and told them to come back in the morning for catch-up 
games. However, Jake is a very by-the-book guy, so he denies them.  
 Hibiko does not seem to mind. He waits around with a smaller retinue of 
followers to see how the two tables turn out, asking when everything seems to be 
wrapping up which the survivors is the weakest. Not entirely aware of what he is up to, I 
let him know that the first-round table had some inexperienced gamers that could use 
some help if he wanted to get rid of the stacks of tokens and artifacts he is holding. He 
thanks me but just mills about puffing out his chest while the team and I close up shop for 
the night. After midnight, the team takes its first break for the day, and we stay up 
drinking and sharing stories about the day until late.  
Friday Night in Dallas 
 While the designers and game-masters sleep, Hibiko and Melinda enact some 
grand symbolic war marching and charging large groups of con-goers back and forth 
across parking lots and up into the nearby hotels. According to Melinda and some of the 
dedicated puzzle-solvers who talk to Harshman the next day, the “war” starts when 
Hibiko gifts most of his amassed power-ups to Melinda and then announces her his 
vassal. She performs a dramatic refusal, and the two begin a long theatrical contestation 
that ends up splitting Hibiko’s followers in two. The performance escalates into a drug-
fueled but formally judged pageant of sorts. Though the rivalry reportedly lasts all night, 
it appears to fizzle as soon as the majority of the performers crash sometime after sunrise.     
IV. CRACKING THE CENTRAL FABRICATION 
 
 This section covers the actions of key players as they resolve the narrative of 
Mark “Crocodile Fingers” Harshman and work to alleviate the curse that soon afflicts 
them all. The major events of Friday night take different directions at the two 
conventions. At Gen Con, two rival factions led by Sid and Nico, who also enlisted the 
aid of Alex, are gearing up to meet Harshman in the tournament finals Saturday evening. 
At A-Kon, Hibiko has hijacked the entire game and created a veritable army of 
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underlings overnight now poised to solve all of the puzzles we have to struggle to hide 
about unnoticed. Hibiko’s influence fades by late morning (and his employment 
responsibilities take up most of his time), with Wamae and Thomas surfing the wave of 
players he attracted. 
Saturday Mornings at Conventions 
 Tens of thousands of new faces arrive at both conventions on Saturday, many 
attendees being unable to take off of work and attend a con on weekdays. In many ways, 
a convention does not start until the weekend hits, and all of the most important 
programming events happen on Saturday (awards shows, reporters, organization or club 
voting, national competitions, etc.). However, for the diehard attendees, Saturday 
mornings at any con are rough. Despite the fact that Gen Con has only been in full swing 
for two days and A-Kon even less, both cons are 24-hour affairs. 
 When we wake up on Saturday morning after four hours of sleep, we are the lazy 
ones. We dig through roller-board suitcases, step over bodies curled up on the floor, sniff 
socks, brush teeth—it already feels as though we have camping for weeks. My bones 
ache, and my voice is almost gone after two 14-hour days of running games. The 
Saturday morning events are pivotal for Fancy Bang, and we have get things prepared 
perfectly to attract as many players as possible for the homestretch.   
 Amphetamines and energy drinks are popular party favors at both conventions, 
and I know many con-goers who do not even reserve hotel rooms. They crash in quiet 
corners for cat naps every so often and run on fumes as long as possible. We get down to 
the lobby just after 8:00AM only to see many of the con-goers just where we left them 
five hours ago. 
Crocodile Fingers Takes a Dive 
 When Mitch as Crocodile Fingers sits down at the third-round table at 10:00AM, 
there is already a small crowd of players forming. Sid and Juno are there to share a table 
with him, along with our actor, Aurora, and two less prominent players. Half of them will 
not make it to the championship table later in the afternoon. The game is scheduled as a 
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two-hour session, but we know that it will not take that long. Nico and Alex are not on 
scene when the encounter beings, but they show up before things get too heated and take 
notes to prepare for their own session, which will take place soon.  
 Mitch and Jake designed the encounter to be “freakishly hard,” and Mitch’s most 
difficult task of the convention is right here: do not accidentally survive longer than the 
rest of the players. He has to be one of the first three out to be disqualified. An 
opportunity shows up early in the battle, and Mitch bites. In what would be analogous to 
a “hale of gunfire,” Harshman’s player-character dies. The room explodes. Mitch stands 
up, takes a bow, and throws off his crutches to celebrate the lifting of the curse. 
 It is a chaotic moment, and I switch out Aurora’s dice for Mitch’s loaded set. As 
the session continues, Aurora becomes the recognizable bearer of the curse. We had 
planned for her to outlast everyone at the table and emerge as “the one who ended 
Crocodile Fingers,” but we did not want to bump Sid or Juno out before the finals. She 
performs very well, and the Fancy Bang players have trouble figuring out her role in 
things. The two other players drop out, and Sid, Juno, and Aurora all survive to play in 
the final table later that night.    
 When Aurora and the others stand up from the table to congratulate each other for 
knocking Mark “Crocodile Fingers” Harshman out of the Fantaji tournament, Greg has 
his only major performative role of the convention to play: he “accidentally” spills a giant 
soda on her (actually water). With our new victim drenched to the bone, suspicions are 
confirmed that the curse has shifted.  
 Channeling her best “Carrie” impersonation, the soaked Aurora spits out curses to 
the group, “I curse you all. All of you. Any one of you who has rolled a single die in this 
tournament is cursed!” It goes over well, and she spends the rest of the day as a rival 
puzzle-giver and plotter for Harshman. The game already has the Nico–Sid split so we do 
not push hard establishing the Harshman–Aurora split we had planned.  
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The Curse Spreads 
 We spend most of Saturday hosting puzzles and challenges and spreading rumors 
about the curse. Did you know so and so lost his wallet? Did you see how such and such 
bombed at the Dominion table? Harshman, now the resurrected leader, spreads the word 
that there will be a healing ritual Sunday morning to counter Aurora’s curse, but it will 
require everyone working together to succeed. More than the other puzzles of the game, 
he and Greg spent ages designing an elaborate scavenger hunt that included material 
objects hidden all over downtown, Internet research for magic words, certain articles of 
clothing crowd-sourced from among the players, and ceremonial eating. Much of the 
communication works like the game of telephone, which always keeps people bustling. 
We still have two tricks left to try intensifying the experience as well. 
Confiscation of Booty 
 At both conventions we nonchalantly suggest to players that they can check any 
merchandise with the “Unopened Merchandise Only” desk to keep from hauling around 
expensive and heavy purchases. Unfortunately for them, this does not really exist. Two of 
our team absconds Saturday morning during the game with the player’s things. The 
complaints are surprisingly minimal, but we hear on Sunday after the desk reappears that 
players were in a tentative panic.  
Iron DM Saturday Evening 
 Erik, one of my friends from junior high school, happens to be a famous dungeon-
master, (a game-master for Dungeons & Dragons). In 2012, he has won the Iron DM 
tournament at Gen Con for the last two years, which likely makes him the most famous 
single Dungeons & Dragons player in the nation. The Iron DM event takes place each 
Saturday at Gen Con from 12:00-6:00PM, pitting dungeon-masters against each other to 
generate the best player experiences and build the most dramatic adventures around three 
thematic elements that are released just one hour before play begins. The event features 
120 players randomly selected from over one thousand volunteers, and over the course of 
 229 
six hours the hall that hosts the event attracts hundreds of spectators who stop by to walk 
among the tables, eavesdrop, and explore.  
 When Erik is introduced at the tournament, he is to offer a small pitch explaining 
the “champion’s curse” and why he feels apprehensive about the Iron DM tournament 
“for the first time in years.” I speak with him just before the event begins, and he is eager 
to play the troubled hero. Erik will go on to win Iron DM that year and again in 2014. He 
and I joke that we should have planned Fancy Bang for 2013, where his performance was 
infamously terrible.  
 Despite Erik’s victory, the ripples and rumors work very well to stun the players 
about the scope of the game, Iron DM being one of the top three or four events of the 
convention.  
Saturday Evening Championship 
 Sid, Juno, and Nico are all in attendance at the final table on Saturday evening. 
Along with Aurora and two other players, the encounter begins. There has been a full day 
of strange happenings and misfortune, and we have a smaller crowd than expected to see 
official—if anti-climactic—championship game. Nico has been buffed with all of Alex’s 
remaining artifacts and tokens before the encounter begins, but the advantage is quickly 
lost. Aurora, Juno, and Andrew all drop out faster than expected, and for a moment Nico 
and Sid look equally matched. Eventually, after bringing in more artifacts, Nico lands a 
killing blow. According to the unofficial “best practices” we have established throughout 
the con, any player who makes a kill has “immunity” from being attacked by any 
monsters on his or her next turn.  
 As soon as Nico makes the kill, Sid knows that he will have to defend all three 
remaining monsters in the ensuing round. He takes a breath and quotes Harry Callahan to 
me. I make his day by killing his player-character with a Psionic Vesbear. The two 
players applaud each other before slipping back into character and pantomiming a short 
fistfight. Everyone else cheers, offering high fives and pats on the back.  
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 The design teams hangs out with some of the players that night, but we make sure 
to stay far from the ICC, where the puzzle-culture players work to solve the curse.  
A-Kon Saturday 
 Hibiko makes an appearance Saturday morning before I hear about his nocturnal 
escapades. He asks if “we’re okay,” and I tell him that everything is fine. He likely drew 
over 100 players to Fancy Bang single-handedly, and I am only hoping he does not give 
me a bill. Had I implied that I was hiring him when we shared drinks Thursday night? He 
smiles, shakes my hand, and slips off; I never see or hear from him again.  
 A dedicated if dull player, Jeremy, manages to be the only survivor of the third-
round sessions at A-Kon and becomes our new champion. He has few friends at the con, 
and more of the players are concerned with taking up the factional politics of the night 
before than celebrating the tournament.  
 With more attention than we ever expected, it becomes much harder hiding the 
puzzles and scavenger hunt items around the con. The team has to get creative tricking all 
the players who hang around the Tabletop Gaming Room. Thomas is quick to stalk any 
teammate he sees leaving the room, tracking our movements and hoping to catch us 
hiding props, scavenger hunt lists, rewards, or artifact tiles. We do not realize how close 
Thomas hovers until we attempt to hide the backpack and use the fake diary as one of the 
objects needed to dispel the curse.  
 Wamae and Thomas work together as leader and silent partner for the entire day, 
toying with or against Fancy Bang a bit. I am running tables all day, collecting anecdotes 
about players being cursed, passing information back and forth, and answering questions 
about the missing merchandise.  
Sunday Morning Ends The Curse 
 The ritual takes place Sunday morning entirely self-directed and self-organized by 
the players, according to the details that Mitch and Greg devised months prior. At the 
Gen Con iteration, 19 players are there. At A-Kon we have over 50. Both gatherings end 
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with the fake arrests of both Aurora and/or Harshman by “undercover officers,” and the 
expected resistance or intervention of the players does not occur.  
V. POIESIS IN ALTERNATE REALITY GAMES 
 
 Most research in alternate reality gaming focuses more on the games themselves 
or on the culture of the producers (coincidentally a booming industry and a marketable 
skill-set) than on the experiences, meanings, and practices of the—dozens, thousands, 
millions of—players each game can attract. This imbalance is palpable: the high-energy, 
financially successful, hybrid authors who produce knowledge about ARG come to the 
field—almost without exception—as producers. In many of these accounts, players are 
the faceless agents of the designers’ machinations. Creativity and expression are defining 
characteristics of the designers, while the affects and intentions of the players are left 
undiscovered. It raises the question, “Who is playing these games, and who is getting 
played?” An anthropology of the contemporary demands scholars come to grips with the 
new publics formed within and around these pervasive games and to understand why they 
are becoming so popular not just for marketing campaigns and a new generation of 
designers but for the thousands playing them.   
 Henry Jenkins’ book Convergence Culture (2006) looks at ARG directly, offering 
an important survey through the lenses of media and literary studies. While Jenkins 
grants that we “need to rethink the goals of media education so that young people can 
come to think of themselves as cultural producers and participants and not simply as 
consumers” (2006: 259), his book contains example after example of how corporate 
institutions promote consumerism and use alternate reality games to construct loyal fans 
and future buyers. Where did the explorers  and “spatial storytellers” go (Jenkins 2004)? 
Mary Flanagan (2009) foregrounds the critical, resistant elements of play convincingly, 
but I am left anxious over how those elements can be expressed in a greater culture 
defined by corporate “gamification,” minimal funding of the arts, and ever-elongating 
work weeks. 
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 The alternate reality game, when constructed as a durable virtual world, can offer 
no less than a life-changing experience for participants. ARGs should be designed and 
studied as “cultural probes” (Thrift 2011), as local and ephemeral happenings that change 
how people imagine socializing can happen. They do something. Participating in an 
alternate reality game offers more than a false sense of power or control; players 
experience for themselves the sizable effects individuals and collectivities can have when 
generating new meanings together. I know the feeling firsthand, and at least twenty 
Fancy Bang players have said as much as well. I have likened the experience of playing 
an alternate reality game to taking hallucinogenic drugs several times, and I suggest the 
positive effects are similar. Playing an alternate reality game enchants the world, makes 
everything suspect. Just like the experience of hallucinogenics, this capacity to “see 
through” the face-value presentation of meaning and matter can last for years. Everything 
becomes a toy, conspicuous, present-at-hand. I might suggest that experiencing such a 
game has the power to nudge someone into a perpetual lusory attitude.  
Fancy Bang & Worlding 
 Gen Con went pretty much according to plan. We knew we would be butting up 
against the rigid scheduling practices of the con, though I was still a little disappointed to 
attract only 80 verified players. The success of the game at A-Kon was heartening, and 
we officially verified more than four times the 50 players we set out to attract, 211. Not 
only was the con in Dallas a paragon of progressive values and a testament to the unique 
strengths of the Millennial generation, the attendees’ pre-existing lusory attitude was so 
resonant it likely did much of the work for us. There was so much life in the objects, 
costumes, accessories—our cyborg minds were reeling in virtual presences. 
Player-Generated Goals 
 Fancy Bang sustained a surprising amount of player-driven activity that added to 
the world of the game and inspired genuine social poetics. At both conventions, the 
Fancy Bang world was large enough to host conflicting interpretations, fulfill unexpected 
intentions, and satisfy multiple agendas. Rather than a linear “game,” it encompassed and 
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made possible a great amount of interactivity and world-building. These goals were not 
only shared; they were intersubjective, responsive, and negotiated.  
 
1. Sid began a personal quest to topple Harshman that ended up engrossing several 
other players and forming a small faction within the game. It changed his 
convention entirely, and likely those of the other gamers he marshaled as well. He 
and Ash cancelled most of their Saturday events to focus on cracking the central 
fabrication and dispelling the curse. Speaking with me on Sunday, he lamented 
that “there won’t be any way for it to happen again. I’ll never trust you guys and 
your stories anymore!” 
 
2. Melinda sat down at our booth in the Tabletop Gaming Room to play a quick 
game on a Friday evening and only a few hours later helped to organize over 40 
young people on a charge across a large complex of hotels to hunt for Hibiko and 
his actor friends after the troupe disappeared from the pageant. We had no idea 
what was going on that night, and it took several interviews to get the details 
straight. The game had gotten away from us in the best way possible. Whether all 
of these individuals knew what was happening or not only makes the event more 
interesting. As Benjamin (2005) observed, sometimes the body wants to run, 
charge, kick. A game can offer an alibi for such childlike exuberance.  
 
3. Wamae volunteered to work for a few hours to pay his way to the convention and 
made friendships that have lasted almost two years. His puzzle-solving abilities 
made him one of the collective’s leaders on Saturday and offered him a fair 
amount of celebrity that he had never felt before. When I Skyped with him a week 
or so later, he said the attention made him feel how he imagined the football 
players at his high school felt years before. I saw him in 2014, and he attended the 
con that year with the friends he had made playing Fancy Bang the year before.   
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4. Like Sid, Nico wanted to meet Harshman in the finals and become the new 
Fantaji champion. The rivalry between Sid and Nico was never hostile, and it 
functioned to retain dozens of Fancy Bang players who had lost in the Fantaji 
tournament and still wanted to play along. The design team had never even 
considered what would happen to gamers after their player-characters were killed 
off. When Nico’s player-character outlasted Sid’s at the championship table on 
Saturday night, they both applauded each other’s performances as combatants in 
Fantaji and as keyed rivals in Fancy Bang.  
 
5. Hibiko hijacked the game for his own purposes, and the virtual world buckled a 
bit but persisted. I was surprised he broke the frame to enlist players, but I never 
thought he would become a problem or liability. Without his advertising, there is 
no way we would have reached 200 players. I am sure it must have been a unique 
experience for him as well, but after a brief handshake Saturday morning I did not 
see him again.  
 
6. Thomas spent long hours organizing activities and running around the con 
keeping players informed of new puzzles that came up all day Saturday. He told 
me later that he never even tried to start one on his own. His self-chosen role was 
that of Hermes. Spying on my and the design team’s activities gave him purpose 
throughout the weekend and this self-defined role-playing became the dominant 
thread of A-Kon for him. I cannot quite imagine what he would have gotten up to 
otherwise.   
Virtual Object 
 I also believe that the “champion’s curse” worked effectively as a virtual object. 
At various times, the curse functioned similarly to one or another of our three models for 
virtual objects: the “epistemic objects” first manipulated physically and later projected 
and toyed with by the mind when the physical objects are absent (Clark 2008: 47), the 
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“hard facts” of Peirce, and the material but abstract natures of waves and charges 
theorized by Brian Massumi (2002).  
  
1. The curse was present enough at Gen Con to change the course of the tournament 
by leading a dozen gamers in Sid’s faction to debate over strategy that literally 
included “the curse” as a negotiating point. While they may not have believed 
there was a magical affliction (by that time focused on Aurora), they knew there 
was something that could not be fully predicted, and they were apprehensive 
about tempting it.  
 
2. Four players at A-Kon apparently recorded the results of Harshman’s dice over a 
two-hour period and worked out probabilities that accounted for “cursed” rolling. 
They made “cheat sheets” for other players and passed them out. I did not find out 
about this until one of the last sessions of the con when I spotted the crib sheet 
next to a player’s character sheet. I felt bad; this was long after we had stopped 
using the loaded dice. 
 
3. Two years later, when I met up with Juno again at Gen Con in 2014, she told me 
how she explained her previous wrist injury to strangers as the result of a “cursed 
gamer” at Gen Con. Barthes might criticize that the virtual curse had “died” and 
become pure gloss or symbol, but that the phenomenon made it into her life 
narrative is worth noting. Similarly, other players have shared with me over the 
years how the “champion’s curse” comes up in their home games now and then 
when dice go wrong or someone spills drink on the table.  
The Bigger Con 
 While conducting post-con interviews with players from Gen Con, I found that 
the moment most commonly held as the “climax” of the narrative was when Crocodile 
Fingers lost his status as champion in the early round on Saturday morning. We had 
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planned Harshman “taking a dive” to be expected, hoping this would focus the players’ 
attentions more on the curse than “beating the champion.” As it went, the culture that 
developed around the puzzles and quests did not communicate the more subtle narrative 
points Harshman was feeding them with the tournament players. There emerged a stark 
division of labor between the two realms even though they worked together: the puzzle-
minded gamers on one side, and the role-players on the other.  
 Even our best players took Harshman’s loss to be unscripted and felt the victory 
as an actual accomplishment by the collective, a mistake by us, or both. Nico described 
the tense moment when everyone leaned in after the big roll and counted up Mitch’s dice. 
He said that he felt “mortified” for us after realizing the character was dead because he 
assumed it was a mistake. Sid and Ash said as much Sunday after the con in not so many 
words. Juno’s idea was closer to the truth; she felt that we left the outcome open on 
purpose, and she took Aurora’s victory as actual if unexpected. 
 In explaining the facts of the ruse to them individually over conversation or 
emails, I caught myself keying where there was no key. It made me think of my best 
memory of the SXSW iteration of Fancy Bang that came from interviewing two players 
after our biggest event (30 participants that resulted in two players). After one of the girls 
described to me and another actor in the game how she “pretended to chase the bus” up 
Congress Ave. in downtown Austin, her friend corrected her, “No, we did chase the bus.” 
They both laughed about the phrasing for a long while. Similarly, when I was debriefing 
players on the Saturday morning session, I slowly realized something about the nature of 
the fabrications for the Gen Con run.  
 In Indianapolis, Mitch portrayed Mark “Crocodile Fingers” Harshman, the 
fictionalized “champion” of Fantaji, while in the actual world, Mitch likely is the world’s 
best Fantaji player. Beyond that, the climactic moment when Harshman “takes a dive” to 
lose the session intentionally, Mitch was actually taking a dive as well. The lusory and 
the prelusory overlapped in such a way that it was only the intentionality of our keying 
that kept them apart. It made the whole plot seem awfully uninspired.  
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 However, when I shared that observation with Mitch a year or so later, he laughed 
it off. He argued that playing all those “coaching” sessions with scores of gamers at Gen 
Con over two days and three nights is what made him the best player. With a mixture of 
pride and embarrassment, I had to admit that we may have captured ourselves in our own 
virtual world.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 I set out to locate virtual worlds in everyday and not-so everyday life. That online 
virtual worlds offer new windows into and images of the human seems obvious in 
hindsight, though a great deal of scholarship went into making sense of these virtual 
rabbit holes that draw our minds and imaginations into a seemingly endless universe (see 
Castronova 2005; Taylor 2006, Boellstorff 2008). That humans can experience contact, 
sociality, intersubjectivity through Internet technologies took many people by surprise, 
but some scholars seemed to think it only natural (Stiegler 1994, Clark and Chalmers 
1998, Clark 2008).  
 After studying, critiquing, and creating three genres of analog virtual worlds, I 
would suggest that it seems some of the power online virtual worlds have to bedazzle and 
confound us rests only on our own long-held misconceptions about minds, bodies, and 
sociality. Digital worlds, from Frogger to World of Warcraft, possess power over us 
because they have the ability to frustrate our wills. We push on them, and they push back. 
But images cannot do that! Symbols cannot do this! It may be the case that our digital 
worlds are finally teaching us that images can do that. Symbols can do this. And maybe it 
is not just images, not just symbols.  
 Taking Andy Clark’s theories of “natural-born cyborgs” (2003) and “extended 
mind” (2008) seriously, I take for granted that objects can be taken up into my cognitive 
processes, that my will can feel the resistance of facts similarly to that of walls, and that 
the images “in my head” are not so in my head.  
 My dissertation attempted to locate virtual worlds connected and built into the 
actual environments we inhabit. I wanted to see if and how individuals could push their 
minds down into rabbit holes that did not exist on a screen but in a city, in a church, 
around a table. I believe I found them. And I believe I built at least one, maybe more.  
Building Analog Virtual Worlds 
 We began with the “spectral geographies” of Derek McCormack (2010b), those 
physical spaces of history—crash sites, battlefields, ruins—that have a way of retaining a 
 239 
material charge and circulating palpable affect despite the physical absence of many 
objects we imagine necessary to activate such a response. The trick is that enough 
physical objects exist as Indices of the absent world, and these Indices—when the 
arrangement and situation are just right—can be enough to bring remote or absent 
presents into alignment around the human body. This experience is nothing magical or 
mystical, just a phenomenon of affect and consciousness produced by our cyborg Mind–
Body, which interpolates objects into itself, has the ability to read and feel the world 
through signs, and evolved strong empathetic and intersubjective faculties. Objects 
physically absent seem to exist, do exist, persist, haunt—as though our bodies are feeling 
the world in cross-eyed tension.  
 Add to one of these spectral geographies manipulable lusory means, toys of open-
ended meaning, and a virtual world can emerge. I consider virtual worlds to be fabricated 
and somewhat controllable spectral geographies large and durable enough to sustain the 
complicated and manifold social interactivity of human frames and agendas. Analog 
virtual worlds reproduce Indices with enough verisimilitude to function as genuine 
spectral environments that draw players into them. These specters are not imaginary; they 
exist in affordances objectively present in the environment, affordances that the human 
body consciously or not can regard and experience. Digital virtual worlds reproduce 
physical virtual worlds in digital space, constructing through code and floating images 
the sensation of physicality. Through the interplay of Signs, these virtually-there-objects 
seem undeniably real; they resist our wills, frustrate us, and react to our actions. 
Importantly, these digital environments can likewise sustain manifold human sociality 
and player-driven poetics. The worlds themselves possess no teleology or purpose; they 
are environments that must be stepped into, donned, accepted.  
 Upon these virtual worlds we can layer lusory goals to engender an alternate 
reality game. These are almost easier to create than a genuine virtual world because the 
lusory goals often entail grids and systems of lusory means that strengthen and galvanize 
the world; however, such games, which multiply virtual objects and direct vectors of 
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activity, must be able to host and encourage player-driven meanings to function as a full 
world or reality.  
Games vs. Play  
 I understand play in the vein of Johan Huizinga ([1938] 1971), as the very 
substance of culture, ritual, art. Play is not a specific form of activity; it is the 
fundamental element of poiesis that exists in all activities. Play in this sense does not 
respect rules, systems, or structures; it creates rules, designs systems, builds structures. 
These many human societies and their concomitant projects of worlding—these rely on 
play. 
 I am less impressed by games, particularly games that claim to exist as their own 
worlds, segregated from the actual world due to their nature as abstract systems. No 
proper game-as-system can function as a world precisely because it attempts to be outside 
the world. Every virtual world I encountered only existed as such because it was happily 
grounded in the material world. It seems a waste to reduce games to “black boxes” that 
turn analog and affective inputs into binary outputs. This is not to say that machines are 
cold or that new-fangled technology will never retain the romantic spirit of pre-modern 
modes of play; on the contrary, modern technologies make possible positive and 
enlightening forms of gaming each year. My issue is that we seem to be focusing on the 
least interesting thing games can do. Games are more than mazes, more than calculators.   
 All of the literature on “gamification” that celebrates how modern games promise 
this magical revelation about how to live more fully (Castronova 2007, Wark 2007, 
McGonigal 2011) then goes on to define games in terms that I cannot see as anything but 
entirely sterile. I have argued that the transformational power these scholars ascribe to 
games misses the mark; it is the forms of play least associated with “gamification” that 
serve to transform and improve this human life. Like Nigel Thrift’s (2011) Lifeworlds, 
which act as kaleidoscopes that offer phantasmagoric fragments of worlds, the kinds of 
games celebrated by certain literatures often work to reduce and replace meaningful 
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sociality with “free movement within a more rigid structure.” What about the creation of 
structures? What about climbing over and through structures?  
Can’t Win Them All 
 The three ethnographic chapters of this dissertation each trace one “cultural probe” 
that I created over the course of my research as a way to engage and better understand the 
respective genre. Though Fancy Bang only attracted a sliver of players, I believe the 
game managed to demonstrate for them new ways to play, to game, to socialize. Both 
Fantaji and The Ski Lodge Murder have been huge successes, and laboring over 
producing a portable system that would afford and encourage toying within the 
constitutive rules shaped my understanding of games and play. However, one genre of 
make-believe left me stumped.       
 North American live-action role-playing (LARP, or larp) works as a local alternate 
reality and may seem like the more obvious middle step between tabletop role-playing 
and alternate reality games (see Montola 2003, Loponen and Montola 2004). Though 
several variations exist, North American larping comes in two predominant forms. One 
form focuses on competitive duels where combatants use boffer swords to simulate 
combat. Instead of rolling dice to imagine oneself a knight of the realm, the actual 
fencing skills of the players determine who hits their target. The other predominant form 
involves large-scale combat and generally entails the creation of factions and teams, 
much like sports franchises, that develop their own cultures and hierarchies. Larping 
more often than not takes place in public parks or other play spaces and can include 
hundreds of participants in a single instance, and it has produced a colorful culture known 
centrally to the uninitiated as “those kids swinging foam swords in the park.” While in 
many ways North American larping is a direct derivative of tabletop role-playing, I could 
not find a way to root the form in toying. After cursory research, larping—like role-
playing video games—seemed to borrow from tabletop role-playing only those modes of 
associating not involved in the virtual.   
 Like sports, North American larping revolves around fixed systems of value that 
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define what any given action means and is worth in the game. Objects, actions, and 
gestures are codified and regulated for what amounts to competitive play. The fantastical 
costumes and trappings, while admittedly aesthetically interesting, are subservient to the 
Symbolic order of “scoring” and taking out enemies. While the resulting worlds are 
worthy of study and interesting, for the same reason studying sports and sport franchises 
can be enlightening, the traces of the virtual I was looking for did not appear to feature as 
the central work of the game. To clarify, any given larp is a game, like football or 
billiards or Monopoly. It has a set of rules and procedures that code behavior and 
determine winners. To be clear, the key difference is not that the game is competitive in 
nature but rather that the game means precisely what it says. ⁠ The constitutive rules of the 
game set the value of any given action or object, and those values are fixed. The rules of 
the game, then, act as a translation dictionary for how to value gestures and bodies in the 
game-world.  
 Nordic larp is a cultural form very different from its North American cousin, with 
its key feature being the pursuit of full immersion. “Dreaming in character is seen as the 
ultimate goal” (nordiclarp.org 2014). The purpose of the larp is to reconstruct a world 
that replaces the actual world. While objects, bodies, and events participate in the world 
of the game, they do so only insofar as they are separated and removed from the world 
around the player. In a way, Nordic larp is about producing temporary alternative 
lifestyles. Nordic larp also precludes a sense of the virtual because the explicit purpose of 
the game is to replace the actual with the fictional. Any doubling is viewed as a failure of 
immersion and so squelched. 
Theoretical Observations 
 In Persuasive Games (2007), Ian Bogost marshals theories of culture to explore 
how video games move beyond traditional forms of verbal rhetoric, implementing what 
he calls “procedural rhetoric,” to persuade gamers and constitute particular kinds of 
subjects. Bogost’s point is that we need to move beyond analyzing verbal rhetoric alone, 
acknowledging more embodied modes of persuasion when looking at how games 
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function. While proper ludologists study the rhetorical means through which game-
systems operate on their users, I suggest the opposite tack; let us research the ways 
creative, motivated players operate with and through game-systems.  
 With so many independent producers and amateur designers, why the recent move 
to celebrate mass-market games that amount to little more than interactive novels? And 
when indie games are studied, why glorify the games themselves? I am more concerned 
not with games as works of art, but games as tools, as cultural operators. I want to see 
games work for people not on them. Adopting a lusory attitude is the first step in playing 
a game, but it is also the first step in creating art, changing culture, and founding a field 
of science. We need more games that let players ask, “What if?” and then build the 
answer.  
 Figuring certain genres such as tabletop role-playing and alternate reality games 
as assemblages that can be toyed with and through—rather than systems that interpolate 
users—allows us to see how games participate in the world. Even the most rigid game is 
organic, soft, responsive to the griefer, the hacker, the drunk. Did ludologists of previous 
generations truly exhaust the study of games as play, as ritual, as creative?  
  While I might make too much of the toy in the ethnographic chapters, I find it a 
useful construct in contrast to the tool. Whereas the tool has purpose, the toy exists only 
insofar as it affords new purposes each time it is taken up. The toy, as an object of 
affordance, elicits and encourages tweaking with the world, with systems.  
  
 I wanted to study games because I felt that of all God’s goodness the game was 
the one place where Plato and Saussure were right. Games really were Ideal, pure form. 
They cannot be denied; they have rules that cannot be broken. Growing up as I did at the 
advent of the video games, I felt them as worlds that really did have all the logic, order, 
and structure that philosophers and scientists were finding did not exist so much in our 
own domain. However, very early in my studies, I found out that games were just like 
language; the game was another false prophet who claimed to govern and organize how 
people played, to provide the system that play activated. It took me a short time to realize 
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that games—like language—have only the very same power as the Wizard of Oz: they 
are very good at tricking us newcomers into thinking that they are the ones performing 
some magical feat that in truth we are quite capable of doing. In fact, our masterful 
capacity for performing said feat on our own is precisely what allowed us to invent 
games—and language—in the first place.   
 So I study play instead. Play makes no such boasts, and yet a little digging 
exposes its great accomplishments. And I study the virtual. The virtual is the wet paint on 
the wall. It is very much not the wall yet; it is paint on a wall. But as soon as it dries, as 
soon as it stops being alive, it will just be the wall. And we might recognize by scraping 
such a wall with our fingernail that there is a chance it is paint all the way down.  
Methodological 
 I have traced out a handful of approaches that seem to borrow one or several 
tenets from Nigel Thrift’s (2010) non-representational theory and from the arguments of 
Thrift (2011), Latour (2005, 2008), and Miller (1987). It seems to me, an “anthropology 
of the contemporary” (to borrow from Rabinow 2006) needs to be less about 
accumulating data and more about intervening in worlds to produce “provocative 
awareness” at the moment of experience. Ethnographic fieldwork can attempt to produce 
probes that generate social change or impact communities by experimenting in/with 
worlds already in progress. Writes Thrift:  
 
cultural probes need to be understood as spaces, frames constructed to produce 
uncertain outcomes which still have grip, frames which both interrupt and restart 
the process of association and, in the process, conjure up invitations to act 
differently. (2011: 19) 
  
I believe the worlds of games, specifically those that emerge in alternate reality gaming, 
can be provocative spaces to invite new kinds of action and sociality. Studying games as 
cultural probes turns the games-as-systems approach on its head.  
 We need cultural probes more than representational accounts. Collecting and 
packaging data should no longer be the job of the sociologist. Likewise, describing the 
 245 
everyway lives of faraway people should no longer be the job of the anthropologist. Let 
people make their own products, their own representations, their own interpretations.  
Implications & Future Work 
 I argued in Chapters 3 and 4 that viewing games as systems of grammar renders 
them detached from and inconsequential to the actual world of everyday life. In contrast, 
I offered that every game can be toyed with and that the best games are designed 
specifically for that purpose. Grounding my theory of games in the work of Huizinga and 
Suits, I made much of lusory means that exist in excess of the constitutive rules of a 
closed-system game. If the game itself does not provide such situating lusory means, then 
players tend to bring them along on their own. Why not study the many ways players 
work against systems? No system is as digital as it thinks. 
 I want to pursue other studies along similar lines and see where games act not as 
systems that interpolate users but as toys, tools, alibis that participate in agendas and 
vectors larger than themselves. No game is as hermetic as it thinks, and there is much to 
learn from seeing just where and how these larger agendas and vectors not only use 
games but also pervade them. 
 This is where “gamification” can be useful: where are people using games 
productively and progressively? I am not so interested in how corporation bosses use 
“games” to extract labor from already strained employees. I am sure they are very good at 
it. I am not so interested in how McDonald’s Monopoly gains the company increased 
revenue. I am sure it does. But I am interested in how people use games to accomplish 
real goals, games like Twister and spin-the-bottle. These games are more like toys. Do we 
use games to fall in love? To teach? To save money? Do we do this by toying with the 
rules of the game, or by obeying them? 
 I believe the implications of Chapter 5 can be aimed in many directions as well. 
Insights from murder-mystery events as virtual worlds provided several practical images 
of social poetics. Corporate retreats, classroom learning, youth camps, sex, or just 
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everyday life—systems that open outward can participate in the world not as “systems” at 
all, but as assemblages. They are made up of parts, these systems. We cannot forget that.  
 The murder-mystery event offered us a model that changes what “incentives” 
might mean for creative labor, a new model that sees games as lusory means for meeting 
prelusory goals. If the lusory goals cannot be made to fulfill the prelusory goals, then the 
game is a lie, a trick, a booby trap. Simple matrix systems with a multitude of keyed 
objects could be used to generate genuine social interaction in just about any setting. The 
game does not encourage sociality; it is sociality. I would be interested in looking at how 
these systems can be distended—or already are distended—in fetish cultures, family 
structures, and sports teams.  
 Also, the absolute paralysis that can strike individuals and entire groups in the 
face of an absent frame was striking. I would like to pursue further research into 
situations that refuse certainty and intersubjectivity to occur naturally and tease out 
precisely what mechanisms can make possible their emergence.  
 Lessons from Chapter 6 beg for treatments in political campaigns, religions, true 
cults, conspiracy theories, and hoaxes. These could not be addressed here for lack of 
space and the necessary fieldwork that would not have dovetailed with the games. This is 
a higher aim of my research, to explore religion and politics as “necessary play,” thus 
redeeming play as ever-present. This would then critique what it means to treat politics or 
other activities as “a game,” which I would distinguish from play in its sleight of hand 
that replaces the actual prelusory goals with lusory goals and “lusory goods” only 
valuable within the system.   
 While I did not get to experience much of the alternate reality game I designed 
because of the responsibilities inherent in making sure it ran smoothly, there is truly a 
place for such broader games in everyday life. Leagues? Virtual friends? Alternate 
currencies? The alternate reality game exists physically as only an infrastructure, but this 
infrastructure spreads out far enough to act like a spider’s web; anyone on it can feel 
everyone else. This is the virtual element of the game.  
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 I imagine being hired to run games that turn into worlds. It would look something 
like giving your neighbor a piece of your rosebush. Families borrow from your game and 
soon grow the practice into an entire world, local and responsive to their needs.  
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Appendix A: The Players of Tabletop Role-Playing 
 While I have gamed with over 1000 players since the summer of 2010, this 
ethnography focuses on four long-term gaming groups I participated in: the techies, the 
townies, the dorks, and the hicks.29 I game-mastered30 the first two groups in Fantaji, a 
game designed by my own company; and I role-played roughly the same player-character 
with the latter two groups in two distinct Dungeons & Dragons campaigns.      
The Techies 
 A long-running group in Austin, Texas, the techies includes four friends who 
work downtown at a Web 2.0 start-up and one of the friends’ significant other. They 
began gaming together in 2007, trying various systems and titles over the years, and I 
was able to invite the group to try Fantaji in 2012. We played for over two years 
regularly (one to three times per month) and still have the odd gaming session even 
today.  
 Alan, 26, is a copywriter for the start-up company. He titles incoming how-to 
videos and writes copy that surrounds the videos to ensure a good performance on search 
engines. Alan’s claim to fame is suggesting that the site misspell “Smoky” as “Smokey” 
for the “Smokey Eye Makeup” video because the correct spelling gets typed into Google 
less frequently. His office is decorated with small illustrations that Hannah draws during 
lunch each day on colored Post-it notes and gifts to him. Alan played Champions 
(Palladium Books 1981), a superhero role-playing game, in high school and enjoys 
Fantaji for its over-the-top style.  
 Hannah, 24, is Alan’s girlfriend and works at a locally owned, upscale retailer 
downtown. She is also a professional artist and regularly has gigs in town doing makeup 
or costuming for local films. Hannah moved to Austin specifically for the indie film 
                                                
29 All of these monikers were chosen by the respective groups and are used by permission to retain 
anonymity and help the readers keep them distinct. 
30 A “game-master” acts as the arbiter of the game-level mechanics and the creator of the diegesis-level 
events in any campaign. Colloquially referred to as “god,” the GM does not participate as a player-
character but instead acts to embody the game itself and present problems to the heroes in the narrative. 
GMs control the weather, the terrain, the monsters, and the mechanics of the game-world. 
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scene and also works as an extra, being featured in more than a few Robert Rodriguez 
movies. Role-playing an old curmudgeon with no conscience, Hannah is the most die-
hard of the gamers in the group and acts as the techies’ in-game leader.     
 Clark, 46, is a former rock journalist who landed his copywriting gig at the 
company after writing for a product-review blog, sneaking into each article references to 
a mythic community of mimes that exist under the streets of the city. He toured with 
some well-known southern rocks bands in the 1980s and ‘90s, but lost his job when print 
journalism markets shrank after the advent of the Internet. Clark took a job with the 
company in hopes of revitalizing his career as a music critic, but the promised 
opportunities to set his own writing agenda have been non-existent.    
 Clark’s best friend in Austin is Dale, 33. Dale works in another department of the 
company, managing filmmakers from all over the world who produce the how-to videos 
for the website. Originally from Los Angeles, Dale has mixed feelings about Texas. He 
never gamed before starting with the group, and Hanna considers him “a cat that needs 
constant herding.” Dale has a knack for creating powerful player-characters in Fantaji, 
though his unpredictable attention span often renders his heroes unreliable at best.   
 Aytek, 36, is originally from Turkey and moved to the United States as a political 
refugee in 2005. He is a programmer for the company, the only one of them with a good 
opinion of their employer. Aytek played Dungeons & Dragons for several years in 
Turkey with his childhood and university friends and an American soldier.  
 The techies use their time gaming to joke and jab at each other, and work-talk 
flows throughout the game, a conversation analyst’s nightmare. We meet in Clark’s tiny 
bungalow most sessions, though special nights take place at my home in Hyde Park when 
roommates are out of town.  
The Townies 
 The townies met at a small university in the Midwest in 2001. They began gaming 
together in 2004, after they’d graduated and put down roots in the area. The group started 
Fantaji without me after one of the members backed my product on Kickstarter in 2011. 
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After being contacted by Green a few times with questions about the game, I was 
impressed by his enthusiasm; and, as the townies live just an hour from my parents’ home 
in southeastern Michigan, I make regular visits to their hometown to run one-off Fantaji 
adventures whenever I visit the Midwest. These one- or two-night adventures take part 
outside their own ongoing campaign.   
 Green, 34, is a pastor at a relatively large “mainline” Protestant church in the 
middle of town. He has a wife of fifteen years and three daughters. Green lost his hair 
before he was twenty, an experience he credits for his self-deprecating but upbeat 
attitude: “How can you take life seriously as a teenager with no hair?” He comes from a 
wealthy family in Noblesville, Indiana, and lives in a house a step or two above what his 
salary as pastor affords.  
 Jones, 34, is a pastor at a small Brethren church two towns over. Jones is in the 
middle of a divorce but still lives with his wife in a small house several miles out in the 
country. They run the church together, and little animosity exists between them despite 
his recent decision about the marriage. Jones has a heavy soul and suffers from bipolar 
personality disorder. His meticulous and interested nature has led to many improvements 
in Fantaji over the years.  
 Mitch, 32, is Green’s younger brother. Mitch went to law school after college and 
now lives in Chicago with his wife, who is also a lawyer. His occupation affords him 
time to travel, and he visits his brother one or two weekends a month in Indiana. Mitch 
has also proven invaluable in debugging Fantaji since its inception.  
 Jess, 37, was a non-traditional student at the university and has seems to be the 
adopted older brother of the entire group. He bought his house in town during college 
with money he earned in a short career as a robotics engineer in Canada. Jess lives with 
his wife, and most of our games take place in his garage, which has been outfitted as a 
“man cave” complete with billiards table, neon beer signs, remote-controlled lighting and 
music, and personal electric coolers for each player.  
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The Dorks 
 Frederik, 38, has been playing Dungeons & Dragons since the 1980s. He runs his 
group in Austin, Texas, with a great attention to detail, and it was only after much 
negotiation that I was allowed to start participating in the already underway campaign. 
The dorks only know each other as gamers and do not socialize outside their Dungeons & 
Dragons meet-ups, which occur every two weeks like clockwork. Frederik takes his role 
as GM very seriously and spends 10-20 hours a week preparing for upcoming sessions: 
he builds models and set-pieces to house the miniatures that help represent the game-
world; he finds props, artifacts, and toys to amplify immersion; he pores over references 
texts and fantasy literature for scripts and characters; and he creates carefully organized 
soundtracks to accompany the narrative.  
 Although I have logged over 40 hours with the dorks, I know the rest of them 
only through our interactions in the game. They practice a ritualized form of gaming, the 
rare token of how gamers are typically represented in film and media, “method actors” 
who identify strongly with their characters, wear homemade partial costumes, and almost 
always speak in first-person when declaring game actions. Nancy, 34, role-plays an Elf 
Sorcerer; Maggie, 35, role-plays a Halfling Rogue; Ismael, 33, plays as a Human Knight; 
and Tony, 33, role-plays a Half-Orc Barbarian. We play in Frederik’s spare bedroom, 
which is outfitted as a games-only den and decorated with Medieval-inspired artifacts and 
artwork.  
 While Frederik takes a no-nonsense approach to running his Dungeons & 
Dragons game and demands an air of formality and order, he has a personal aversion to 
running any module or using any published material as-is. He obsessively customizes and 
adapts the “official” version of any character, story, location, etc.; and his books are 
riddled with notes and edits that record how he has changed the system and the game-
world to suit his vision. Frederik’s game is very much a personalized version of the 
Dungeons & Dragons 2nd Edition system originally published in 1988. Nothing enters his 
campaign “raw,” and Frederik is the only player trusted to “cook” the material.  
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The Hicks 
 Howard, 32, has been playing with the same group off-and-on for about twenty 
years, which amounts to the longest tenure of any group I have participated in. They 
began playing Dungeons & Dragons when Howard was in 7th grade and played into high 
school before going separate ways when the older members graduated. After high school, 
some of the players tried college for a couple years; one joined the military; two moved 
in with relatives in another state. Somehow their paths all led them back to their 
hometown within a few years of graduation to take up working-class occupations in or 
near Ottawa Lake, Michigan. Howard never left Ottawa Lake. He works in nearby 
Toledo, Ohio, as a “first responder;” and while he paints the job as something akin to a 
paramedic, his crew is under contract to clear wrecks on the highway and replace 
damaged guardrails.  
 Though we attended schools in different townships, with no fewer than two sets 
of train tracks between us, I have known Howard since we were kids. For a brief stint, he 
became a regular in a gaming group of mine during our senior year of high school, after 
his had split up. He and I met up for the first time in over a decade by chance at a bar in 
Toledo in early 2011, and he shared with me that his old gang had gotten back together.   
 Terry, 34, has been a semi-professional bull-rider sponsored by Jack Daniel’s 
whiskey for over ten years, though his age keeps him from riding much lately. It is not 
the bull-riding he misses—his body bears too many marks to ever forget—so much as the 
travel and the post-rodeo drinking. The cowboys would often wear their body-armor into 
dive bars on the road and intentionally start trouble with locals. Terry enjoys drawing 
analogies between any fight we encounter in the game with one wild night or another 
from his past; he stops the action on his turns regularly to regale us. The last night I 
played in the group in January of 2013, Terry had received his final case of Christmas 
whiskey and a severance letter.  
 Russell, 32, works at his family’s dog kennel near the quarry. Amanda, 30, is 
Russell’s new girlfriend and also works at the kennel. Together they live in his 
grandmother’s basement one town over.  
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 The GM of Howard’s gang is an older guy who goes by the name Trash. He is at 
least five years older than Howard, but when the group got together in 1995 Trash was 
dating a girl from Howard’s church, Heather, who brought everyone together. Heather 
gamed with them all in high school but now worked in “some office” and lived in 
downtown Toledo near the river and the baseball park.   
 The gang meets up once a week for gaming and once a week for drinking, though 
both nights typically involve both activities. Marijuana and prescription pills of various 
types are present as often as not, and Trash continues the tradition he started when the 
others were in high school of providing the substances. Howard, Terry, and Russell all 
role-play as bruiser characters, a Barbarian and two Fighters, respectively. Amanda plays 
the Cleric. Starting in January of 2011, I join in as a Rogue as often as I can during 
semester breaks, and over the next two years I log about 80 hours of gaming with the 
group. Terry is eager for a fresh audience member; Russell and Amanda enjoy asking 
about my life in Austin; and Trash seems thrilled to incorporate a Rogue into the 
narrative and add some espionage to what are otherwise hack-and-slash adventures.   
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Appendix B: Frame Analyses of Tabletop Role-Playing Games 
 Gary Alan Fine’s (1983) ethnographic account introduces the reader to a group of 
colorful gamers and presents tabletop role-playing as a hobby of performance, creativity, 
and ingenuity. Moreover, the formal analysis of the genre which constitutes the first half 
of the book offers a worthwhile mobilization of Erving Goffman’s “frame analysis” and 
delineates three frames of meaning that overlap and interact during play: the social frame 
(the friends around table), the game frame (the rules, artifacts, systems), and the diegetic 
frame (the imagined world and ongoing narrative of the fictional heroes). His Fine 
illustrates how much activity and action goes into role-playing, leaving a comparison to 
the mundane pointing-and-clicking of computer-users only implied. However, his three-
frame paradigm prevents him from considering how the rich performances and 
meaningful activities around the tabletop act as anything other than a flowery, theatrical 
pageantry (the social frame) that surrounds, dresses up, or at best enlivens an otherwise 
mechanical, calculated procedure (the game frame). The social occasionally dips into the 
game, for instance when a player who is angry at her friend takes it out on him by not 
protecting his character from a dragon or the like, but these are seen as anomalies—
“frame breaking”—that exist outside the normal activity, which centers on how the rules 
function as signs that constitute and represent the world of game (diegetic frame).    
 Daniel Mackay (2001) implies that Fines’ framing misses a key element of 
sociality. Mackay draws heavily on Fine’s research but adds to the earlier study a fourth 
dimension, the aesthetic. He argues that Fine’s analysis must inevitably remain 
incomplete without emphases on performativity and concomitant registers of 
performance. This would mean we need to pay attention to those moments when the 
social performance dips down into the game and muddles up the role-playing? Not quite. 
To take account of this new dimension, Mackay expands Fines’ three frames into five: 
“the social frame inhabited by the person; the game frame inhabited by the player; the 
narrative frame inhabited by the raconteur; the constative frame inhabited by the 
addresser; the performative frame inhabited by the character” (ibid: 56). Mackay 
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redeems the costumes, props, acting, and pageantry that Fines relegates to the social 
frame by granting performative elements of play frames of their own.  
 In a later study that characterizes fantasy role-playing as a family of games that 
“possess narrativity” (2010: 75, after Ryan 2005), Jennifer Grouling Cover calls 
Mackay’s expansion into question. Cover shares with Mackay the absolute need to 
differentiate between the fantasy world of the game (the fictional setting and inspiration) 
and the narrative story (the processual development of narrative meaning for the 
individuals and the group), but she argues that Mackay’s redistribution is only necessary 
within his specific project of highlighting the modalities of fantasy performance. Cover’s 
frame analysis, then, subsumes the constative (the addresser) and performative (the 
character) frames within a singular narrative frame. What result are three frames that at 
first appear to reproduce Fines’ original paradigm, but Cover makes clear that her 
narrative frame is both less and more than Fines’ diegetic frame. For Cover, the narrative 
frame does not encompass the imagined world of the game but does contain all 
narrativizing activity (in the vein of Ryan 1991, Murray 1998, and Herman 2004). 
Following, Cover’s paradigm includes the social, game, and narrative frames. She argues 
that the imagined game-world is not a frame in itself but better seen as the imaginary 
byproduct/background of a narrativizing activity that is deeply rooted into human social 
and cognitive functions.  
Imagination as Interpretant 
 Cover cites Ryan’s (2005) treatment of “Actual” and “Possible Worlds” to make a 
domain for the events and objects of the fantasy world. I find this argument compelling, 
but I would reframe this treatment within my own Peircean project. Towards this end, I 
would say that the imagined heroes, dragons, castles, and magics of the game’s setting 
are not to be seen as “signifieds,” not as Saussure’s “objects in the mind.” Rather, they 
need be regarded as imagined Signs, mental images that arise as Peircean Interpretants 
within ongoing Sign play in the world. This is an absolutely crucial step towards 
understanding games (or anything) in non-representational terms. Of course mental 
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representations in the form of imagined objects and actions exist, but these work not as 
Symbolically predetermined “meanings” floating above reality; rather, they are just one 
kind of Interpretant (and thus one kind of Sign) among others, arising and affecting as 
part of the actual world. That they are mental rather than physical only restricts the 
number of agents capable of interacting with them, not their essential nature.  
 The central limitation of Cover’s paradigm for us is that it distinguishes between 
the work needed to narrativize the diegesis of the game on the one hand and every other 
social, bodily, and cognitive function of the human animal that the game might engage on 
the other. What about the interpretive translation of mechanical rolls into story events? 
What about the reflexive dynamism between player and character? What about the 
rewriting and redoing of the rules? What about the negotiation of space as well as story? 
Maybe most importantly, what about the narrativizing work that is happening at the 
social level already, prior to and around the imagined events/worlds of gaming?  
 Most of the sources31 Cover relies on are not talking about deliberate storytelling. 
In fact, these scholars reference performative storytelling only to uncover and underline 
the ways “narrativization” or “narrativity” occurs amidst everyday sociality and makes 
possible a modern understanding of the self. In other words, narrativity is not a special 
element of fantasy gaming but one element of sociality/subjectivity as a whole. If we take 
these sources seriously while retaining Cover’s overall correction of Mackay and Fines, 
then the resulting frames would be something like the social frame, the game frame, and 
the… sociality/subjectivity frame. There seems a small redundancy here that we will need 
to address below.  
 
  
                                                
31 See specifically Ryan 1991, on language and representation; Murray 1998, on reflective experience; and 
Herman 2004, on narrative as a primary cognitive template. 
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